










Media reform and democratization in post-Mao China : a 








This is an electronic version of a PhD thesis awarded by the University of 
Westminster.  © The Author, 1993. 
 





The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of 
Westminster aims to make the research output of the University available to a 
wider audience.  Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the authors and/or 
copyright owners. 
Users are permitted to download and/or print one copy for non-commercial 
private study or research.  Further distribution and any use of material from 
within this archive for profit-making enterprises or for commercial gain is 
strictly forbidden.    
 
 
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, 
you may freely distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: 
(http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/). 
 
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail 
repository@westminster.ac.uk 
MEDIA REFORM AND DEMOCRATIZATION 
IN POST-MAO CHINA 
A TELEVISION CASE STUDY 
YU HUANG 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements of the University of Westminster for the 




Social reform movements in the communist state are a 
simultaneous, dialectical Process of the revival of socioeconomic 
dynamism on the one hand, and the abandonment of Party-state 
praxes on the other. As a result, the Party-controlled media 
system is bound to proceed to organic transformation. However, 
by using the medium of television as a key example, this thesis 
seeks to demonstrate that, under the conditions of Deng 
Xiaoping's particular and contradictory reform programme and in 
the context of Chinese society, Chinese mass media have created 
their own pattern of media transition that is unparalleled by 
that of other communist states, particularly those under the 
Gorbachev-style reform programme. The main characteristic of the 
Chinese case is that the growth of the industry and the reform 
of the media institutions have spontaneously become a twofold 
theme governing the whole process of post-Mao media development. 
Therefore, its adopted policies and strategies, institutional 
transactions, media performance, structural changes and the ways 
of delivering resources and increasing productivity, have all 
been conducted and constrained within that framework. The style 
of media transition in post-Mao China is not radically 
revolutionary, but evolutionary. It entails growth that 
incrementally redefines reality, producing its own dynamics and 
conflicts. 
The evidence of the thesis suggests that Deng Xiaoping's reform 
formula for the Chinese mass media --- an unintended 
contradiction of promoting the growth of the media industry and 
rationalizing its performance without allowing the parallel 
development of institutional democratization and fundamental 
changes of the power structure of Party's media --- cannot obtain its intended objective. Rather, it tends to produce a boomerang 
effect: although it can protract the process of media democratization, the new social forces, the changing economic 
relations and political culture in post-Mao China have provided the solid foundation for a further change with the overall media 
reform tendency continuously gaining momentum. The historical 
logic and irony become explicit here: Deng's reform programme, 
as a desperate resort to save the Party-state system and to 
prevent the advent of democracy, has turned out to be the midwife 
of far-reaching societal transformation and democratization in 
China. Thus, despite the sufferings and frustration of the 1989 
Beijing pro-democracy movement, the present course of social 
reform is almost impossible to reverse. 
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Preface and Acknowledgments 
Although it cannot be immediately evident, the search for the 
present topic of this thesis was prompted initially by a very 
personal response to the Beijing events of 1989 known by the term 
the "Tiannenman Square tragedy". on that day, the 4th of June, 
two of my university's classmates in China were killed by bullets 
of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. One of them -- 
Mr. Chen Laishun -- was a close friend of mine. These events 
exerted a powerful influence on my political outlook and led me 
to pursuing the research which is recorded in the pages below. 
I grew up in Mao's China -- an entirely different world. During 
the extraordinary period of the Cultural Revolution, I remember 
every person in the morning had the hour-long collective ritual 
of reading aloud from Mao's Little Red Book, then performing the 
people's loyalty dance to Mao, then participating in mutual 
criticism and self-criticism, ending with bowing before Mao's 
portrait and shouting "Long Live Mao and the Party! " 
In 1968 when I was about twelve, my father, a senior doctor, was 
sent to a labour camp for about two years on the ground that he 
was a "bourgeois intellectual", and for another two years was 
made a hospital cleaner. At the time I naively thought -- as did 
almost every one around me -- that this kind of punishment was 
a form of inevitable class struggle and was necessary in the 
interests of building a pure Red Communist China. 
Small children such as myself were inculcated with the idea of 
the New Man. For a period of Mao's ideas penetrated the whole of 
China, convincing most people of the nobility of communism's 
utopian aims. People genuinely believed we had a duty to liberate 
the world from the sufferings under capitalism. 
However, their success was their failure: the country gradually, 
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in the early 70s, became disillusioned with Maoism. The reality 
was that society was endlessly in conflict in the name of class 
struggle, for instance, 90% of Chinese intellectuals were purged 
or punished. When the euphoria faded away, people found that 
their traditional Chinese culture had been destroyed; political 
life was in a constant stat of flux; the economy had come to the 
edge of collapse. By the mid-1970s people began to question the 
Cultural Revolution, even the whole communist system. Daily 
personal experience taught us all too graphically the great 
contrast -- indeed, absolute contradiction -- between reality and 
the Maoist ideals which we required ourselves to express. 
By the early 1980s I was one of those questioning the system. 
However, as Deng Xiaoping's reform programme began to make 
progress, it revived some hope in me that the party-state would 
reform itself. 
Then came Tiannenmen Square. 
By then I was in England studying mass communications. With a 
democratic and free debate academic circumstances of the Centre 
For communication and Information Studies, University of 
Westminster, I was developing a better understanding of problems 
in China. 
Immediately after the Tiannenmen massacre, my first instinct told 
me that the ref orm movement was over and that China would return 
to classical totalitarianism. In an attempt to understand this 
great tragedy, with tremendous encouragement and vital support 
of Professor Nicholas Garnham and Dr. Colin Sparks, I started 
researching the development of the Chinese mass media and the 
role of the media in the context of the post-Mao reform era. 
In the course of the research and the post-Tiannenmen 
development, I readjusted my position and found that in fact it 
is almost impossible for anyone to reverse current course of 
profound social transformation in China. Eventually, I emerged 
vi 
from the emotional trauma and subsequent shadow of Tiannenmen 
Square. 
For the reason outlined above, from the personal point of view, 
this thesis is a way of expressing my loyalty and moral duty to 
my motherland. I dedicate this thesis to the effort to search for 
a better China. 
The study of the Chinese media within Western culture and in 
English language is a big challenge to me. Many people have 
contributed to accomplishment of my thesis. To them, my thanks 
and wish that I could have been a better student. I owe a great 
intellectual debt to Professor N. Garnham, Dr. C. Sparks for 
their insightful inspiration, pointed criticisms, valuable 
suggestions and patient assistance. I would also especially like 
to thank Dr. R. Barbrook, Dr-P. Morris, Ms. Virginia Tym, and Mr. 
Wang Te Yung. Grateful acknowledgments are due to the British 
council and the Sino-British Friendship Scholarship Scheme, to 
the Educational Section of Chinese Embassy, to the Great Britain- 
China Education Trust, and to the Centre For Communication and 
Information Studies, University of Westminster. Finally my deep 
gratitude to my wife Lei Wang and my parents, who have far more 
to do with this thesis than they realize. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Democracy, let us admit it, has overcome the challenge of 
historical communism. But what means and what ideals does it have 
to confront those very problems out of which the communist 
challenge was born? 
Norberto Bobbio (1991) 
Media Studies in (Post-) Communist Transition: Wider Context 
Perhaps the single biggest event in recent history has been the 
rise and fall of communism and the prevalence of liberal 
democracy. The "post-historical" argument which proposes "the end 
of history" (Fukuyama, 1989; 1992) turns out to be largely the 
end of the human experiment with two major social choices: 
Western liberal democracy and Soviet communism. It seems that, 
behind the controversial rhetoric, the exponents of the post- 
history debate have unmistakably delivered a crucial message to 
the world: After communism, there can be no real challenge to 
liberal democracy. 
However, against this background of neo-liberal triumphalism, it 
is also important to point out that liberal democracy is neither 
the flawless nor the optimal solution to the very problems of 
modernity brought about by the modern industrialization movement 
and the capitalist mode of social production. 
Looking back on modern history, it appears that the process of 
modernization constantly demands a social structure which would 
efficiently create and fairly allocate wealth amongst all members 
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of society. However, it was proven that the answer provided by 
capitalism based on classical liberalism was a failure. Its 
profit-driven approach does indeed create wealth, but it cannot 
distribute it fairly. As a result, capitalism has led to gross 
social injustice and left the majority of people living at the 
level of marginal subsistence, which in turn seriously undermines 
overall social stability and progress. As the economist J. 
Galbraith remarks, "Capitalism in its original or pristine form 
could not have survived. ... The system has survived only because 
of its capacity, in a liberal political contest, to adapt" (J. 
Galbraith, 1990: 24). In other words, what we imagine to be the 
success of today's western society is in fact a combination of 
the democratic political system and the free market economy with 
some measures ensuring a degree of fairness in the distribution 
of wealth, which have long been advocated by the social 
democratic movement. 
The Soviet model communist experiences in this century, on the 
other hand, have been even more dismal. Its totalitarian social 
engineering turned a whole society into a giant Gulag, which 
could only end up in debacle. However, one point remains clear 
for the sake of a better future for humankind: Universal human 
values such as liberty, equality, and solidarity, require the 
transcendence of an individualist, liberal doctrine. The 
construction of the social democratic institutions is essential 
in order to break through the limitations of liberal democracyr 
and in the long-term, it can provide some means and ideals that 
"it have to confront those very problems out of which the 
communist challenge was born"(Bobbio, 1991: 5). it is in such a 
process of developing the social-democratically oriented 
institutions that the mass media play a crucial role; and it is 
here that questions surrounding media democratization have to be 
dealt with. At the juncture of the state's drive towards a 
maximization of power and the market's drive towards a 
maximization of profit (Splichal, 1992; Sparks, 1992), two forces 
merge in the public communications media, the very arena in which 
modern democracies hold there should be neither oppression nor 
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compulsion, neither coercion nor deprivation, but rather freedom 
of information and democratizing the means of public 
communication. 
In communist states the question of f reedom of the press and 
media democratization was always the most vexed one, the Achilles 
heel of the regimes' commitment to Marx's doctrine. For one 
thing, the Party defended central control of the media on the 
grounds that it was for the good of the people as laid down by 
the officially interpreted Marxism, even though Marx himself 
fervently advocated media freedom. As a result, the Party 
destroyed a facet of its own credibility and constructed for 
itself a hypocritical image, purporting to follow Marxist theory 
while at the same time suppressing all forms of freedom of 
expression. Worse still were the Party's efforts to exert power 
over people not only by f orce which was much used, but by 
dictating their thoughts and opinions through its overwhelming 
media hegemony. 
In the last decade we have witnessed the world-wide decline of 
the communist movement, most visibly in the case of the Soviet 
model system. In response to this, initial reform programmes took 
two major directions. One was led by Gorbachev and the other by 
Deng Xioaping. Gorbechev sought to change the political structure 
of the communist state in an attempt to revive the dynamics of 
society, whereas Deng concentrated on market-oriented economic 
reform. 
The result of the Gorbachev reform programme was the total 
disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and the reconstruction of the 
whole socio-political system in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union with the painful task of effecting an economic 
transition from a state command economy to a market economy. 
Deng Xioaping's reform programme, in contrast, has created 
certain social dynamics in post-Mao China. He has tried to give 
people economic freedom while maintaining Party power in a 
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political dictatorship. social transition, in his view, means 
attaining the neo-authoritarian model society already 
successfully operating in South-East Asia's "Four Little Dragons" 
-- Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan (Deng, 6.3.1989) . 
However, what he has not taken into account is firstly that 
mainland China is a communist state fundamentally different from 
the Little Dragons in terms of ideology, political institutions, 
legal system, state structure and so on. Secondly he has failed 
to recognise that these countries are now on the fast track to 
democracy. Taiwan, for instance, has almost fully implemented a 
democratic political system. The others follow close behind. 
In short, the Party-state of mainland China to some extent bears 
little resemblance to the socio-political foundations of those 
countries. Thus this single issue creates a fundamental and 
antagonistic contradiction in Deng's reform programme, namely, 
capital ist-oriented modernization and economic liberalization 
versus the communist "Four Cardinal Principles" (i. e adherence 
to Marxism-Leninism and Mao's Thought, Communist Party 
Leadership, Proletarian Dictatorship, and the Socialist Road) - 
However, this contradiction, as we shall see in the course of the 
thesis, constitutes a basic dialectical movement between 
continuity and convergence on the one hand, and dynamics and 
change on the other. The ultimate anti-thesis is that society is 
driven towards post-communist evolution. 
The transitional course of China's post-Mao reform indicates the 
discontinuity of the Soviet model of communism in China. The 
question is: what is China headed towards? one major suggestion 
being made is of the likelihood of the neo-authoritarian 
arrangement. This author argues, however, that a neo- 
authoritarian rule may indeed be successful economically, but 
that it can last for only a short period. The structural problems 
of the existing party-state and the irreconcilable contradictions 
between the growing social forces and the weakening old 
formations as well as the momentous demand for social 
democratization have created a firm base for further political 
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changes. But such changes may not occur in the radical short term 
in the revolutionary style, but in the long term evolutionary 
struggle towards building up Chinese democracy, albeit with see- 
saws of set-back and advance. 
overall Purpose of the Thesis 
The mass media provide the principal arena of interplay -- often 
a battleground -- of social forces in the process of reform and 
democratization with the key issue that of fundamental 
transformation of media institutions in (post-) communist states. 
The overall purpose of this thesis is to present a study of major 
aspects of post-Mao Chinese media reform and development in an 
attempt to explicate the structural changes and dynamic trends 
in the present period of profound social transformation. By using 
the medium of television as a key example, this thesis seeks to 
show that the media institutions in the post-Mao era, especially 
television, have found themselves placed in the forefront of 
change, redefining their roles and in themselves demonstrating 
the effect and the process of commercialization, pluralism and 
democratization. 
The study is based on the following three hypotheses: 
First, as part of society and as a product of a particular socio- 
political system, the mass media can only be understood through 
their social context and through their connections with the wider 
society. Therefore, the study attempts to link the development 
of the Chinese mass media to wider political, economic and 
cultural movements within its overall social formations at the 
time of post-Mao China's transition. 
Secondly, during the past fourteen years the process of Chinese 
dynamic reforms and the unbalanced development between politics 
and the remaining sectors of society (especially the economy) 
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seem to indicate that China is undertaking its own transitional 
course which is likely to involve the process of a zig-zag long 
march towards democratization. This delicate and complicate 
process is slow, and could well include a short period of neo- 
authoritarian rule. 
Thirdly, under Deng Xiaoping's style of reform programme in the 
circumstances of Chinese society and within the context of 
weakening party-state institutions, China may, with its pragmatic 
solutions and social interaction, provide a model of the media 
development and reform under communist-towards-(post-)communist 
conditions. 
Dialectical changes 
The focus of this thesis is on the dialectical movement and 
dynamic changes in media development and institutional reform 
under the Deng's solution. In effect, the evolution of post-Mao 
Chinese mass media has almost certainly prompted a set of 
questions concerning continuity and changes in society. It 
reveals how culture, politics and economics have interacted with 
one another to engender far-reaching social transformations. It 
brings into focus the key problem that has acutely faced post-Mao 
China, namely, the intensifying conflicts between the entrenched 
political institutions and alien and fast-growing socio-economic 
formations. On the one hand, all the dynamic forces for rapid 
changes and growth come from the reform programme led by the new 
impulse towards economic liberalization. This tendency indicates 
that the Chinese media industry has been forming a new logic of 
media performance ranging from production, organization, 
resources allocation and institutional rationalization -- a 
process which is a far cry from the original Party media model. 
on the other hand, the existing party-state apparatus remains 
formidable, retaining monopoly power over the mass media. The 
Party has made every effort to stop the tendency towards 
liberalization and pluralization. However, despite the Party 
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temporarily gaining some ground by conducting political campaigns 
and tightening media control against so-called "Bourgeois 
Liberalism" at intervals of two or three years in post-Mao China, 
the spontaneous massive challenge for political freedom and media 
democratization has never been staunched. 
It is this author's understanding that the interplay and 
dialectical movement are producing a powerful driving force for 
fundamental institutional reform both in the mass media and the 
political system as a whole. This thesis seeks to demonstrate 
that it is these dynamic changes and contradictions which will 
ultimately determine the fate of Deng's reform programme and the 
future of Chinese society. 
Media Democratization in China 
One of the major themes of the present study is media 
democratization in post-Mao China. In the thesis I consider media 
democratization as a series of institutional changes and social 
movement whether through evolution or revolution, whether 
dramatic or not, towards the praxis of democracy. It is tempting 
to argue that, in all past and present communist states, media 
liberalization is the first step towards media democratization; 
and that a large-scale political-or-economic reform movement 
generated by the indigenous social conditions is vital to foster 
a media liberal ization-to-democratization process. As far as 
China is concerned, two distinguishing factors can be identified: 
a) That China was a communist Party-state which suffered an 
extraordinary experience with the catastrophic consequences of 
Maoist rule (1949 - 1976), and that Deng"s subsequent reform 
programme has brought about immense diversification of interest 
groups and created new social formations demanding further 
political changes in the direction of (post-) communist 
pluralisation and a long-term evolutionary process of 
democratization. 
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b) That China is an underdeveloped country, the largest in the 
world, which has been constantly constrained by its low level of 
material productivity. Thus, pressure for national development 
has always been a paramount task and economic modernization 
became a priority. 
It is these two interrelated factors that have had an 
overwhelming impact on, and to a large extent dictated the course 
of Chinese media development and the crescendo of institutional 
reform. Thus, media democratization in China may differ 
substantially from its western counterparts as well as from its 
counterparts in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. It 
has the following characteristics: 
1. It appears to be gradually weakening the Party's monopoly 
power over the operation of the mass media. 
2. It involves a process of structural decentralization of the 
media which has resulted in fostering local autonomy, allowing 
different social groups (such as local industry, local 
authorities, media corps, and the public) each to pursue its own 
interests and to produce something approaching a pluralistic 
media policy. 
3. There is an ongoing attempt to establish a legal framework to 
protect individual civil rights and to allow greater independence 
within media institutions vis-a-vis the Party control mechanism. 
4. There is growing forum - of momentous import - for cultural 
diversity along with the increasing editorial autonomy, allowing 
more space for the expression of heterodox views within the 
changing media environment. 
S. Modernization of the media and its commercialization of 
affiliated industries have increasingly rendered the media 
economically independent of the State, creating a potential base 
for political change and democratization. 
8 
6. Instead of being accountable only to the Party, the media are 
increasingly accountable to the public and public opinion; and 
are becoming influential sources in the process of public policy 
makings. 
These six major aspects reflect the trends of media 
democratization in post-Mao China. Although separately they may 
be small steps, they are all in the long term heading towards 
evolutionary change, and their cumulative effects will be 
irreversible. 
The Case against Technological Determinism 
The thesis sets out to examine the relationship between social 
changes and media development. With the evidence contained in the 
study, this author challenges the influential argument put by 
McLuhan and Sola Pool that the determining factor in transforming 
socio-economic-cultural structures of a society is the mass media 
equipped by new information and communication technologies 
(McLuhan, 1965; Sola Pool, 1983). Malik even argued in 1984 that 
the advancement of new information technology would simply defeat 
the Soviet communism, as he put it in his long article "Communism 
v. s the Computer": 
The USSR and its associated countries cannot survive the 
large-scale introduction of information technology in any 
meaningful way and be recognizably the same system that 
has evolved over nearly seventy years (Malik, 1984: 10). 
However, the relationship between media development and social 
change in post-Mao China, as this thesis illustrates, provide 
counter -examp 1 es: It is socio-economic forces and their interplay 
within the given political and cultural circumstances, in an 
energising spiral and loop with the mass media, that have created 
the dynamics of social change, and that have transformed not only 
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information and communication technologies but the politics of 
the country. Moreover, what seems clear in China's case is that 
the fall of communism and the rise of the liberal-oriented reform 
movement have not resulted from the introduction of new 
information or any other technologies. Rather, it was its 
internal movement of institutional contradictions, namely, the 
fatal failure of the communist system in terms of dictatorship 
over human consciousness, and the irreconcilable, cumulative and 
intensifying conflicts between the state and society, between the 
Party and the masses, that created the foundations of 
antagonistic contradiction which in time cannot but entirely, 
from deep within China's social formations, undermine the whole 
communist structure and push the society towards fundamental 
change. 
Meanwhile, the evidence of the thesis is also set to oppose 
another type of technological determinism, namely, "the pessimism 
of technological development" or "the dystopia school of 
technological determinists" (e -gH. Schiller, K. Robins, F. Webster) 
in which it argues that new information technologies are 
technologies of greater social control and manipulatory tools of 
power elites. Contrary to this argument, the study suggests that 
technological advancement in the communication media does play 
a positive and important role in increasingly reducing once-all- 
powerful the party-state's capacity to isolate, encapsulate, 
atomize, and, eventually, total control the people living in such 
a system. Therefore, I also argue that the rapid development of 
information technologies and revolutionary changes in Chinese 
communication industries (with special reference to the growth 
of television) have had a profound and catalytic effect in the 
process of creating greater openness, information flow, opinions 
exchanges and thereby, fostering sweeping social reform movement 
and democratization in post-Mao China. 
The case of television development and social transformation in 
China clearly reveals the f laws of technological determinist 
arguments in both schools. The underlying problem with their 
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arguments is that, as Garnham points out, "it overlooks the fact 
that technological developments are themselves shaped by the 
prevailing structures of economic, political and cultural power 
and more importantly that they offer a range of potential which 
will only be actualised by the prevailing structure" (Garnham, 
1991: 28). In short, the advancement of information technologies 
cannot determine the direction and process of societal change, 
but it can have the potent sociopolitical and socioeconomic 
effects on influencing the pace and scope of societal change. 
The Study of Chinese Television 
In the 1960s, factories on the mainland China were producing 
about 3,000 to 5,000 television sets each year. In the nearly 
twenty years of the television broadcasting in the Mao's era 
(from 1958 to 1976), only 925,000 TV sets were made in China, 
a very tiny figure against a population of 700 million at the 
time (now 1.2 billion). But in 1989 alone, China produced 27.67 
million television sets, and the total number of receivers 
reached 165 million with a viewing public of 700 million -- a 
ratio equal to the world average, equal to countries such as 
Malaysia and Thailand where the per capita GNP is four or five 
times as high. 
These statistics underline the fact that compared to both the 
West and the former Soviet Union and its former satellites, the 
development of China's television industry, though recent, has 
been extraordinarily rapid. moreover, as the pioneer and part of 
far-reaching social changes, its impact on all aspects of society 
-- from affecting one's trivial round of daily life to fostering 
macro socio-political transformation (most visibly in the case 
of the 1989 Beijing pro-democracy movement) -- has been wide- 
spread and strongly felt. Clearly, something has profoundly 
changed. 
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one of the basic aims of this thesis has been to augment 
available information on the development of Chinese television 
by finding relevant records as well as conducting interviews with 
individuals involved in the f ield. In the course of the research 
an area of consideration reveals itself, an area which provides 
complex ground against which to set the documentary findings, and 
which invites further research in the future. In brief, this is 
the dynamic, causal, and contradictory relationship between the 
Party's fostering of television expansion for modernization and 
political control on the one hand, and the far-reaching, grass- 
roots drive towards social democratization, of the pluralization 
and commercialization of a key communist industry (which is still 
regarded as the Party Is mouthpiece) I and the consequent 
breakdown 
of the Party-state on the other. 
The Chinese case of gradual organic growth from communism to 
pluralism raises general issues of media-society interaction and 
institutional transformation. The evolution of television in 
post-Mao China invites reconsideration of Western academic 
interpretations of the actual or desirable relationship between 
the media, the state and society. The way of China's progress in 
the last decade as yet seems preferable to the consequences of 
the Gorbachev-style of political reform in its (abortive) attempt 
to transform "Glasnost" into the fruits of economic wealth. But 
even so, one should not underestimate China's problems, such as 
commercialism run riot in a country whose media regulation and 
legal framework have not kept pace with commercial greed and 
corruption, and a cultural sieve which cannot contain an excess 
of low-quality television game-shows, thirty-minute blitzes of 
advertisements, and all that those two examples imply. 
Ironically, from this dross might arise the phoenix of a new 
democratic order. The unique Chinese approach to media reform 
and the industrial leap into the late 20th century, remains a 
challenge and valuable case for mass communication studies. 
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Method and Sources 
This work mainly considers Chinese television development against 
the background of radical socio-economic transformation in post- 
Mao China. As stated, the focus will be on the growth of the 
television industry and the reform of the media institutions in 
their social contexts. Although television programmes will be 
examined, the emphasis is not on surveys of empirical data and 
content analysis, but rather on institutional perspectives and 
analyses of the social formations and their macro-level effects 
of interplays between television expansion and post-Mao 
socioeconomic changes. Also it is not the aim of this thesis to 
examine the nature of micro-level, motivational nuances or 
alternative psychological and material perspectives of the 
subject. Rather this study provides a descriptive account and 
detailed analysis to explore the sociological nature of the 
subject systematically. This may be the first broad and deep 
inquiry into the development of Chinese television broadcasting 
both in the West and in China. 
It was only a decade ago that the discipline of media study was 
introduced to mainland China (L. Chu, 1986), but progress has been 
made, particularly in respect of print media and opinion research 
(including audience surveys) . The literature published concerning 
media study has increased gradually both in terms of quality and 
quantity. 
However, up till now little systematic research has been done on 
the subject of Chinese television broadcasting, and information 
has been hard to come by. Therefore, I have relied mainly on two 
principal sources to undertake the present study: The first is 
documentary, both published and internally circulated. In so far 
as data are available on every source and aspect of the Chinese 
broadcasting, I have traced its development from the pioneering 
stage of the mid-1950s to the present. Chief among them are the 
Chinese Journalism Yearbook (since 1983) and Chinese Broadcasting 
Yearbook (since 1987), media study journals, audience surveys, 
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policy-making documents and public debate reporting. 
The second and probably more valuable primary source comes from 
my interviews with some key figures involved in Chinese 
broadcasting, including broadcasters, decision-makers and 
academic researchers which I conducted on a visit to China in 
September -October 1990.1 am much indebted to my interviewees in 
developing my research work, for providing comprehensive 
information ranging from the recall of important events 
concerning early Chinese television development to current 
trends. A list of name of interviewees is provided in the 
reference section of the thesis. 
Arrangement of Chapters 
The thesis has been arranged as follows. Chapter 1 provides a 
theoretical review of the media role in modern society within the 
three perspectives: liberal democracy, social democracy and 
communism. Chapter 2 provides a literature review of studies of 
the Chinese mass media and social contexts of media evolution in 
mainland China since 1949. From chapter 3, the main theme 
concerns Chinese television. An historical survey of the origins 
and development of Chinese television in the Mao's era is 
provided in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 and 5 are devoted to 
decentralization policy, commercialization, structural change and 
rapid growth of the industry after Mao. Chapter 6 deals with the 
cultural and social impact of television expansion. Chapter 7 
examines media institutional reform and the evolution of freedom 
of the press in the f ield of broadcasting. Chapter 8 is the 
conclusion. 
Terminology 
A word about the terminology used in the thesis is necessary 
because it reflects certain basic authorial premises and 
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assumptions about the subject. 
The academic convention of using the general term "communist 
state" (or system or society) is followed. This is not meant to 
suggest that the author supposes that the communist state which 
Karl Marx envisaged more than a century ago has been achieved. 
Rather, the terminology refers to the state or the system based 
on Marxist and Leninist doctrines, established along the lines 
of the Soviet model, given the name "communism" rather than 
"social democracy", and possessing basic features of the 
totalitarian hyper-rationalist genre in which the communist 
ruling party commands politics, economy, culture and daily life 
in an attempt to create a society of "New Man". It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to argue as to what constitutes genuine 
Marxism or Leninism. 
The thesis entails a notion of progressive historical evolution 
of communism in what appears to be three phases, two of which are 
already almost complete. The first stage was the phase of 
"classical totalitarian communism" in which the Party power 
virtually penetrated the whole society. The major examples are 
identified in Stalin's Soviet Union and in Mao's China. 
The second stage involves what we might call "post-totalitarian 
communism" or "authoritarian communism". Here the Party still 
dominated society but control became loose, allowing some 
personal freedom. The emphasis was on material advancement rather 
than the political transformation of man's mind. These shifts 
started a process of peaceful evolution in which the communist 
totalitarian system was being damaged and decaying, opening the 
way to the third stage. The major examples are found in 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev's Soviet Union as well as in Eastern 
Europe during that period, and, less obviously, in China in the 
late I70s and early 180s immediately after Mao's death and during 
the early stage of Deng's consolidation of power. 
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The third stage, which China is currently entering, exhibits much 
greater variation than the previous two. No consensus yet has 
been reached on how to def ine it, but two categories may be 
suggestible: The first might be called "post-communism", and 
refers to the drastic direction and revolutionary change taken 
in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. The other category 
might be called "communism in a state of profound transition" 
which may identify what has been happening in China and other 
south-east Asia communist states, where the market-oriented 
economic reform initiated by the leadership has progressively 
undermined the Party power and driven the society towards 
pluralization. This is a complex, delicate stage inviting 
research, and it is the one with which this thesis is primarily 
concerned. For the purpose of generalization and convenience I 
sometimes put bracket on the pref ix "post-" as (post-) communist 
to loosely identify this stage situation as a whole. In the 
course of the following chapters, Deng's China is mainly 
discussed as a developing, communist-transitional country, as 
defined above. 
The use of the term liberal democracv is used to connote liberal 
ideas current since the Enlightenment; the term social democracy 
or democratic socialism is used to connote socialist ideas 
current since the Industrial Revolution. 
The use of the term democracv in this thesis is entirely 
conventional. It refers to a Political system which supplies 
regular constitutional opportunities for choosing and changing 
governing bodies, which provides a social mechanism permitting 
the largest possible part of the population to influence major 
decisions, and which has constitutional means to ensure citizen's 
basic rights, such as free speech, freedom of association and 
freedom of press. The term "democracy" as used here does not 
refer to definitions based on theories of "class struggle" and 
"proletarian dictatorship" by which, from Lenin to Mao, the Party 
forced people to believe that the communist system was the most 





MEDIA, STATE, AND DEMOCRACY 
--- A Theoretical Background Review 
Since the modern mass media took their rise from the 
Enlightenment, and developed, mutated and re-shaped by the large- 
scale social movements ranging from the Industrial Revolution, 
the October Revolution to the current waves of global 
marketalization and democratization, the primary purpose of this 
first chapter is to provide a theoretical background review by 
surveying the role of the mass media in the broad contexts of 
liberal democracy, social democracy and communism. In the first 
section, an overview of research approaches and paradigms to the 
study of media system will be provided, followed by the three 
parallel sections covering media theories and approaches in the 
framework of liberal democracy, social democracy and communist 
doctrines. 
1.1 THEORIES OF MEDIA SYSTEM MODELS 
1.1.1 Four Basic Models of the Mass Media and Variations 
The mass media in all societies are perforce forged by and 
attached to the socio-political system and are determined by the 
nature of the state power. In 1956, there appeared an important 
work in the systematic examination of the relationship between 
the general characteristics of the mass media and the socio- 
political system: S-Siebert, T. Peterson and W. Schramm published 
their seminal book of Four Theories.. of the Press. They presented 
four models of the media system, calling them "authoritarian, " 
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"libertarian, " "social responsibility, " and "communist". 
Essentially, the book seeks to answer the fundamental question 
of why and how the different media systems are formed and how 
they function and what is the relationship between social systems 
and media institutions. Throughout the four-case studies Siebert 
et al. have cogently argued on the premise that "the press always 
takes on the form and coloration of the social and political 
structures within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the 
system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and 
institutions are adjusted. We believe that an understanding of 
these aspects of society is basic to any systematic understanding 
of the press" (Siebert et. al, 1956: 1-2). 
Although the shadow of the Cold War and the threat of the Soviet 
communist expansion at the time made the analysis of the 
communist media model hostile within the us(good)-versus- 
them (bad) f ramework (Altschull, 1984) , Siebert et al. Is research 
did establish a solid paradigm of media-state-society. It focused 
on the issues of socio-political control and the nature of the 
communication media under the conditions of the different state 
powers. In particular, their research produced an accurate 
anatomy of the Soviet media performance and a deep grasp of its 
institutional failure. Thus, the analysis still remains relevant 
in assessing the evolution of communist totalitarianism in the 
field of mass communication. The four media models may be 
summarized as follows: 
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Table 1.1 
Four models of the Mass Media 
Model 1: Libertarian Model 2: Social Responsibility 
-------------------------------- 
Chief to seek truth 
---------------------------- 
similar to Model 1, but 
purpose to check on government 
---------------------------- - 
to act more responsibly 
- -- 
Norm of autonomous & 
---------------------------- 
similar to Model 1, plus a 
management professional ethics 
------------------- -- - -- 
degree of state regulation 
- -- -- --- 
Financial self-reliance, 
---------------------------- 
can be self-reliance, or 
viability commercial-orient 
--------------- -- - -- 
state support, or mixture 
-- ----- -- --- 
Relation free market & 
---------------------------- 
controlled market & 
with market competition 
--------------- -- ------------ 
regulated competition 
- - -- 
Relation freedom from 
-- ------------------------- 
negative &positive freedom 
with state state interference 
-------------------------------- 
the right to communication 
--- ------ 
Essential media act being 
------------------- 
similar to Model 1, but 
difference free & independent , media assume obligation from others society's watchdog 
--------- ---------------------- 
of social responsibility 
- - 
Applicable mainly press 
--------------------------- 
mainly broadcasting 
to the media 
-------- ------------------- 
Model 3: Authoritarian Mod 
------------------------------ 
------------- -------- 
el 4: Soviet-type communism 
- 
Chief to support or obey 
--------------------------- 
being loyal to the Party, 
purpose policies of the to contribute to Party success 
authorities, to mold views & change behavior 
to serve the state acc 
----------------------- -- -- -- 
ording to communist ideology 
- - - - - - 
Control mainly non-ideology 
- ------------------------ 
ideological-oriented plus 
method e. glicense, censorship 
---------------------- - 
political action of Party 
- - ---- ----- 
Financial can follow either 
- ------------------------- 
rely on the state entirely 
viability Model 1 or Model 2 
---------------------------- - - - - - 
Norm of limited to none 
-- ------------------------- 
to run as a branch of the 
management autonomy, guided Party and political & 




Relation can follow either 
---------------------------- 
absent 
with market Model 1, or Model 2 
------------------------------- - 
Essential no watchdog functi 
---------------------------- 
on, an instrument of state 
differences ancillary to the and Party's mouthpiece 
from others government in power 
Source: Siebert et at. (1956); Hachten (1981); McQuail (1983); 
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Altschull (1984); Head (1985). 
D. Graber (1980,1984) later simplified the four models into two 
categories: authoritarian media control systems and non- 
authoritarian media control systems. Within the category of 
authoritarian media systems are the non-ideological and 
ideological sub-sets requiring either an authoritarian 
administrative power or communist ideologies to control media 
activities in order to maintain the social order. 
correspondingly, the two sub-sets of non-authoritarian approaches 
are the American model of "libertarian" and the western European 
model of "social responsibility". 
1.1.2 Achievements and Shortcomings 
The methodological and theoretical paradigm set out by Siebert 
et al. was nearly universally accepted in the West and became the 
widely used normative approach in conducting media system 
studies. In effect, it was not until the 1970s that major 
revisions were made beyond the framework of the four theories. 
As a result, a great deal of literature based on this paradigm 
was generated with the three following characteristics: 
1) it usually followed from a set of preferences and desirable 
goals about the nature of the media performance and social 
process and tried to provide some analysis of ways to realize 
them (Bobrow, 1974: 107-108); 
2) a considerable number of analyses focused on the problems of 
establishing a democratic system in various nations and the role 
that the mass media can or does play in that process (e. g Pye, 
1963; Gregg & Banks, 1971; ) ; and used the concept of press 
freedom as the key index of political democratization to examine 
and assess media systems, especially media political behaviours, 
management and ownership (e. g Namurois, 1964; Lowenstein, 1970; 
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Wells, 1974) ; and analyses of the institutional performance of the 
mass media (e. g Nixon, 1960,1965; Lowenstein, 1970; Tustall, 
1977). 
3) national and international media systems studies were commonly 
projected in the bipolar framework of the libertarian/ social 
responsibility model and Soviet communist model; and there were, 
therefore, aggregated in the particular areas of western European 
and north American media systems on the one hand, and of Soviet 
media system on the other hand with most of such researches being 
restricted to an investigation of a specific national media 
system or comparisons of different media organization on a 
nation-by-nation basis (e. g Inkles, 1956; Emery, 1969; Dizard, 
1966; Paulu, 1974; Markham, 1967; Hopkins, 1970; Liu, 1970; Yu, 
1964). 
While it continued to predominate in media system and media-state 
relation studies, the Siebert et al. approach with the four press 
theories drew considerable criticism which mainly concentrate on 
three aspects. First, there was the problem of inadequate 
dimensions employed in the four press models and a lack of 
flexibility in the descriptions and analyses of existing media 
systems. It was argued that their approach was based mainly on 
the dimension of political/ ideological conflicts (e. g freedom v. s 
dictatorship) and thus tended to ignore other important economic- 
cultural factors which shaped the structure and operations of 
media systems (Mowlana, 1976). 
Second, (a problem related to the first one) the over- 
concentration on the political dimension led to an ideological 
bias of the stereotypical us/them, good/bad formulation, and thus 
a lack of objectivity and rational analyses (Bobrow, 1974; Hardt, 
19s8). one criticism even went so far as to argue that there are 
in fact "fundamental similarities" between western media systems 
and Soviet ones and claimed that the Siebert et al. approach 
"minimizes the similarities and exaggerates the differences" 
(Altschull, 1984: 108). 
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A third problem was that because the four models theory was 
produced in the heyday of the Cold War with a bipolar West v. s 
Soviet structure, it largely neglected the situation of newly- 
independent and developing countries which probably belonged to 
neither. As a result, it failed to identify with the different 
characteristics of the media system and its performance in these 
countries. The phenomenon that Mowlana (1973) and Dinh (1979), 
among others, criticised as an ethnocentric bias in media 
research and lack of literature in media system analyses of 
developing nations, was to some extent attributable to such 
theoretical and methodological limitations. 
1.1.3 Reformations 
Thus, since the work of Siebert et al. came out, many attempts 
have been made to modify or redefine the mainstream approach both 
in terms of theoretical innovation and model construction in 
response to the inadequacy of the four theories of the press 
within the context of growing concerns about the developing world 
and the changing reality of media performance. 
Williams' Four Models and the Critical Approach to 
Media Studies 
As early as the 1960s, R. Williams, amongst others, began to 
indirectly challenge the Siebert et al. classification of 
existing mass communication systems. Instead of following the 
prevailing approach to analyze the media system, Williams set his 
own criterion of media democratization to examine the media 
performance, and thus transcended the framework of the us-v. s- 
them. By focusing on the problems of media systems both in Soviet 
type society and western industrialized society, Williams also 
proposed his own four models of mass communication systems: 
Authoritarian, Paternal, Commercial and Democratic (1962,1966, 
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197 6) . In his classif ication, roughly speaking, the authoritarian 
model covers both Siebert et al. 's authoritarian and communist 
ones, while the counterparts of the libertarian and social 
responsibility models fall under his paternal and commercial one. 
His major contribution, however, was his democratic model upon 
which he believed that modern communication systems should rest. 
Although, Williams agreed that paternal and commercial models 
were better than the authoritarian one, he also sharply 
criticised their undemocratic essence. For democratic 
communication, Williams argued, should not only be against 
"paternal control of what ought to be said", but also against 
"commercial control of what can profitably be said, because this 
also can be a tyranny" (1976: 133). As he saw it, the existing 
free press practice in Western society would not go beyond the 
limitation of freedom for profits within the principle of 
commodity exchange law. In this way, he concluded that only the 
democratization of the communication media would provide a 
solution to overcoming the problems of media systems currently 
dominating the West. 
The inadequacy of Williams's proposal is obvious. As he himself 
acknowledged, his blueprint of democratic media is based on the 
idealistic model of what should or may be achieved rather than 
what already exists. Consequently, it remained, by his own 
admission, at the stage of discussion and imagination (1976: 133) - 
Inevitably, the influence of his version of media models was 
limited. Nevertheless, he was one of the pioneering exponents of 
a critical approach to communication studies and was the first 
to cast the light on the issue of media democratization. 
In view of the press-state relationship and the role of the mass 
media in the advanced capitalist societies, it must be mentioned 
that the critical approach has made significant contribution to 
studies of communication by rejecting positivism and scientism 
in social thought and by paying attention to the social context 
of the media performance and the media institutions with other 
social relations. From a critical perspective, the mass media is 
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perceived in both its political-ideological and economic 
dimensions as unevenly reflecting and reacting with the 
perspectives of commodity production and the structure of social 
relations. Thus critical scholars view mass media in capitalist 
society primarily as serving commercial interests determined by 
the market pressure, or as agents of established powers, or of 
existing the socio-cultural order (J. Altschull, 1984). L. 
Althusser, for instance, regards mass media as "state ideological 
apparatus" whose function is to reproduce the conditions of the 
existing social production (1971). In a similar vein, S. Hall 
argues that the mass media are the chief source to transmit and 
produce the ruling class (i. e capitalist) ideology (1977). 
Political economists, on the other hand, approach the mass media 
basically as part of the information and cultural industries. By 
examining media performance within the mode of capitalist 
production, they explore the deeply unequal social relations in 
terms of media structure, ownership, access and the power of 
control (Garnham, 1990; Murdock & Golding, 1977). 
1.1.3.2 Developing-Media Approach 
By the 1970s, the growing awareness of the Third World 
consciousness and the intensifying international debate over the 
New World Information and Communication Order resulted in the 
proliferation of literature concerning Third World media studies. 
Thus arose a new media approach addressing the issues of Third 
World communication that came to be known, in varying terms, as 
the development media model. An early influential version of this 
model was provided in W. Hachten's book The World News Prism 
(1981,1987) and similar studies in scattered publications (e. g 
A. Lent, 1977; C. Salinas, 1980; C-Ogan, 1982; and D. McQuail, 
1983,1987). According to Hachten (1987: 30-32), the development 
media concept was "an amorphous and curious mixture" of 
liberalism, socialism and nationalism. The key issue involved in 
this model concerned using the mass media to promote economic 
development and national integration. Indeed, this has become a 
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common theme widely accepted in the developing nations as Kwame 
Nkrumaah, president of Ghana (1960-1966), said some twenty years 
ago: 
The press does not exist merely for the purpose of 
enriching its proprietors or entertaining its readers. It 
is an integral part of the society, with which its 
purpose must be in consonance. It must help establish a 
progressive political and economic system that will free im 
from want and poverty (cited in Altschull, 1984: 150). 
In effect, the development media model is a model for nation 
building and therefore it shares some basic features with 
nationalism and utilitarianism -- with particular reference to 
media relations with the state. These may include belief in the 
media as a unifying and constructive force rather than a divisive 
and adversarial force; belief in the media as an instrument of 
national development and a device for the beneficial social 
change. The state is expected to oversee and intervene in media 
performance with the aim of facilitation national development. 
The media assist in entrenching national cultural identity. The 
media seek partnership with government (Hachten, 1987: 30-31; 
McQuail, 1987: 119-121). 
It is clear that, by redefining nations in the world into three 
groups (the rich western group, the eastern communist group and 
the developing or poor group), the development model reflects an 
attempt in Third. World countries to escape from the dominance of 
the West-East context and thus seek to establish a media model 
distinguished from both western and eastern models. At the heart 
of the approach is an assumption that media performance and media 
institutional arrangement in today's world are more concerned 
with a nation's level of economy and wealth than that of other 
factors, particularly when it views the scantiness of some of the 
material conditions or backward communication infrastructure (e. g 
capital investment, the production and cultural resources etc. ) 
necessary for adopting other developed media models (mainly refer 
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to the western ones) . In this way, it plausibly argues that media 
freedom should be subordinated to the development need and is 
less important than the viability of the nation (Hachten, 1981; 
McQuail, 1983). Surely, there is a lot of truth in this argument: 
First, it highlights the correlation between the material 
conditions and the construction of a national media system and 
media freedom; second, it exposes the serious problem of unequal 
distribution of communication media resources -- an increasing 
disparity between the North and the South, between the rich group 
and the poor. 
However, the idea of the media performing a positive role in line 
with national development is in fact required by all types of 
society ranging from the pluralistic to the totalitarian one. 
The vague term "national development" can mean anything even 
merely in terms of economic growth. In other words, the objective 
of development in this context is always questionable: 
Development for what? For building a democratic prosperous 
society or one governed by military might or a dictatorship? The 
goal and priority of national development in the same rank Of 
developing countries can be fundamentally different, for 
instance, between the current Iraqi authority and the Egyptian 
government. Therefore, the defined media role for national 
development needs to be justified -- a key issue to which the 
solution can only be provided by a society according to the 
nature of its social formations and systems. The other problem 
with this theory is that it misinterprets media performance in 
relation to its social conditions. For the truth is that while 
the nature of the media system and the degree of the performance 
of media freedom are constrained by the material condition of 
society, they are to a large extent determined by its socio- 
political structure. 
Nevertheless, the development media model, with the new category 
of the media relations with the state in the developing nations, 
did offer an alternative and thus better approximated to the 
realities of the changing world in the 1970s and the 1980s. Thus., 
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it was widely accepted and the typology of three worlds (i. e the 
West, the East and the Third World) and their media systems 
became a new research paradigm in conducting the studies of 
media-government and media performance, particularly in aspect 
of comparative perspectives. 
Since then, the paradigm of the traditional four (or two for 
simplicity) models has been replaced by that of three in an 
attempt to distinguish different characteristics and problems of 
media system and media performance among the three types of 
society. The main academic reference to such efforts, among many 
others, may include, for instance, Comparative Mass Media System 
(L. Martin & A. Chaudhary (ed), 1983), Agents of Power: The Role 
of the News Media in Human Af f airs (J. Altschull, 1984) , and World 
Broadcasting Systems: A Comparative Analysis (S. Head, 1985). 
1.1.3.3 Robinson's Six Patterns 
Meanwhile, M. Robinson seems to remain dissatisfied with the 
relative simplicity of three tYpologies of the media systems 
compared to the more complicated reality reflected in the range 
of varying functions that different media systems actually exist 
and perform. In focusing on the analysis of different patterns 
of media performance in society, he, therefore, with no dissent 
concerning the Soviet media system, proposed the existing media 
system in the world (excluding the Soviet media model) into six 
basic patterns: 1) antithetical, 2) adversarial, 3) symbiotic, 
4) bureaucratic, 5) partisan, and 6) obeisant. 
According to Robinson (1989: 227-229), the antithetical media 
reject several of the basic values of the political system and 
refuse to link with the dominant power structure in any ongoing 
way; whereas, the adversarial media accept the basic political 
values of the system but define its relationship to the 
governmental institution in an aggressive and "negative', way, 
particularly when it is believed that the government or its 
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officials have broken the basic rules of the game. By contrast, 
the pair of symbiotic and bureaucratic media are by and large 
identified with the existing social order and are formally or 
informally tied to the state. The difference between the two, 
however, mainly lies in their financial resources and the degree 
of autonomy and state intervention. The symbiotic media are more 
likely to be financially independent and therefore have more 
autonomy, while the bureaucratic media as the term suggests, tend 
to rely more on the government in terms of funding, operation, 
policy and general journalistic practice. Partisan and obeisant 
media represent another two patterns which are outside the 
mainstream of the above four patterns of media system. The main 
difference between partisan and obeisant media is that the 
partisan media have a directorate that is linked to a party and 
tend towards a soft partisan stance; while the obeisant media 
have a directorate chosen in large measure by the party and 
therefore, retain a hard partisan stance. In research practice, 
however, this approach seems to be more useful to the individual 
case of analysis but less applicable to the institutional and 
macro level of media studies. 
In recent years, there has emerged another theoretical approach 
which is increasingly becoming popular in communication policy 
debate and media studies. It may be called the "Democratic- 
participant media theory" (McQuail, 1987: 121) with the central 
theme being media democratization. Since I believe this approach 
is grounded on ideas of social democracy and is closely related 
to the tradition of critical media studies, I will review this 
approach later in the context of a social democratic framework. 
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1.2 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA --- An Appraisal 
Perhaps the ethos of liberal media theory is best revealed in the 
First Amendment to the American Constitution which declares that 
"Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press". Clearly, the basic assumption behind this is 
the liberal belief that negative freedom should be put first and 
foremost with two basic factors concerning press activities: 1) 
freedom to express views and gather information, 2) freedom from 
outside interference (i. e an almost equivalent reference to the 
state). In that sense, the government must be committed to free 
speech and free press. 
The last decade has seen the rise of liberalism and the triumph 
of the (liberal) democracy movement world wide. In the field of 
mass communication, with the advance of communication technology, 
liberal argument of communication and de (re) regulation has become 
an increasingly dominant theme in the policy debate as well as 
in media studies in contemporary western society; while, more 
imperatively and ironically, liberal media doctrine seems to 
become the only alternative remedy in the reconstruction of media 
institutions in all former Soviet type societies -- an ongoing 
process of returning to the starting point of liberal democracy's 
value, the notion of free press model (cf. Introduction]. This 
hard fact yet again reminds us that, both in theory and in 
practice, liberal democracy is easily criticised and difficult 
to replace. It is largely for that reason that we need to examine 
some essential lineaments of liberal democracy and its 
understanding of media freedom. 
1.2.1 Liberalism and Democracy 
According to N. Bobbio, the reciprocal nexus between the liberal 
state and democracy is the individual. Both liberal state and 
democracy repose on an individualist conception of society. And 
30 
both are necessary tied each other, in the sense that only 
democracy can bring about the liberal doctrine and only the 
liberal state has so far fulfilled the condition for the rise of 
political democracy (N. Bobbio, 199o). 
However, it is worth noting that the democratization of 
liberalism (or what we now understand as liberal democracy) is 
in fact the result of historical evolution in response to the 
20th century challenges (e. g fascism and communism) and massive 
public demands (e. g trade union movement) which could no longer 
be ignored (T. Qualter, 1985). 
Liberalism views democracy as a derivative political value within 
the framework of general theories of rationalism and the natural 
law. Its ideal model of society is perceived in the formulation 
that the state can be controlled by the civil society and the 
government can be controlled by the people. It emphasizes 
individual liberty and negative rights as the paramount condition 
to implement democracy and as the inalienable base to deal with 
collective action. Meanwhile, its attitude toward positive 
aspects of freedom (in Berlin's sense) -- freedom to take action 
to promote progress and good -- is sceptical and tends to treat 
it subordinate to the negative one. In effect, this basic point 
of view determines the feature of liberal democracy. The 
political philosopher I. Berlin (1958: 50) viewed the relationship 
between democracy and liberty in this way: 
Perhaps the chief value for liberals of political -- 
"positive" -- rights, of participating in the government, 
is as a means of protecting what they hold to be an 
ultimate value, namely individual -- "negative" -- 
liberty. 
Democracy is thus designed to ensure individual liberty and, at 
its best, an effective mechanism to avoid pervasive and abused 
power from the state. To liberalism, as influential liberal 
theorist F-Hayek argued, democracy is not an end in itself; 
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rather, it is a means, "a utilitarian device", to help safeguard 
the highest political end: liberty (Hayek, 1960). Therefore, 
democracy was/is always given less high expectation in the 
liberal doctrine than that in social democratic thinking and even 
seen as the "least worst choice" among other alternatives. 
W. Churchill once put it bluntly, saying that democracy is "the 
worst political system except for all the others" (quoted in 
A. Nathan's "Tiananmen and the Cosmos", The New Republic, 
29.7.1991). To liberal thinkers, the risk for democracy is to 
demand too much and to expand its function beyond its proper 
defined boundary. In that case, S. Huntingtion (1991: 9) argues 
that it "raises all the problems that come up with the 
definitions of democracy by source or by purpose". Because it is 
held that "the long-term effect of the operation of democratic 
politics is probably to broaden and deepen individual liberty. 
Liberty is, in a sense, the peculiar virtue of democracy. If one 
is concerned with liberty as an ultimate social value, one should 
also be concerned with the fate of democracy" (Huntintions, 
1991: 28). In short then, liberal democracy is a democratic 
safeguard for individual liberty and civil society, no more, no 
less. 
From a liberal perspective, society would only be held together 
through the reciprocal transaction among individuals. In trade 
and commerce, men and women were able to realize their self- 
interests that would in turn facilitate conditions for civil 
society to flourish. Thus the essence of exchange relations -- 
liberty, equality and independence -- became a cornerstone of 
civil rights and natural laws which, in principle, is seen to 
guarantee that everyone has a fair opportunity to participate and 
to gain or lose in society. "No one", Locke asserted, "ought to 
harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or Possessions" (Locke, 
[1689] 1960: 311). Accordingly, the state is only conceived as a 
necessary institution to protect these rights and interests of 
individuals. No state could violate them without becoming a 
tyranny (Paine, [1791-1792] 1969: 69). To liberalism, the major 
threat to an individual's freedom always comes from the intrusion 
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of state power and unjustified institutional intervention in 
civil society. Therefore, the less the state becomes involved, 
the better off for freedom (R. Nozick, 1974; Manning, 1976; 
Macpherson, 1977). 
Related to the above discourse, liberal democratic doctrine, 
however, also possesses an important feature that is reflected 
in its theory of searching for the truth. Regarding men as 
rational beings, liberalism sees that "men desire to know the 
truth and will be disposed to be guided by it" (Becker, 1945: 33), 
and the truth would only emerge through a free marketplace of 
ideas and information. Indeed, the encouragement of pluralistic 
ideas, the protection of dissenting views and the toleration of 
antithetical expression are essential to the liberal democracy 
society. 
1.2.2 Liberal Media Approach 
The implication of the liberal doctrine to the realm of public 
communication is that the mass media are of vital importance to 
the survival of liberal democracy in a sense that the media 
should function as a potent check and counter balance to the 
power of the state which presumably no other institution is able 
to substitute. In doing so, the mass media are expected to 
provide sufficient information and diversity of views for the 
truth to emerge and for citizens to make rational choices, 
through, for instance, the general election, in deciding how 
their communities are governed. Traditionally, this referred to 
the Fourth-Estate function with which the media is regarded as 
the public watchdog being acted upon citizens "in much the same 
way as courts, kings and parliaments did in their wielding of 
other kinds of social power" (Sparks & Spilchal, 1991: 92). In 
Siebert's expression, "the right and duty of the press to serve 
as an extralegal check on government" is the essential feature 
of the liberal democratic performance of the media system which 
distinguishes it from the others" (Siebert, 1956: 56). T. Glasser, 
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on the other hand, provides his digest of liberal democracy's 
connection between a free press and the building of a (liberal) 
democracy: 
A free press can best meet the public communication 
needs of a democratic society; first Amendment protection 
for the print and electronic press is desirable because 
it fosters a robust and uninhibited press; a robust and 
uninhibited press is desirable because it is a press able 
and presumably willing to accommodate divergent points of 
view; divergent points of view are desirable because they 
sustain public debate; public debate is desirable because 
it nurtures an informed citizenry; and an informed 
citizenry is desirable because it bring about a more 
perfect polity and, in the end, legitimates the very idea 
of self-government (Glasser, 1984: 137). 
The argument of the relationship between the mass media, the 
state and (liberal) democracy can thus be understood as follows: 
In a free society, freedom of speech and press is the first 
freedom and precondition required by the exercise of democracy. 
By definition then, in order to maximise press freedom and 
concomitant political and civil rights, not only the operation 
and management of the communication media and the flow of 
information and opinions must be free from outside intervention 
but also the media institution should be free, at least in 
principle, to challenge and even defy the state authority. 
Through such arrangements, the practice of media freedom has been 
regarded as the rational mechanism that a democratic system needs 
to remain on course. 
Historically, four major sources on liberal media theory are 
traceable. According to John Keane (1991: 11-21), They are: 
1) the theological approach, most eloquently expounded by John 
Milton in his Areopagitica, criticized state censorship in the 
name of the God-given faculty of reason enjoyed by individuals; 
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2) the idea that the conduct of the press should be guided by the 
natural rights of individuals (e. g J. Locke and many other 
liberal theorists); 
3) the theory of utilitarianism viewed state censorship of public 
opinion as a licence for despotism and as contrary to the 
principle of maximizing the happiness of the governed (e. g J. 
Bentham, J. S. Mill); 
4) a fourth defence of liberty of the press is guided by the idea 
of attaining Truth through unrestricted public discussion among 
citizens (e. g Enlightenment thinkers). 
In development of the practice, particularly in modern western 
society, however, a fifth factor of defending a free press in 
terms of validation of market principle may be included (Leading 
exponents of this view may include F. Hayek). According to the 
argument, the implementation of press freedom should be justified 
on and through the free enterprise system within which the media 
operate independently as an industry. Hence, the economic 
dimension of media performance, with the hallmark of the 
commercialization, remains conspicuous. Media should behave like 
any other economic entity functioning on the market paradigm. The 
influential economist R-H-Coase argues (1974: 389): "1 do not 
believe that this distinction between the market for goods and 
the market for ideas is valid. There is no fundamental difference 
between these two markets, and in deciding on public policy with 
regard to them, we need to take into account the same 
consideration". Consequently, it is important to recognise that 
the commercialization of communication media and commodification 
of cultural products have become a major feature in reckoning the 
evolution of liberal media history. 
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1.2.3 The Strengths and Problems 
Developed from the Enlightenment project of rationalism and 
universalism, liberalism came to stand for a cosmopolitan 
ideology in a way that it created a legal system of formal 
equality for the universal rights of every citizen. Liberalism 
put the negative freedom -- freedom from outside interference -- 
in its central place and offered its solution to the emancipation 
of human beings and realization of a rational social order 
through free market economy and political democracy. With little 
dispute over democracy insofar as the best solution to the 
problem of modernity, however, there is also growing consensus 
that the development of a modern economy cannot dispense with the 
complexity and autonomy of market relations (Nove, 1983). 
Nevertheless, one may still argue that, despite its imperfection 
and deficiency, the western democratic type of society has still 
been the model second to none that human beings have so far 
experienced. In other words, under the present condition of human 
society, it is only through the prevalence of the liberal 
democratic stage that other more advanced solution, not based on 
the idea of perfect and total social engineering but on the logic 
of the process of human evolution, may be founded in searching 
for a better future of humankind. Thus it is important to stress 
the validity of the two fundamental principles of the historical 
materialism which were first articulated by Marx in his 1859's 
work "A Contribution to the critique of Political Economy" and 
later summarised by Gramsci. The principles state: 
1. that no social formation disappears as long as the 
productive forces which have developed within it still 
find room for the further forward movement; 2. that a 
society does not set itself tasks for whose solution the 
necessary condition have not already been incubated, etc. 
(A. Gramsci, 1971: 106). 
To be sure, after the grand failure of Soviet model society and 
bankruptcy of its communist ideology, this point is even more 
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relevant to today's world situation. This explains why all former 
communist countries are now struggling to establish a social 
structure based on liberal democracy and restarting a historical 
process of western experience both in political and economic 
realms which seems to be the only alternative available to them. 
The conquest of liberal democracy of the modern world, as 
remarked by Norberto Bobbio (1991: 5) the influential Italian 
political theorist, "if and insofar as it is possible -- cannot 
but be the starting point for the countries of the upturned 
utopia" (i. e a term to describe Soviet type communist state). 
1.2.4 The Universalism versus Individualism: 
an Institutional Contradiction 
However, the dual strand of the liberal solution entails a 
profound institutional conflict concerning social systems between 
the political realm and the economic realm and social 
relationship between individual roles as a citizen and a 
consumer. The problem is further compounded by its prejudiced 
position of human value judgement. Liberalism, as understood, 
regards liberty as the paramount need of human beings. Yet, we 
can't see why some other essential human values, for instance, 
equality, should be subordinate to liberty. As a matter of fact, 
liberty and equality both belong to the human essence and 
therefore, we can hardly prove in an ultimate sense which of the 
two is supreme or more important than the other. 
As eviewed previously, the essence of liberal media theory is 
based on the principle of the dichotomy of political democracy 
and f ree market economy. The media is thus seen as an instrument 
of the liberal solution towards the opening of the mass society 
and the consumer world in the process of modernity. With that 
scenario, therefore, two points can be made here: In the first 
place, the liberal media performance adopts the idea of political 
universalism by setting up a formal equality for free speech 
practice -- a classical liberal doctrine that everyone should/can 
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in principle receive and send any information or opinion without 
prior censorship or posterior punishment provided certain 
inhibitions (e. g libel) by the law. To this extent, the principle 
is universalism, and the door is genuinely open to all. In the 
second place, it identifies the means of free speech/press within 
the free enterprise system based on the private property and 
capital capacity in which the realization of free speech goals 
and the right to get the access to the public communication field 
prescribed in the first place would virtually be indexed to each 
individual capability in terms of his/her economic status. Here, 
however, the guiding principle becomes individualism, the 
authority is the law of supply and demand of the free market; the 
concerns is the consumer interest; the motivation is profits 
(through, in market economics theory, satisfying customers) ; and 
with little doubt, the more determined power is capital. Grasping 
this core of the institutional problem of liberal theory with 
respect to the mass media, Garnham (1990: 111) provides the 
following important argument: 
The site of the problem (of liberal media theory) is the 
fundamental contradiction between the economic and the 
political at the level of their value systems and of the 
social relations which those value systems require and 
support. within the political realm the individual is 
defined as- a citizen exercising public rights of debate, 
voting, etc., within a communally agreed structure of 
rules and towards communally defined ends. The value 
system is essentially social and the legitimate end of 
social action is the public good. Within the economic 
realm on the other hand the individual is defined as 
producer and consumer exercising private rights through 
purchasing power on the market in the pursuit of private 
interests, his or her actions being coordinated by the 
invisible hand of the market. ... The field of the mass 
media is a key focus for this contradiction because they 
operate simultaneously across the two realms. 
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It is this contradiction that had a profound effect in 
determining the basic performance of the liberal media. A 
constant tension and disparities between "the ostensibly 
democratic ideals that the mass media are supposed to serve and 
the communication structures and practices that actually prevail', 
(Gurevitch & Blumer, 1990: 270) is thus faced with liberal media 
approach. Just as J. Keane (1991: 89) points out, under today's 
condition of capitalism, "communications markets restrict freedom 
of communication by generating barriers to entry, monopoly and 
restrictions upon choice, and by shifting the prevailing 
definition of information from that of a public good to that of 
a privately appropriable commodity.,, 
Central to this is a basic dilemma linked with the problem of 
liberalism dichotomy of political democracy v. s market efficacy: 
on the one hand, there is the ideal of universalism -- a 
politically appealing role -- assigned for the media to fulfil 
in the process of democratic performance. on the other hand, 
there is the underlying tendency that the media are driven 
towards the sphere of free exchange in order to pursue commercial 
interest and maximum profits. In this way, freedom of the press 
and the right to communication is, as Splichal remarks, "reduced 
to, and thus condemned to decline by, the freedom to maximize 
profit"(1992: 139). 
In short then, the problem of the liberal media theory has always 
been associated with principles of the free market and its 
reliance on success in serving those who are able to control or 
own the means of communication media. Thus it sets impediments 
to the application of the liberal universalism of free press 
doctrine in the political realm and tends to push it to an 
impasse. 
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1.3 SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND THE MASS MEDIA 
The deficiencies of the liberal democratic solution to modern 
society and the cha llenge of democratic participation produced 
the response of the social democratic alternative in an attempt 
to overcome the underlying predicament of the liberal dichotomy 
of equal entitlement of citizenship of every person in the 
political realm and unequal property ownerships and capital power 
in the economic realm. Indeed, what made social democracy a more 
appealing challenge to the liberal approach was the context of 
unregulated (capitalist) market performance and the reality of 
increasingly socio-economic inequality. Thus one can hardly be 
surprised that, in contrast to the liberty (in particular, the 
aspect of negative freedom) as the core of liberal doctrine, the 
notion of equality with special reference to the positive freedom 
is central to the construction of the alternative approach. In 
social democratic thought, freedom means the equal enjoyment of 
certain opportunities and social rights to realise human 
capacities as well as individual autonomy. For liberal democracy, 
the notion of equality implies equivalent exchange relations in 
the marketplace and thus equality before the law in the legal 
terms; by contrast, social democracy employs equality as positive 
discrimination to rescue the disadvantaged based on the equal 
consideration of human needs and capacities. Historically and 
theoretically, it developed out of four major complexes of 
sources: 1) Rousseau's idea of equal society and radical 
democracy doctrine; 2) Marx's theory, particular Marx's critique 
of political economy of capitalism; 3) "revisionism" approach 
initiated by E-Bernstein of the Second Internationals; and 4) 
varying schools of socialist thoughts proposed by advocates of 
socialist reform movement ranging from Owen, Saint-Simon, Fourier 
to the Fabian Society. 
1.3.1 Democracy and Social Equality 
The vision of democracy or instituting a democratic society in 
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social democratic thoughts is a much more positive and wider one. 
For them, as Held has observed, to take equality, liberty and 
justice seriously is to challenge the liberal view that these 
"great universal ideals" can be realized by individuals left, in 
practice, to their own devices within a framework of a free- 
market economy and a minimal state (Held, 1987: 269). Their 
starting point is, therefore, to look at the problem of 
inequality and the class-base of modern western society with the 
major concerns of how unregulated capitalism could be reformed 
and transformed into an industrial society which all members in 
the community will get benefit from, and be happy with 
(Lichtheim, 1975). By focusing on the contradiction of liberal 
separation of human beings' political rights and economic 
acquisitiveness, social democracy emphasises the importance of 
equality in regulating the opportunities for acquiring and the 
means of distributing wealth for all citizens; and argues that 
only within such a common life framework based on equal right and 
social provision to remedy unjustified liberal dichotomy imposing 
on citizens that the society could be held together cohesively 
and its institutions and relationships could be formed 
legitimately (Gamble, 1981; Eccleshall et at., 1984; Held, 1987; 
Keane, 1988). 
The issue of realizing social equality remained crucial in the 
social democratic tradition with Positive freedom occupying a 
significant position (although negative freedom is not denied). 
Positive freedom, as generally understood by the social 
democratic approach, involves a certain moral duty to exercise 
power in an attempt to alter unequal social relations and create 
conditions for a better and constantly improving society which 
would use its increasing material wealth to the best advantage 
in the interests of the whole community (Picard, 1985: 25-56). 
Therefore, contrary to the liberal idea, social democracy views 
the major threat to the very existence and development of 
democracy as generating by increasing capitalist economic 
domination and commercialization of socio-political life. In 
other words, unregulated free market performance is the chief 
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source of social injustice and inequality with the underlying 
tendency of polarization of social structure that would 
fundamentally undermine the process of democratization. 
In order to reverse such a tendency, the (democratic) state has 
thus been endowed with a moral duty in the social democratic 
approach to exercise positive power to correct the worst abuses 
of the private enterprise system and to provide a certain 
equality for every citizen to exert his/her due rights. However, 
it is worth noting that the call for state action in theorists 
of social democracy is grounded on the principle of modern 
democracy within which its minimum common base is accepted by 
both liberalism and socialism, and therefore, a democratic state 
is the key to implement the social democrats, idea of state 
involvement. It is with this touchstone that decisively parted 
the social democratic approach from the Soviet type's communist 
one and made it a challenging alternative where society has been 
increasingly disillusioned with the liberal solution. From a 
social democratic perspective, as summarised by Gamble 
(1981: 223), the function of democracy "comprising all citizens 
would exert such pressure on politicians and governments through 
elections and public opinion as to ensure collective measures to 
make the conditions of life more equal, to correct huge 
imbalances in the distribution on incomes, and to use public 
agencies to remedy shortcomings in the performance of the market. 
In this way the state would guarantee certain rights, 
opportunities and services for all its members". 
In brief, while liberal democracy regards pursuing individual 
interest and freedom through the "invisible hand" of the market 
as supreme; social democracy by contrast gives priority to 
social equality to promote the general good and universal 
fairness through extension of citizen's right to the wide-ranging 
social realm and through a certain degree of state intervention. 
Nevertheless, both are a dialectical mirror-images of one another 
in the process of historical development. In fact, it is not 
difficult to tell that the contending ideas stemmed from two 
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basic philosophical traditions: the individual ly-oriented v. s 
socially oriented tradition of Locke, Mill and contemporary neo- 
liberalists on the one side; and Rousseau, Marx and the new-left 
movement on the other side. 
1.3.2 The Media For (Social) Democracy 
Based on the above general framework of social democracy, an 
alternative media approach is being constructed with its 
conceptual ization of the role of the media in modern western 
democracies. As P. Jacklin expresses (1975: 49) that "A society 
is democratic to the extent that all its citizens have equal 
opportunity to influence the decision-making process. Clearly, 
communication is essential to this process -- just as essential 
as voting itself. " For that purpose and to counter the problems 
of implementation in liberal media approach, he then argues that 
proper regulation of communication media is needed "not only to 
insure a competition of ideas, but so that all citizens have an 
equal opportunity to influence and shape this competition" 
(Jacklin, ibid. ). Thus, from the point of view of media 
democratization, the traditional version of freedom of speech and 
press in the social democratic thoughts has more to do with 
communication than with expression through which the issue of 
equal access to the public communication becomes essential. 
J. Curran (1991a: 31) further articulates the media function of the 
social democratic approach (in his analyses, he terms it as 
radical democratic approach) within the comparative context with 
liberal approach: 
In traditional liberal theory, the media are conceived 
primarily as vertical channels of communication between 
private citizens and government: they inform individual 
choice at election time, and they influence governments 
by articulating the collective view of private citizens. 
In contrast, radical revisionism (i. e social democratic 
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alternative) advances a more sophisticated perspective in 
which the media are viewed as a complex articulation of 
vertical, horizontal and diagonal channels of 
communication between individuals, groups and power 
structures. ... The role of the media is to facilitate 
this intricate system of (liberal democratic) 
representation, and democratize it by exposing intra- 
organizational decision-making to public disclosure and 
debate. 
In general then, four theoretical characteristics of the approach 
are identical: 1) being against commercialization of human 
sentiment and market domination of mass communication with 
particular concerns about unequal access to the media; 2) 
maintaining and promoting citizen-cultural/political or public 
media model with special reference to the British model of public 
service broadcasting, against the background of consumer-market 
driven media model; 3) stressing the democratic right to 
communication and the necessity to provide certain material means 
to realize it; 4) regarding public (through democratic state) 
regulation of communication media as a necessary measure to 
strengthen citizen's positive freedom and the need to restrict 
commercialization of media performance. 
In practice, however, until the 1980s and more or less still 
relevant now, the British broadcasting system and the western 
European experience in general can largely be said to have been 
characterised by the social democratic approach, whereas the 
American media performance can be loosely identified with the 
liberal approach [cf. 1.1.1] 
1.3.3 "Democratic-participant Media Theory" 
Among the various social democratic media versions, the one 
called "democratic-participant media theory" (McQuail, 1983) or 
"Democratic socialist press theory" (Picard, 1985), has been 
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proposed, debated and tried in varying scales and levels. Under 
this approach, according to Picard, media freedom no longer means 
merely the right to communicate without outside interference, but 
also the public's right to have equal access to the media and to 
a full accounting of the events and opinions of society. The main 
purpose of the media is to provide avenues by which diverse views 
can be made public, and to promote democracy in all social 
spheres. Public regulation and other state actions can be 
employed to insure the ability of citizens to use the media and 
advance media plurality. Media ownership can be mixed, but 
ultimately, should be public and not-for-profit through 
foundations, non-profit corporations, journalist-operated 
cooperatives, and other collective and feasible means and methods 
(1985: 67-70). In another case, the approach stresses the needs, 
interests and aspirations of the active "receiver" in a political 
society. It favours multiplicity, interchange of sender-receiver 
roles, horizontality of communication links at all levels of 
society, interaction, commitment (McQuail, 1987: 122). 
As can be perceived, at the heart of this approach is the notion 
of equality and the balance between negative freedom and positive 
freedom. For social democrats, the main obstacle to media freedom 
and democracy is the polarization of increasing social inequality 
resulting from free market competition, a fact that can not be 
willed or wished away, but that has to be (partially) altered 
through positive state intervention. It has developed from 
Williams's model of democratic communication with many valuable 
and concrete proposals to implement it. Thus, it has made a step 
forward in media democratization. It also reflects a growing 
sense of disillusionment with the liberal democratic solution 
both to society and public communication. Therefore, as Picard 
points out, the struggle to democratize the mass media is a 
microcosm of the struggle to democratize society (1985: 150). 
However, the problem with this media model as well as the 
approach of social democracy is that, like its counterpart of 
liberalism, it still remains trapped within, in Garnham's term 
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(1990: 106), "the bind of the state-market dichotomy" while 
seeking a solution. Although it rightly identifies the problems 
of free press practice, it fails to understand that the state 
intervention could easily transfer the media from market control 
to bureaucratic control, neither of them would further advance 
the course of the realization of media freedom and media 
democratization. 
1.3.4 The Public Sphere and the New Approach towards Media 
Democratization 
In recent years, efforts have been made to break with the 
thinking of the bind of the state-market dichotomy with special 
reference to the Habermas' notion of the public sphere. "By the 
public sphere we mean first of all a realm of our social life in 
which something approaching public opinion can be formed" 
(Habermas, 1979: 198). Based on the study of the rise and fall of 
the "bourgeois public sphere" in early capitalist society, 
particularly in Britain, Habermas argues that the public sphere 
involves the idea of a common space or polis zone for public 
debate and political discussion through which the dissident view 
is registered, public opinion is formed and eventually rational 
choice and/or agreement can be made among private individuals. 
It is open to everyone that all citizens may participate with low 
entry cost and with equal access to information necessarily 
provided by the mass media. More importantly, it seeks to 
insulate it from state domination; at the same time, to free it 
from (market) economic pressure. Therefore, democracy can be 
implemented without being manipulated by either authority's power 
or market interest. The mass media, Habermas argues, are 
important in the process of creating such public spheres by 
providing availability of multiple contexts with wide-ranging 
accessibility of information to conduct rational construction of 
social affairs that would redeem the emancipatory interests of 
humankind (Habermas, 1979: 198-201; 1989; also cf. Garnham, 
1990: 104-114; Curran, 1991a: 27-57). 
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Although the discourse of the public sphere has some deficiencies 
and blind-spots (e. g idealised the early evolution of bourgeois 
model) as identified by, among others, Dahlgren (1991: 3-5), Keane 
(1991: 35-36), and Curran (1991a: 38-46), it is reasonable to argue 
that Habermas' notion of the public sphere does provide a good 
starting point to transcend the bind of the state-market 
dichotomy traditionally featured in communication policy debate; 
and, as Curran remarks, offers "a powerful and arresting vision 
of the role of the media in a democratic society" (1991b: 83) . It 
thus advances the social democratic media approach in response 
to the challenge of current development of public communication 
and global democratization in the changing situation of the 
contemporary world. 
Inspired by the theory of the public sphere, recent studies of 
the media have produced several new visions of media 
democratization which to varying degrees have drawn upon 
Habermas. Among them, Curran (1991b: 102-111) offers a seminal 
working model which has three distinguishable characteristics. 
First, it redefines the democratic functions of the media 
institution in three ways together with proposals for the 
practice of media democratization: (a) that media should generate 
a plurality of understandings and balance the interests of 
collective and individual sides without relying on social 
engineering; (b) that the media system is to act as an agency of 
representation; and (c) that the media perform to assist the 
realization of the common objectives of society through agreement 
or compromise between conflicting interests. Secondly, it 
contains major principles of the notion of the public sphere 
which may include practical universality, economic viability and 
rational normality. Thirdly, it attempts to combine the liberal 
and socialist media approaches in a synthesis that incorporates 
the strengths of both. In brief then, the model is constructed 
around the core sector of public service media compounded by the 
civic sector, private enterprise sector, social market sector and 
professional sector. 
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Curran's model is sophisticated and has many strengths. Judged 
from the democratic point of view, it makes an effort to 
compromise and balance the interests of the public sector and the 
private sector. It attempts to provide a tentative solution to 
the needs of contemporary communications by "changing the 
relation between autonomous public spheres, on the one hand, and 
the areas of activity governed by money and administrative power, 
on the other" (Habermas, 1991: 42). Meanwhile, as Curran argues, 
it draws upon and composites features derived from the practice 
of different European countries and thus approximates to the 
realities and works with the grain of what is attainable 
(1991b: 105). Although it still has lots of technical difficulties 
and terminological problems (e. g social market? ) to be worked 
out, the model clearly reflects the growing consciousness and 
current trend of media democratization. 
In short, the importance of media democratization can be 
summrised in the recent remark made by J. Habermas: 
The challenges of the twenty-first century will be of an 
order and magnitude that demand answers from Western 
societies which cannot be arrived at, not put into 
practice, without a radical-democratic universalization 
of interests through institutions for the formation of 
public opinion and political will (Habermas, 1991: 45). 
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1.4 THE COMMUNIST STATE AND THE MASS MEDIA 
1.4.1 The Party-State 
The 20th century communist state or the "established Soviet Model 
social ist-to-communist system/ state/ society" is very different 
from any other type of modern society which are based on their 
essential social formations of capital ist /market economy (N. B in 
many cases especially in some developing countries, however, the 
economic framework can also be taken in its major form of 
nationalization, but still perform on the market paradigm) plus 
either political pluralism (e. g western style democratic state) , 
or political authoritarianism. As analyzed by many scholars, a 
self-declared vanguard Party monopolizes power in the name of 
proletarian class and of waging class struggle. In this way, it 
establishes an unprecedented modern totalitarian society with the 
framework of absolutism of command economy, command politics, 
command culture and command life-style in order to achieve 
complete control of society and to eliminate any islands of 
exemption, no matter how trivial, from political/ ideological 
intervention. 
Thus, the key of the Soviet model communist system is the concept 
of the party-state which possesses two crucial factors: complete 
dominance of official ideology over society, and the supremacy 
of the Party's interest. The hyper-rationale for establishing 
such a system lies in its vanguardism that only the Party 
represents people's interests and can lead people to a situation 
of material abundance and the final victory of the world 
communism movement. It thus justifies its leadership on the 
ground of ideological purity rather than approval by citizens; 
of unity between the Party and the people rather than a sense of 
the social contract. In so doing, it needs to routines the 
application of reason into a rigid political formula. Therefore, 
it does not allow the emergence of alternative political groups 
or the existence of the public sphere. In a word, it is the 
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Party's power that is pervasive in all sectors of society. This 
phenomenon largely explains why the praxes of modern democracy, 
particularly its rule and form of governing society is virtually 
irrelevant to the Soviet model communism (cf. Z. Brzezinski & 
C. Friedrich, 1956; M. Djilas, 1957; B. Womack, 1990; J. Kornai, 
1992). 
1.4.2 Media Theoretical Framework 
From Marx to Lenin major contributions were made towards building 
up a media theory for the communist state to justify its tight 
control over mass communication on the one hand, and active 
promotion of the media for achieving the Party's designed goals 
on the other. The communist media theory largely flows from the 
legacy of Marx's notion on communication in the class-base 
society through the mutation and reinterpretation of Lenin's 
media theory. In China, Mao also had his own understanding of 
Marxism-Leninism and developed his approach for the use of the 
mass media [cf. 2.33. 
In all established communist states, the role of the mass media 
is firmly placed on the Political/ ideological ground, solely 
serving the Party's interest as a propaganda instrument. In order 
to understand this, it is necessary to provide some basic points 
of Marx's and Lenin's versions on the communication and the role 
of the media, which were laid down as foundation of communist 
media theory. 
1.4.2.1 Marx: the Media as an Instrument of the Ruling Class 
Perhaps the basic work that Marx did for his later followers was 
his thorough understanding that the mass media were a crucial 
instrument in the service of ruling class in a class society. 
In the German IdeoloqV, Marx examined the relationship between 
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the mode of social production and its implication to political 
and ideological conflicts in society. As such, he (with Engels) 
presented a key argument: 
The class which has the means of material production at 
its disposal, has control at the same time over the means 
of mental production, so that in consequence the ideas of 
those who lack the means of mental production are, in 
general, subject to it ([1845], 1970: 64). 
The mass media, then, became a crucial instrument of the Uberbau 
(i. e superstructure) to the ruling section in society. 
Consciousness itself, according to historical materialism, can 
only come into being and develop in the process of material 
production through social communication. Individuals feel their 
existence and become conscious of themselves only through 
interaction with others. The process of interaction relies on 
information exchange, and the essential means to do so is to use 
human symbolic systems, particularly language. That "which is 
the dominant material force in society is at the same time its 
dominant intellectual force" (Marx, ibid) . In this way, those who 
control the means of the use of a symbolic system virtually 
control people's minds. Since human history entered class 
society, the ruling class has got every necessary privilege to 
create, use, and disseminate symbolic systems through the 
superstructure such as schools, churches and the communication 
media. Because of the power and nature of mass communication in 
modern society, the mass media thus play the vital role not only 
in the process of shaping ideology, but also in that of ruling 
the society. From this point of Marx's view it might draw the 
following conclusions: 
1) The material interests of the dominant social class are 
also reflected in the sphere of ideology, culture and 
communications. 
2) The mass media always serve the power of the ruling class. 
3) They are used by the bourgeois state to maintain the status 
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quo of the exploitation of man by man. 
4) Therefore, when the historical evolution moves on to a new 
stage with the success of the proletarian revolution, the 
mass media shall be used by the state of the proletarian 
class to change the existing world, eliminate bourgeois 
consciousness and guide mankind entering a free and 
classless society. 
Thus Marx provided a general framework of the double roles that 
the mass media play both in the capitalist and the initial post- 
capitalist societies. Underpinning his media approach is Marx's 
rational judgment that the mass media at heart were instrumental. 
However, it is important to point out that Marx's vision of the 
future evolution of social transformation was quite different 
from Lenin's Soviet Russia and Mao's China in their later 
experiences. For Marx, it was grounded in his analysis of 
historical materialism about the basic contradictions of 
capitalism. He believed that the full maturation of social 
conditions, particularly the development of material production 
with an advanced class consciousness was crucial for a genuine 
revolution of social ism-to-communism. It was with this touchstone 
that theorist Marx parted company with his revolutionary 
disciples Lenin and Mao. 
1.4.2.2 Lenin: Towards the construction of the PartyFs Media 
The above idea of Marx, particularly his understanding of the 
instrumental nature of the mass media in a class-base society, 
was developed and revised by Lenin in his ideas about the Party's 
media. He created a newspaper-party to pursue and secure 
dictatorial powers. In so doing, he (and his successor Stalin) 
devoted a major effort to strengthening the media role in 
propaganda, mobilization and organization on the one hand; and 
to using the media as an internal organ of the Party-state to 
control the general public in the guise of class struggle on the 
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other hand. Lenin regarded mass communications as extremely 
important Party work. In essence, Lenin argued that class 
consciousness of the proletariat could not be automatically 
rooted and developed in the proletarian class itself (it could 
only grow up into, in Lenin"s word, "trade-unionist 
consciousness"); therefore, it must be brought from without to 
the proletarian class and brought to it by a Leninist Bolshevik 
Party. Hence it was Lenin who carefully re-channelled some of 
Marx's essential texts to fit his pragmatic uses and transferred 
them into a much more radical, eloquent, conspiratorial and 
determined approach in order to serve the needs of the Bolshevik 
Revolution and Leninist Soviet Power (cf. A. Inkles, 1956; 
J. Markham, 1967). 
A media theory in Lenin's mind was central to his framework of 
the three major roles for the mass media, which were postulated 
on the ground that human consciousness was subject to dictation. 
Lenin put great stress on a closed organizational relationship 
between the media and the party's leadership. It was in an 
article of the Bolshevik newspaper The Spark headlined "Where to 
Begin" (No. 4 1901), that Lenin identified three role concepts and 
presented his famous argument: 
A newspaper is not only a collective propagandist and a 
collective agitator; it is also a collective organizer. 
... With the aid of the newspaper, and through it, a 
permanent organization will naturally take shape that 
will train its members to follow political events 
carefully, appraise their significance and their effect 
on the various strata of the population, and develop 
effective means for the revolutionary party to influence 
those events. 
According to the terminology of orthodox communism, the Party 
shall always represent the collective will, so that the word 
l1collectivell in this context means "the Party's". To Lenin, the 
media was thus primarily conceived of as the Party's instrument, 
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or, in his own words, the "wheels and cogs" of the Party 
apparatus, asserting its paramount leadership over the whole 
society. "There can be no question", Lenin wrote in his famous 
Party Organization and Party Literature (1905), "of revolutionary 
proletarian newspapers standing outside the Party of the 
proletariat" (Lenin, [1905] 1972: 130). 
With respect to this essential understanding, the basic task of 
the mass media was designed with three identities. 1) As an 
educator: socializing people by providing them with selected 
information and appropriate views based on socialist doctrine. 
2) As an organizer: mobilizing the masses to accomplish 
production targets as well as various Party goals. 3) As a 
defender: suppressing any dissident voice to defend the Party's 
authority. 
1.4.2.3 Mao: An Endless Two-way Communication 
There was not, however, a clear line of distinction from Lenin 
to Mao. What was different between Lenin and Mao was only a 
matter of degree, and probably Mao even went much further who 
constantly prepared to resort to radicalism and put more emphasis 
on voluntarism. Mao adopted the Leninist Party media doctrine 
with some indigenous specifications and tactical modifications. 
In addition to the Party's media theory, Mao further argued that 
the role and power of the mass media "consists in their ability 
to bring the Party program, the Party line, the Party's general 
and specific policies, its tasks and methods of work before the 
masses in the quickest and most extensive way. 01 (Mao, 1975: 4: 241). 
Therefore, in the expression of Chinese communist leadership, the 
mass media are described as the tongues, ears and eyes of the 
Party. 
Mao also viewed the mass media as the key battle-ground of class 
struggle and in the forefront of ideological propaganda. In 1962, 
he warned the Party that the work of the media, art, literature 
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and other cultural forms was extremely important for the Party 
to establish and maintain the state power by putting his famous 
argument in this way: 
In order to overthrow a political regime, it is always 
necessary to prepare public opinion and carry out work in 
the ideological field in advance. This is true of the 
revolutionary class; it is also true of the counter- 
revolutionary class (cited in People's Daily, 16.2.1967). 
Theoretically, the Leninist Party media in the Chinese context 
was largely embellished into a two-way communication process 
which was based on Mao's rhetoric about "The Mass Line" and 
"Unity of Theory and Practice". In the first place, the mass 
media carry out the Party's initiatives and policies toward the 
general public, which are supposed to originate with the masses; 
then the mass media will bring feedback to the Party for its 
reassessment and readjustment in an attempt to meet people's 
desires and interests before a new round starts. The process 
itself is endless. Thus the media are operated as a vital 
transmission belt through which information and opinions are 
supposedly exchanged between the Party and the masses. This style 
of media management, in Mao's jargons, was called "Walking on two 
legs" and "three-in-one combination". The first means that the 
media work should not only rely on the professional staff, but 
also non-professionals. The second refers to the unity of party 
leadership, professional media and the masses in carrying out 
party's media missions (cf. F. Yu, 1964; J. Markham, 1967; J. Chu, 
1978). 
1.4.3 Defining the Role of the Party Media 
The sacred mission for a Leninist media approach is ultimately 
to serve two interrelated purposes: firstly to defeat the 
subversion of class enemy both from within and without the Soviet 
Power through the function of exposure and criticism; and 
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secondly to create a "New Man" society with the common bond of 
collective consciousness, selflessnessf and class brotherhood 
through the function of persuasion and indoctrination. To achieve 
this, the media submission to the Party leadership is not only 
necessary, but also unconditional. For Lenin, the contribution 
of his three roles was no more than the manifesto of 
justification that mass media should be of the Party, by the 
Party, and for the Party. Thus, the Party media approach is of 
the life-and-death importance to all established communist 
regimes in spite of disputes they may have from time to time. 
Accordingly, as identified by A. Liu in the Chinese context, the 
substance of the mass media in communist states may be 
characterized as ideological, didactic, hortatory, and partisan. 
It is primarily ideological ly-or iented, as all media contents 
must be explicitly framed in the context of the communist 
doctrine. It is didactic in that mass media are also used to 
fulfil an instructional function for the needs of various Party 
programs. It is hortatory in the sense that media communications 
make a great effort to achieve "desirable" social effects at the 
expense of the truthfulness of information. For instance, "Truth 
and fact reporting must serve the need of class struggle" became 
overwhelming journalistic canons and media praxis in Mao's era. 
it is partisan in that, although all the information provided by 
the media is to be put in the framework of Marxist-Leninist 
doctrine, specific interpretation of Marxism-Leninism is in the 
hands of whichever ruling faction of the party is currently in 
control (1986: 265). In a word, the role of the mass media is 
incorporated into the overall strategy and goals of the party- 
state. 
It is clear that at the heart of Party's media approach is the 
assumption that the Party is omnipotent, always right, and 
exclusively represents the people's will. The vital problem of 
the legitimacy is thus intrinsic and insoluble which is in fact 
inherent in its institutional failure. 
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1.4.4 The Party Media towards Institutional Transformation 
However, the fatal deficiency of the Soviet type communist system 
itself has created the condition for a fundamental change and 
therefore, has pressed the society towards returning to the 
starting point of western experience of liberal solution -- a 
dichotomy of political democracy and market economy. In the last 
decade, we have witnessed the world-wide decline of the communist 
movement and the debacle of the Soviet system. The situation has 
been drastically changed. In eastern and central Europe, after 
the 1989-1990 popular revolution and the subsequent 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, all the formal communist 
states have been (or, are being) transformed towards a kind of 
pluralistic structure based on the market economy and political 
democracy. As a result, the process of media institutional 
transformation is underway with the emphasis on establishing 
liberal media institutions. In parallel, the south-eastern Asian 
communist states except North Korea seem to be proceeding to 
market-oriented economic reform first, choosing the path of 
"peaceful evolution" with an uphill transitional period towards 
a genuine pluralism. No doubt, the mass media have played a 
central role in that process and, consequently, themselves have 
started a movement of fundamental institutional reform. 
Thus, as will it shown in the later chapters, the essence of the 
media reform in post-Mao China has been precisely to redefine the 
role of media towards commercialization and pluralism and, 
furthermore, democratization. It is for that major reason that 
this thesis will present a study of media development and the 
media reform in post-Mao mainland China since 1976 with special 
reference to television broadcasting. The evolution of the 
Chinese broadcasting medium and the role that it has played in 
the process of the breakdown of communist totalitarianism on the 
one hand, and of the modernization drive on the other, revealed 
that the Chinese experience presents a unique case deserving of 
study. The main purpose of the research project is thus to 
explore how the growth of media industries, especially 
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television, as well as institutional changes have taken place as 
reflections of complex interactions of the media, culture and 
society in post-Mao China. The present study seeks to advance our 
knowledge of: 
(a) the fundamental relationship between the mass media and the 
overall social system (in this case, the Party-state) in the 
context of post-Mao China; 
(b) the media performance in the process of pursuing economic 
rationalization and political democratization against the 
background of profound social transition; 
(c) the social conditions that generate the changes of the 
media system; 
(d) the institutional problems and politic-economic constraints 
on such changes; 
(e) the impact on society and its connection with a broad 
social reform movement. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A REVIEW OF STUDIES OF THE CHINESE MASS MEDIA 
AND MEDIA EVOLUTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 
This chapter is divided into two major parts: first, a review of 
the literature on communist China's media studies; second, the 
Chinese social contexts and media development since 1949, as a 
general introduction to the major theme of Chinese television 
studies. 
2.1 A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1.1 Media Studies of Mainland China in Mao's Era 
During Mao's rule of China three important books appeared in the 
West on the subject of China's mass communication studies and the 
relationship between the (party-)state, the mass media and 
society. Nothing remotely similar was published in mainland 
China: politically it was virtually forbidden and was held to be 
unnecessary. As a matter of teaching and study, the media was 
primarily considered to be the mouthpiece of the Party, not a 
possible area of research or criticism [for background, see 2.2]. 
The three books are Frederick T. C. Yuls Mass Persuasion in 
Communist China (1964), James W. Markham's Voices of the Red 
Giants: Communications in Russia and China (1967), and Alan P. L. 
59 
Liu's Communications and National Integration in Communist China 
(1971). As noted, these texts were produced during the heyday of 
the Cold War, and thus there was virtually no dispute about the 
nature and function of mass media in communist China. As a 
result, the three books have very similar approaches to the 
subject matter, though there are significant details in their 
different objectives and arguments. 
In general, these early studies have four similarities: Firstly 
they all follow the framework of Four Theories of the Press 
(1956) laid down by Siebert, Peterson and Schramm (cf. 1.1-11, 
presenting the Chinese media system as a copy of the Soviet's, 
but viewing it in a different stage of development and with 
different characteristics. Secondly, they attempt to provide a 
comprehensive analysis and descriptive account of political 
nature of the mass media in the Mao's era, focusing on how the 
Party employed the media to build a communist society. Thirdly, 
although they rarely develop an explicit theoretical elaboration, 
their frameworks reveal their basic assumption that the success 
of consolidating Chinese communist power and implementing its 
social transformation was largely a matter of mass mobilization 
and communication penetration. Fourthly, because China at the 
time was an isolated and closed world, these early studies have 
a big problem in terms of information collection and the authors 
could not for instance visit China to do first hand research. 
Thus, their primary sources have to rely on Chinese off icial 
publications plus some unconfirmed reports and phenomenal 
observations, using techniques of careful textual exegesis and 
documentary reviews. 
It is well known that the omnipotent power of the Soviet model 
of the party-state is legitimated on the basis of its pursuing 
Marxist-Leninist ideology in an attempt to create a "New Man" 
society supposedly for the good of the people. As the Party's 
instrument, the mass media perforce serve this paramount goal. 
However, there is a basic dilemma persistently facing the 
communist state between ideological legitimacy and constant 
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pressure for material improvement. That is to say, on the one 
hand, the Party can only build its totalitarian ruling power upon 
its premise of ideology. On the other hand, in order to maintain 
grassroots support, the party has to find some pragmatic solution 
to develop the economy and to produce something to satisfy the 
people's demands of improving living standards. In practice, this 
means the party-state has to yield some power to the society, 
allowing a limited personal freedom in an effort to revive 
economic dynamism. It thus inevitably results in diversity of 
social interests and a spontaneous tendency towards what the 
party may rightly label "bourgeois" liberalism, which has a 
potent effect of ideology dilution, thereby undermining the 
party's ruling legitimacy. Therefore, tension arises between the 
need for ideological purity and the need for material progress. 
In the case of Mao's China, this tension tended to be reflected 
in the form of the bitter party internal struggle between the 
pragmatic faction led by Deng xiaoping (then the Party's general 
secretary) and his ally of state paternalism, Liu Shaoqi (then 
the State president) on the one side, and Mao and his radical 
Maoists left-wing on the other side. There developed a politics 
of "pendulum swing" between a tightening ideological control when 
Maoists took command, and a striking economic development when 
Deng-and-Liu group was ascendent. Since the party-state's media 
are closely tied to this dilemma, they also play a unique role 
in that process: the role of agent signalling the alternating 
requirements of the political pendulum swing. To observe a 
communist society and its media performance, this "pendulum 
swing" phenomenon can become a distinctive parameter in which a 
better reading of the party-state's policy shift and the change 
of the direction might be reached [cf. 2-2]. 
Frederick Yuls Mass Persuasion (1964) was the first major work 
to explore communist China's mass Communication system. It was 
a study comparable in importance to Alex Inkeles's Public Opinion 
in oviet Russia (1950). Yuls major contribution was that he 
described and interpreted how the Chinese Communist Party's media 
institutions were organised and how they functioned under Mao. 
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Apart from the conventional media studies such as the press, 
broadcasting and film, Yu also paid special attention to some 
indigenous forms of mass communication employed by the Maoists 
to conduct political campaigns and mass mobilization. For 
instance, "Dazibao", which literally means "a paper of big 
letters" (the English translation is "big character poster") , was 
simply a large sheet of paper with hand-written content and 
posted at any convenient place f or people to read. It is a 
peculiar, crude and low-cost medium extensively used -- often on 
a dramatically large scale for political campaigns, and most 
favoured by Mao himself. Mao viewed Dazibao a very effective 
weapon for mass mobilization as he once remarked it at a 
conference for cadres in 1957, that "Dazibao is a good thing and 
I think it will be handed down to future generations. I think 
it is a good idea to use it, the more, the better. Dazibao 
as an instrument favours the proletariat, not the bourgeoisie" 
(Mao, (19571 1977: 464). In August 1966, for example, Mao 
explicitly gave his full support of the Red Guards movement and 
declared his determination to launch the Cultural Revolution just 
by issuing his own famous big character poster "Bombard the 
(Liu&Deng-led capitalist) Headquarters". This poster has been 
regarded by historians as the turning point of the early stage 
of the cultural Revolution. But when Deng regained power, he 
ordered a ban of Dazibao in 1980, and it was constitutionally 
forbidden in The 1982 Chinese Const'tution. 
However, I'Dazibaoll was scarcely addressed by previous western 
scholarly studies on communist China's media let alone 
researched. Yu made an effort to analyze how the Chinese 
communists made ingenious use of this medium and help us to 
understand that I'Dazibaoll actually played a unique and important 
role in Mao's communication system and mass persuasion. Yu argued 
that using the medium of "Dazibao", under some circumstances such 
as targeting the "criticism and self-criticism" campaign (i. e a 
common form of communist ideological control), was far more 
effective than the newspapers (Yu, 1964: 142). He also revealed 
how Chinese communists did an enormous amount of work to turn 
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this form of mass communication into a powerful weapon for mass 
ideological control which can partly explain why China -- 
technologically backward and materially impoverished -- could 
establish its own effective and giant mass communication network. 
In sum, by focusing on Mao's use of the media to effect his 
politics-in-command solution, and on the consequence of 
pervasiveness and penetration of such a propagandistic 
communication system, Yu made a big step forward towards media 
study of communist China at that time. However, his heavy 
emphasis on Mao's political and ideological significance in the 
Chinese media was unbalanced by his neglecting the effect of 
China's political pendulum swing -- a key issue which would have 
revealed the inherent contradictions of the social system. Yu 
thus failed to sort out and examine the underlying problems of 
the party-state and its media policies. In particular, Yu ignored 
the influence of Liu-and-Deng group which tended to provide an 
alternative to use the media for economic development and to 
offer people a more elaborate and better quality of cultural 
life. Nevertheless, considering the fact that Yuls work was the 
first comprehensive investigation of the mass media in communist 
China, it still remains a classical case with respect to the 
subject. 
To some extent, the shortcomings and research vacuum left by Yu 
was fulfilled by Liu's work Communications and National 
Integration in Communist China (1972) - Liu put his finger on a 
central issue when he focused on the complex relationship between 
mass media and social systems in the context of nation building. 
As he states: "Previous studies of the media system in Communist 
China have not adequately considered its political and social 
context, and thus have missed the most important part of the 
system: its function in the national integration of China. This 
aspect is the theme of the present study" (A. Liu, 1972: 2). He 
argues that the role of mass media in the communist state is 
essentially that of a facilitating agent. The effective 
functioning of the mass media as an integrative force, as Liu 
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identified, depends on three interacting sets of factors which 
he claims fostered the integrative influence of the media 
performance: (1) a social infrastructure (such as transport 
networks, the linguistic framework); (2) political culture; and 
(3) the administrative organization of the media. Based on these 
premises, Liu provided an analysis of the subject which revealed 
the role media played in the evolution of communist national 
integration with a widening of the focus on the ruling elite 
power struggle and the bi-polar tension between maintaining 
ideological purity and pursuing economic improvement. 
Liu tracks China's alternating media policy shifts between Mao's 
position and Deng-and-Liuls, between left and right, from the 
1949-1953 Leftist attacks on the past to the 1953-1957 period of 
Deng-and-Liu consolidating their bureaucratic power, through 
Mao's campaign of the Great Leap Forward of 1958 to its failure, 
from his opponents' attempts at economic reconstruction to Mao's 
1963 counter-attack and finally his 1966 Cultural Revolution. The 
author's major contribution is to put the mass media into these 
concrete contexts of the China's political pendulum swing of each 
period, showing how and why the media was manipulated to function 
as the servant of the prevailing political faction, fighting the 
battle on behalf of each successive master. 
Liu concluded that the media did not achieve fundamental national 
integration in Mao's era because of China's economic under- 
development and political instability (Liu, 1971: 6). However, his 
analysis is limited by his not taking into account the 
institutional arrangement of the party-state or its way of social 
organization which in my view was the chief reason for the 
media's failure to achieve national integration in China. 
In Markam's Voices of the Red Giants (1967), he gives a 
historical perspective on social development to approach the mass 
communication and communist power in the USSR and China. He 
examines the media performance in their social settings using the 
method of system analysis. Like Liu he did not regard the media 
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as existing in isolation from other aspects of society, but 
unlike Liu, he took a much wider and comparative approach to 
study the media performance of the two major communist giants and 
to try to find their internal dynamic and contradictory movement 
of such a type of the entirely different and eccentric -- to the 
western world -- communication system. His major concern, as he 
indicated, was the relationship between communist regimes, mass 
media and society (Markham, 1967: 445-457). 
Central to Markham's research is his opposition to the media- 
centric view to the study of communication. He argues that "the 
mass communication system is a product of a society in which 
there is a reciprocal influence in operation among all the 
interacting social forces including the other system of 
institutions that serve the society" (Markham, 1967: ix). 
Following historical materialism, he observes that "How well a 
mass communication system serves its society is determined, then, 
not only by the nature of the system's capability but also by a 
whole host of other systems and facets of the society that both 
limit and expand that capability" (Markham, 1967: x). 
In this fruitful 500-odd page book, Markham contrasts the 
different Soviet and Chinese Political approaches towards the use 
of the mass media. He finds the Soviet model more conventional 
and more oriented towards the bureaucratic control of society. 
China, in contrast, because of its own cultural, political and 
economic conditions, and in particular, because of Mao Is charisma 
power and his radical ideas, creates its own dynamic (and 
limitation) to use the communication system to build up a 
communist society. Markham analyses and compares to Soviet Russia 
all the main organs of Chinese party media system -- from 
newspapers to (wired & wireless) broadcasting networks. He finds 
in general that the media all serve the party interests and that 
there is no basic difference between the two communist giants in 
this regard. But how, tactically, to use the media as ideological 
apparatus to reach their goals and objectives, is substantially 
different between the two nations. To this extent, Markham 
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regards China as a quite distinct case from Soviet Russian which 
mainly employed a conventional praxis in its communist media 
systems. He reveals that China developed more target oriented 
methods, aimed at reaching the vast and diverse Chinese 
population with its specific indigenous social conditions by 
which the media could change minds and attitudes. 
one of the strengths of Markham's analysis is that he sets it 
within a comprehensive historical context which includes their 
origins, so that for instance, his discussion of the development 
of the press in China is set against the 19th century western 
missionary importation and promotion of newspapers which 
introduced at the time a new form of communication. 
The considerable scale of Markham's comparative study of Soviet 
Russia and China means that there are some difficulties in his 
historical account of the Chinese media institutions. He for 
instance, does not give an adequate analysis as to how China, 
given the precedents or their absence, developed its unique 
styles of communication such as the Chinese way of using the 
media in promoting political campaigns. Despite these 
shortcomings, Markham's work remains amongst the most valuable 
of publications dealing with that period of communist media 
systems. 
2.1.2 Media Studies of mainland China in the Post-Mao Era 
Mao's death and Deng's regaining power in the late 170s marked 
a beginning of the new era with a wave of change dramatically 
taking place in post-Mao China both in direction and in approach. 
The economic reform programme and open door policy rapidly 
brought the nation out of the stage of classical communism, 
affecting all aspects of Chinese society including the mass media 
[cf. 2.2]. 
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As noted, changes in China correspondingly alerted Western 
scholars of Chinese communication studies who in turn were now 
able to adopt new approaches and more methods to conduct their 
researches on the subject. Firstly, no longer were they confined 
to the traditional framework of communist studies -- relying on 
decoding "Black Box" information and observation from a distance 
-- but could conduct field studies within the country and obtain 
easier access to many necessary documents and publications 
hitherto withheld from public scrutiny. Secondly, foreign 
scholars no longer stuck to the Cold War's us-versus-them 
dichotomy, but let go of stereotypes and out-dated media 
performance about mainland China, and began to see the new 
dimension of the media in terms of post-Mao industrial 
development even while was as yet subject to political control. 
Research methods became more diverse. Data collection and 
research projects operated in a much wider field ranging from 
empirical studies, content analysis, sampling survey and personal 
interview; and employed varying disciplines including 
anthropology, sociology, mass communication and political economy 
as well as traditional political-ideological studies. Among them, 
direct and in-depth interview from senior Party officials, media 
executives to ordinary Chinese people brought the most 
interesting and valuable information concerning post-Mao media 
development. As a result, the standard of media studies of the 
mainland China and the quantity of publications in the West has 
increased since the early 180s. 
However, this is not the case in mainland China itself. 
Chinese media researchers were and still are largely restricted 
in the nature of their investigations. Thus, compared to the 
West, there has been no parallel movement inside the Chinese 
academic community of the deeper and wider examination of media 
system and performance which has emerged in post-Mao western 
publications. The main reason, as noted, is that the Party 
believes that the media are too important to be allowed as a 
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subject of independent research. The legitimacy of control of the 
media -- in the authorities, view -- can be damaged by enquiring 
students and scholars. 
Therefore, media system studies on mainland China, especially 
institutional analysis, has become taboo -- a high risk area with 
political sensitivity: the state maintains careful vigilance 
towards the people engaged in media (journalism) research. A pre- 
emptive strike is often employed by the authorities concerned to 
restrict any potential "trouble makers". A research department 
supervisor, for instance, will not allow in the first place a 
student to choose any topics which may lead to questioning the 
existing media institutions. Thus independent research work 
comparable to western studies conducted in the last decade is 
practically impossible. 
For these reasons, as far as I know, little of direct relevance 
to this thesis has been published in mainland China or in the 
Chinese language in the last decade. Because of this unfortunate 
absence, the following review will not include the products of 
Chinese texts. This is by no means to deny that there have been 
many insightful analyses and challenging views hinted at or 
expressed in coded language or by hinted expression in scattered 
Chinese publications. Instead, I will focus on the research 
achievements in the West. 
Amongst the various books concerning Chinese media that have been 
published in English since the early 18os, the four most 
influential have been chosen for brief discussion. These are Mass 
Communication in China (1982) by John Howkins, Mass Media in 
China: The historv and the future (1989) by Won Ho Chang, Oi Lai! 
-- Mobilizing One Billion Chinese: The Chinese communication 
sVstem (1989) by Robert L. Bishop, and most recently, China 
Turned On: Television, reform and resistance (1991) by James 
Lull. 
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Howkins provides not a deep analysis but a useful general 
introduction to the Chinese media in the early period of the 
post-Mao era when the social reform movement was just instituted. 
Most of his information is based on his China tour in 
October/November 1979 at the invitation of the Chinese Foreign 
ministry during which he had extensive personal interviews with 
senior officials as well as people working at all levels in the 
media and the government, including Zhao Ziyang, who shortly 
afterwards became the prime minister and the Party's general 
secretary (1980-1989). In the pioneer stage of China's reform era 
at the beginning of the '80S when he was writing this book, 
Howkins found that mass communication in China still remained, 
by and large, the old model of Chinese communism. He hung on to 
the old view that the main agent of communication was not 
broadcasting or newspapers or the cinema, but the Communist Party 
itself; that the main resources of communications were not 
printing presses but party members; that their main tools were 
not TV programmes but political discussions (Howkins, 1982: 5). 
However, he also detected that major changes were brewing and 
just underway. He gives a detailed account of the new emerging 
social forces and how the post-Mao policy change started to 
effect the communication industries. He is the first to provide 
an analysis of the economic as well as the usual political 
dimension of the Chinese media performance. He also devoted his 
attention to the telecommunication and advertising areas: the 
former was seldom dealt with in mass communication studies and 
the latter was just emerging at the time. His discernment of 
communist problems put him in a position to predict that the 
clash between the traditional totalitarian system and the 
protagonists of modernization would be one of the motifs of post- 
Mao China (Howkins, 1982: 6). 
After a long pause two major books devoted wholly to Chinese 
media studies appeared in the same year: Bishop's Oi Lai! and 
Chang's Mass Media in China. 
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Bishop approaches the subject from the communication study point 
of view. He isolates the sender (the Chinese Communist Party) and 
the receiver (the ordinary Chinese citizen) in order to examine 
comprehensively how the Chinese communication system functions. 
He made some progress in understanding the evolution of Chinese 
mass communications, especially media development after Mao. But 
his conclusion was fraught with problems. According to him, 
"China and her communication system will remain socialist and 
authoritarian. A violent change, either toward Maoism or 
capitalism, is unlikely" (Bishop, 1989: 171. emphases added) . The 
difficulty lies in his terminological use of the term "socialist" 
and "capitalism". He seems to believe that socialism can be 
identified with Deng's dictum of building "a socialism with 
Chinese characteristics", a delicately designed basket into which 
can be thrown a mixture of capitalism market economy and one 
party political dictatorship. It is not clear in fact why this 
can be called "socialism", and why this to a degree cannot be 
called (author itar ian-style) capitalism -- particularly in the 
age of post-Mao China's booming Doint ventures and private 
enterprises, busy property transactions, in-flow of overseas 
investment, rampant commercial advertising, and flourishing stock 
markets with massive share speculation -- and all that those 
current trends imply. It is evident that Bishop did not consider 
media changes within the context of the social reform movement 
and within Deng's contradictory solution in post-Mao China. 
Therefore, he failed to assess the underlying tendency of the 
Chinese media towards liberalization, commercialization and, 
furthermore, democratization. This major flaw make his premises 
and assumptions too vulnerable to sustain his whole research 
framework. However, his factual research data and analysis are 
useful. 
Chang's work concentrates on analysis of the Chinese mass media 
in the traditional journalism format. The chief purpose of his 
book "is to present an up-to-data description and analysis of the 
mass media system in a country whose population exceeds one 
billion people". And, particularly, it is to show "the changing 
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trends in the Chinese media", and to provide "a context for 
comparing the Chinese media with other media systems" (Chang, 
1989: x). In many ways, the book consists largely of case studies 
with updated versions of much of Markham's work. Moreover, he 
devotes much attention to the contents of different media (e. g 
press, TV, radio) comparative analysis, editorial policy, 
administrative organization, journalistic control patterns and 
the historical development of journalism and its education in 
China. In a word, as a narrow focus study, he reveals in-depth 
the operation of the mass media in China today. 
James Lull's China Turned On is presented in a readable, 
interesting and journalistic style. Its strength is not that it 
deals with television study itself, as does this thesis, but 
rather that he examines the effects of the media, especially TV, 
on the hearts and minds of the Chinese people against the 
background of the far-reaching social reform in the post-Mao era. 
Lull made some innovations in the research by mainly employing 
sociological and anthropological methods. As he explained, "to 
research this book I wanted to enter more ethnographically into 
everyday life in China and to focus specifically on television's 
roles in culture and politics" (Lull, 1991: 40). In doing so, he 
conducted two types of extensive interviews: one was with China's 
leading television executives, media researchers and varying 
levels of authorities concerned; the other was with 100 ordinary 
Chinese families in lengthy in-home friendly conversations. The 
families were randomly chose in Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou, and 
Xian. Through these face-to-face direct talks and his first hand 
observation, he gives us a vivid account of the major events from 
a cultural studies point of view during post-IMao China's 
modernization drive, showing that the dramatic expansion of 
television in China's urban areas in the last decade has been a 
powerful stimulator of political resistance to the party-state 
system. He is also the first western scholar to reveal 
comprehensively the television-watching behaviors of the urban 
Chinese. He finds, because of the cramped living space in China's 
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cities and the family as the centrepiece of Chinese tradition, 
and because of a relative lack of leisure activities, television 
has fulfilled a particularly important function in post-Mao 
China's cultural development. He argues that television has 
intensified basic contradictions in the society, inspiring 
visions of a more free and democratic China. His analysis focuses 
on how oppositional readings through the television medium are 
reached, which is, according to him, through three ways: 1) the 
heterogeneity of opinion constructed with the television 
institution, 2) the polysemy of TV programmes, and the role of 
a politically engaged, active audience (Lull, 1991: 208-219). Lull 
also tries to explain why and how the 1989 Beijing tragedy 
occurred, and the role of television during that extraordinary 
period. Despite the 1989 Tiananmen setback, Lull remains 
relatively optimistic about the future of China and its movement 
towards pluralization and democratization. In short, his 
impressive work presents a cultural study with wide political, 
economic and social significance in the context of post-Mao 
China's profound changes. However, his work has a tendency to 
exaggerate the role of the television medium in the process of 
post-Mao transformation in Chinese society which, in my view, 
television itself as well as other new information technologies 
could not directly generate or determine the large scale of 
social changes as the evidence of this thesis is revealed. 
To sum up, post-Mao media studies about mainland China have 
entered a new pluralistic mode, as these examples above indicate. 
They are relevant to this study, providing as they do a macro- 
background of western academic understanding of the media in 
communist China. 
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2.2 THE MAOIST LEGACY A. ND THE POST-MAO REFORM PROGRAMME 
--- A Background Overview 
When Mao led the 1949 communist victory in the mainland China, 
he had a vision of building a communist society. By this he meant 
that the revolution of human mental or spiritual life must 
precede the material life. Mao persistently argued that the major 
challenge faced in a communist-led society was the pressing 
danger of the spontaneous tendency towards the restoration of 
capitalism through pursuing material progress, and as such, he 
viewed class struggle and political campaign as the "key link" 
upon which all other development hinged. The essence of Maoist 
was therefore, embodied in his famous formula: politics-in- 
command --- that correct thought could produce social miracles. 
In practice, Mao thus constantly sought to change human relations 
of production and relied on mass mobilization in an attempt to 
construct what he believed an ideal society. 
Yet Mao's impulsive revolutionary radicalism, which virtually 
dominated the whole nation between 1949 to 1976 and which was 
characterised by one mass campaign after another in the name of 
carrying on the class struggle, made the Chinese people pay a 
huge price. In 1958, for instance, Mao launched the Great Leap 
Forward aimed at the success of economic self-sufficiency, 
especially vis-a-vis the untrustworthiness of Soviet Russia. 
However, it failed devastatingly and, according to Chow's study, 
China's agricultural output during that period (1958-1962) 
dropped by 28%, light industry by 21%, and heavy industry by 23% 
(G. C. Chow, 1987: 72). Moreover, it resulted in record-breaking 
famine that was directly responsible for 25 to 30 million people 
dying of starvation (the official admitted figure is 15 million). 
There followed a period of reaction led by the Deng-and-Liu 
group, emphasising economic modernization. 
However, the new effort made by Deng-and-Liu group to 
institutionalize social order, to pursue material progress and 
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to implement the pragmatic and professionally oriented policy in 
the cultural field had worried Mao a great deal. The rise of 
state paternalism was unacceptable to Mao. As he was to reveal 
later, Mao believed that this would lead China down to the path 
of the Soviet "revisionism" (a term employed by Mao to justify 
his radical approach) and jeopardize his utopian ideal and 
revolutionary purity. Mao thus decided to launch another 
extraordinary campaign called the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) 
in an attempt to reverse the tendency with the re-imposition of 
his approach. The aim of the Cultural Revolution, according to 
Mao, was "to settle the question of who will win in the 
ideological field between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie 
(Pekinq Review, No. 25,17.7.1977); and "to establish the 
overwhelming ascendancy of Mao Zedong Thought" (cited from the 
editorial of Red Flag -- the Party's Central Committee's journal, 
no. 15,1967). 
From the outset, Mao determined to mobilize the masses into a 
rebellion against the Party bureaucracy as he defined it. Through 
his personal charisma, and with the help of mass communications, 
he attempted to smash the "revisionists" within the Party from 
the bottom to the top. Yet, Mao's fantasy about the Culture 
Revolution soon turned out to be a nightmare and a total 
disaster. As the result, mainland China experienced a decade of 
the personality cult accompanying massive violence, chaos and 
mass terror which led to a total national catastrophe: On the 
political front, China found itself in a near-anarchy situation 
and close to civil war with fierce fighting involving the ruling 
officialdom, the Red Guards, numerous political factions and 
varying military lords. On the economic front, the devastating 
consequence was worse than the Great Leap Forward: collectivised 
production and self-reliance became the paramount principle that 
must be employed to conduct all economic activities, production 
condition for economic growth rapidly deteriorated and the annual 
gross output value of industry and agriculture fluctuated between 
$US 70 billion to $US 90 billion against a population of 700 
million at that time. on the cultural front, there was total 
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denigration and prohibitions on both traditional and foreign 
cultures -- from Confucianism to Shakespeare, from Chinese opera 
to western classical music. On the international front, China's 
bid for self-reliance turned into almost total isolation. By 1969 
it seemed that an all-out war with the Soviets was imminent. It 
was only due to the western Cold War strategy that this explosive 
situation was relieved in the early 70s by a new compensatory 
solidarity with the political anxious the United States of 
America to cast the China trump card. 
Thus, the Cultural Revolution brought the whole country on the 
brink of collapse and if this general crisis went on any further, 
there was a real danger, as the Party latter admitted, of "the 
extinction of the Party and the nation" (wangdang wangguo). In 
this way, the Maoist approach actually resulted in the opposite 
effect to the one intended, and created the conditions for 
fundamental reform both in public opinion and the ruling elite. 
Indeed, at the time of Mao's death in late 1976, a change of 
direction to save the country was not only urgent but almost 
inevitable. At this critical juncture, Deng Xiaoping and his 
supporters won the decisive power struggle within the Party and 
proceeded with a reform programme. On The Communique of the Third 
Plenum of the Eleventh Chinese Communist PartV Central Committee 
in late 1978, the ruling elite led by Deng declared that "the 
main concentration of party work and the full attention of the 
people of China would shift toward socialist modernization and 
construction" (People's Daily, 24-12.1978). Thus, starting in 
1978, the far-reaching modernization drive was initiated. 
As economic development has become the Party's priority, Deng is 
virtually conceding that the Party's legitimacy now increasingly 
depends on the progress of modernization and prosperity, rather 
than revolutionary commitment and communist dogmas. This, 
however, has inevitably led to gradual ideological flexibility 
and even doctrinal dilution, whereas much of the Maoist legacy, 
particularly his unremitting emphasis on the class struggle and 
persistent appeal to egalitarianism, populism, asceticism and 
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isolationism, had to be discredited. In effect, Deng readily put 
Marxist-Leninist ideology behind his pragmatism and was to 
encapsulate his new guideline most famously in his dictum: "It 
doesn't matter whether the cat is white or black so long as it 
catches mice" (it f irst appeared in 1962 when Deng made a speech 
on agricultural production; Deng[1962], 1989: 305). Whereas, under 
Mao, "class struggle was the key link" with Mao's catchword of 
"politics- in-command", under Deng, this has to be reversed and 
the new catchword is now "To get rich is glorious 11 (Deng 
Xiaoping). The Chinese people are being reassured that the 
socialism sought by their leader will be one with "Chinese 
characteristics", meaning that socialism would be stressed when 
there was a challenge to the Party; Chinese characteristics will 
be given priority if a departure from communist ideology is 
required for the sake of economic growth (T. Tang, 1986). Of 
course, the official interpretation of Dengism -- especially his 
"cat philosophy" -- is more rhetorical with some lip service 
being paid to the terminology. According to Hu Qili (Party 
ideological boss, 1983-1989), the Party's reform programme is 
based on the essence of the Marxist thinking of seeking truth 
from facts. In China's present situation, the first priority is 
to develop the productive forces. So, he remarked, "whatever 
benefits the development of the productive forces is required or 
permitted by socialism, and whatever does not benefit it is 
contrary to scientific socialism 11 (Speech on Propaganda Work, 
1987, emphasis added). To be sure, since the late 1970s , Deng's 
"cat philosophy" has been increasingly popular among the ruling 
elite and has become a de fide principle in policy making. 
Central to Deng's ambitious economic reform programme were two 
radical strategies which are fundamentally alien to the party- 
state system: one is the "Open Door policy" towards world 
capitalist market of trade and investment, the other is the 
restructuring of the economic order with the disciplines of the 
market by allowing competition to be the spur to greater 
production increases and profitability. The purpose of such 
reforms is said to establish "a socialist market economy in 
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China" (Beilinci Review, 1.11.1992). This becomes the Party's "new 
historical mission and basic line" formally adopted by Deng's 
disciples in the latest 14th Party National Congress in October 
1992. Ironically, as stated before, by "socialist", it now only 
means to maintain monopoly of the political power of the 
communist Party; but, by "market economy", it actually means to 
use whatever capitalist means is necessary to keep the economic 
growing. 
Nevertheless, the economic reform in the last fourteen years has 
struck a great success. According to a recent comprehensive China 
survey conducted by the prestigious magazine The Economist, 
China's GNP has since then grown by an average of 9% a year and 
by 1994, China's economy is almost sure to be four times bigger 
than it was in 1978 (The Economist, 28.11.1992). Meanwhile, China 
has also showed huge gains in Foreign trade and western 
investment. Total two way trade grew from $US 13.4 billion in 
1976 to $US 160 billion in 1992 roughly accounting for 30% of 
China's GNP, and overseas investment from near-zero level in 1978 
to $US 16 billion in 1992 (Financial Times, 29.12.1992; People's 
Daily, 31.12.1992). By 1992, China had absorbed $US 23.7 billion 
worth of direct foreign investment, set up 21,000 overseas funded 
enterprises, used $US 52.7 billion of foreign loans to build over 
1,000 big and medium-sized projects (figures cited from the 
speech by China's vice-premier Zhu Rongji at Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, UK, 16.11-1992). 
As noted, the rapid economic expansion has been chiefly 
approached by the adoption of quasi-privatization in agriculture, 
the creation of "special economic zones'll decentralization 
policy, commercialization of industries, de-regulation of state- 
controlled price, liberalization of state allocations of producer 
goods, and most recently, massive introducing stock market and 
property market. As a result, China, overall economic performance 
has decisively moved out of the original central planning 
paradigm. In 1978, for instance, around 700 kinds of producer 
goods were allocated through the hands of the planners in 
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Beijing; by 1991, the number was significantly reduced to less 
than 20. In the fast growing non-state sector (e. g private or 
local cooperatives, joint ventures or overseas investors) which 
now accounts for over 45% of the Chinese economy, almost all 
inputs or outputs are operated in the market mechanism. Even in 
the case of the state sector, the situation has also changed 
remarkably. By the end of the 1980s, only within the span of ten- 
year time, about 56% of inputs were uncovered by the plan and 40% 
of output sold outside the plan. Therefore, in today's China it 
is not surprising to see that 60% of coal, 55% of steel and 90% 
of cement -- the typical goods controlled and allocated by the 
state under the command economy -- are actually delivered by the 
market rather than the planners in Beijing (China Survey, The 
Economist, 28-11.1992: 7). "The market economy", in the liberal 
minded Chinese vice-premier Zhu Rongjils words, "is no longer a 
textbook term but a living reality in the everyday life of the 
Chinese people" (speech at Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, UK, 16.11.1992). Clearly, The general trend of Chinese 
economic reform since 1978 has indicated an upward spiral towards 
forming a new market-oriented social order and thus deeply 
affects all aspects of the society. 
Indeed, the sweeping reform movement initiated by the drive of 
economic modernization has profound and wider-ranging social 
impacts on the post-Mao Chinese society. In brief then, there are 
several broad, interrelated trends at work pushing China 
proceeding of fundamental institutional transformation. 
The first obvious change, for all Deng's protestations about 
"Chinese characteristics", has been that the arbitrariness and 
scope of Party control have been much reduced and the state has 
become less intrusive, that Popular opportunities for local 
political participation have been increased. The Party's retreat 
from many aspects of the social arena, its yielded move of 
political rationalization and partial liberalization followed by 
economic development, and its new strategy of "reform and 
openness", has created the conditions for the growth of 
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autonomous - nature public sphere which tends to further expand its 
space through more differentiated and pluralistic activities. 
Secondly, the role of ideology has dramatically declined and 
rampant political propaganda has increasingly lost its hegemony 
over society. This has produced two results. In the first place, 
there is considerable recognition of the virtues of pragmatic 
approaches to varying social issues and as a result, many policy 
matters have been addressed on the basis of instrumental 
rationale rather than dogma. In the second place, the ideological 
laxity has fostered cultural genres including media 
entertainments and other less ideologically loaded materials. Not 
only Western knowledge and thoughts have been introduced in a 
large scale and unprecedented rate, but listening to foreign 
broadcasts (e. g the BBC, the VOA) and the consumption of foreign 
cultural goods, audi-video in particular, have now become 
commonplace. Moreover, heterodox views may now be expressed in 
a range of forms of cultural forums provided they are not 
politically too sensitive. 
Thirdly, where Mao went in for mass mobilization campaigns to 
pursue his radical revolutionary vision at the expense of social 
stability and economic development; Deng, in contrast, has sought 
to take measures to stabilise elite politics, fostering more 
orderly procedures, injecting more younger and better educated 
people into the state bureaucratic machines, and introducing more 
legal praxis to maintain an authoritarian social order. This, 
however, gives the rise to institutionalize the policy-making 
processes and to regulate the industrial behaviours such as media 
product distribution, advertising and libels. It thus in turn has 
moved China, though slowly and gradually, towards the path of 
rule by the law and therefore, has fostered social pluralization 
and democratization. 
Fourthly, while it has been less and less constrained by 
doctrinal considerations, Post-Mao China has been increasingly 
affected and re-shaped by the commercial forces. With the urgent 
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need for capital accumulation and rapid expansion of economy, the 
market has played ever growing role in challenging or undermining i 
the infrastructure of the Party-state and are pulling society far 
away from the state power which, in a positive sense, may prove 
to be necessary for transformming communist totalitarianism. 
Thus, the great reform movement has made China much less 
totalitarian. In fact, the structure of the party-state has been 
deeply shaken by the dynamics and impact of the open-door policy, 
commercialization, decentralization, cultural pluralism and de- 
ideologilazition in the post-Mao era. However, the evolution of 
the party-state transition is by no means smooth. Some of the 
difficulties may have been endemic to all Soviet model system, 
but others are peculiar to China. The central and irreconcilable 
contradiction lies in the so-called "Deng Xiaoping Style" reform 
program, namely, to pursue economic liberalization while 
maintaining the Party's political dictatorship. It has thus 
generated the intensifying social confrontation between the 
entrenched political institutions and alien and fast-growing 
socio-economic formations [see Introduction]. Therefore, a tug- 
of-war scenario has characterised the post-Mao reform era and has 
a momentous impact on social changes. 
To sum up, I cannot do better than cite T-Tang's lucid remarks 
as my conclusion: 
In undertaking to reform that (party-state) system, Deng av 
to pursue a middle course, balancing two sets of 
potentially contradictory principles. He was to play a 
decisive role, for better or for worse. But the three 
factors -- the party's retreat from society, the split 
within the party, and the impact of outside world -- 
interacted so as to produce tremendous social forces for 
reform and openness that Deng could not control. In the al 
Deng himself and the system he represented were directly 
challenged by the forces that he had unintentionally 
unleashed (T. Tang, 1991: 277). 
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2.3 MEDIA EVOLUTION IN COMMUNIST CHINA: A Profile 
The mass media always played a vital role in the communist state, 
aside from the important fact that the party itself, exercising 
its totalitarian control over the whole nation, obtained much of 
its coherence and convening powers by means of media activities. 
The evolution of media development in mainland China from the 
time Mao took over in 1949 until the present day, can be divided 
roughly into three phases: 
(1) from 1949 to the eve of the Cultural Revolution in 1966; 
(2) the ten years of Political turmoil of the Cultural 
Revolution; 
(3) from Mao's death in 1976 to the present. 
2.3.1 The First Phase (1949 -- 1966) 
In the first phase (1949 -- 1966), the Chinese communist party' 
consolidated its national power and established its control 
system over the mass media. This task was completed around the 
mid-1950s when the party formally committed itself to "the 
socialist construction cause". The media model was copied from 
the soviet Union's and overlaid A-with some 
- 
of Mao's much more 
radical ideas and methods. 'Basically 
the components of national 
media were all owned, operated, financed and staffed by the 
party. The pyramid structure of the media system rested on the 
party propaganda department which was directly responsible to the 
party's politburo. 
The People's Daily was officially designated as the party's 
mouthpiece. Its administration belonged to the ministerial level. 
its editorial policy was devised by the politburo in charge of 
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party ideology affairs. The primary purpose was to convey party 
policies and strategy direct to the masses and in Mao's era, the 
party -- particularly Mao himself -- heavily relied on the media 
to conduct large scale political campaigns. 
In 1957, for instance, Mao wrote an editorial for the People's 
Daily calling for "let a hundred flowers blossom and let a 
hundred schools of thought contend" aimed at encouraging people's 
free expression of their views to his regime. Unfortunately, this 
was proved to be Mao's plot of "luring the enemy into the trap". 
A few months later Mao wrote another editorial to launch "Anti- 
Rightist Campaign", mobilising the masses to identify the self- 
confessed anti-socialist elements in their communities. As a 
result, half a million people, mainly intellectuals, would 
thenceforth be labelled "rightist enemies". The ratio of 
rightists among journalists was higher than other groups, 
exceeding 10% and in some media organizations it reached 30% 
(B. Liu, 1990: 90). 
The role of the media during the campaign of the Great Leap 
Forward was notorious. The media were engaged in producing 
various fabrications of "the great achievements" in an attempt 
to raise revolutionary spirit and further support the apparent 
good sense and uplifting purpose of Mao's strategy. So, for 
instance, reports on "high production" of crops being produced 
by some rural communes were incredibly exaggerated or simply 
falsified out of all proportion, giving the impression that Mao's 
approach would soon bring China to the economic level of Britain 
and America. 
Conversely, the media's silence and subjection to Party authority 
had its own heinous consequences. For instance, when 25 to 30 
million people died of starvation in the early 1960s, the 
authorities forbade, and the media organizations dared not, to 
cover and gather this information. The tragedy remained strictly 
hidden from the outside world as well as the Chinese people 
themselves. only about a few top leaders had been allowed to know 
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some detail about the extent of this man-made disaster into which 
Mao had led the country. 
During this phase, the media were also frequently used in the 
power struggle. When Mao's Political campaign brought economic 
depression, he had to yield power to Deng-and-Liu group. The 
media were permitted to signal consequent policy changes from 
pursuing ideological purity to promoting state paternalism and 
for economic and cultural development and vice versa [cf. 2.1, 
3.3.2). 
The Newspaper 
In 1949 there were about 400 newspapers in China, mostly run by 
private companies. After the communist took power, the party paid 
much attention to the development of the print media. by 1954, 
the state took over all private newspapers. The number of state- 
own newspapers increased to around 560. Circulation amounted to 
about 18 millions. All the newspapers were virtually organs of 
different levels of the party or authorities (e. g national, 
provincial, city, county levels or official sponsored mass 
organizations such as Trade Unions, Youth League) . Most were 
state subsidized and free of charge. However, before the cultural 
revolution, there were also some evening papers without such a 
strong political dimension. 
Radio 
Radio broadcasting developed substantially during the first 
period between 1949 to 1966. The party's strategy was divided 
into two: in the urban area concentration was on wireless 
broadcasting while in the rural areas every effort was made to 
establish a wired broadcasting network [cf. 3.1.2]. 
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The Film Industrv 
By the end of 1965 the national film industry was well 
established. There were 16 film studios which normally produced 
an average of one feature film a week. Whereas in 1949 the 
Chinese film market was dominated by the USA and cinema 
admissions were only about 47 million a year, by 1965 the state, 
with its provision of mobile film show units was recording 
admissions of 4.63 billion. The average person saw seven films 
a year. 
2.3.2 The Cultural Revolution ( 1966 - 1976 ) 
This was a period of extremism, today in China referred to as 
"the dark age". Mao had found that criticism of him and his 
policy was being largely conducted under the guise of the Chinese 
heritage of multible-perspectives, and through the cultural 
sphere. So he took it upon himself to a launch counter-attack, 
as he saw it, called "the Cultural Revolution". Mao used the 
media in an increasingly coherent, radical as well as self- 
destructive way. The number of publications declined markedly 
from about 1,000 to 200, the number of magazine dropped from 790 
in 1965 to 191 in 1966 to 27 in 1967. Worse still, from 1966 to 
1969, almost all television stations stopped offering service for 
nearly three years. In the meantime, the giant propaganda machine 
of Chinese communists put into highest gear to disseminate 
Maoism. According to Chinese official report, between 1966 and 
1968, the Beijing authority issued 150 million sets of Mao's 
Selected Works in Chinese, Mongol, Tibetan, Uighur, Kazakh, and 
Korean; 140 million copies of Mao's Selected Readings; and 740 
million copies of Little Red Book of Mao's Ouotations freely 
distributed to almost every Chinese adult (Pekinq Review, No. 2, 
January 1969: 3). 
The media cult of Chairman Mao reached maximum pitch. Various 
Mao's statements were quoted in journal, s articles, cited in 
newspapers, editorials and broadcast on wireless and wired 
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broadcasting and, later, on the television medium. On every 
newspaper, for instance, the upper right corner of the front page 
was exclusively reserved for a daily display of Mao's sayings, 
always framed in a box and entitled as "The Supreme Instruction". 
As a rule, wherever Mao's quotation appeared, it must be printed 
in boldface type. If anything went wrong with these formats, 
there could be a "political incident": the authorities would take 
the matter seriously and the editor or reporter in question could 
be severely punished. 
Moreover, hundreds of local media outlets parroted the Maoist 
controlled The People's Daily by simply copying this paper even 
from the headline to the typeface as a widely spread saying at 
that time described: "the job of small newspapers (i. e county and 
city level newspapers) is patterned after big newspapers (i. e 
regional and national level ones) ; and the job of big newspapers 
is to follow The People's Daily". Only in the next phase of media 
development did it become evident that previously the media had 
been subject to what was wryly termed "a thousand Buddhas with 
the same face". Eighteen of 26 minutes of news programme could 
be devoted to Mao's slogans, commonly used as bona fide news copy 
which in fact simply furthered his version of the class struggle 
and denounced his political opponents. As a result, media was 
known as "the manufacturer Of Falsehood, Boastfulness and 
Emptiness", a special term now used to describe Maoist extremism 
of media performance during that period. 
Meanwhile, as Mao saw the intellectual group as dangerous to his 
regime (he believed that "the more knowledge you have, the more 
reactionary you will bell) and was closely identified with "the 
overthrown bourgeoisie class", thousands of reporters, editors, 
broadcasters, and filmmakers were imprisoned or forced into 
labour camps. More than 2,000 films and operas were banned almost 
overnight. For ten years, only a few revolutionary model operas, 
films, music and songs were allowed to cast. Media censorship 
intensified. 
85 
"Dazibaoll the Big Character Poster [cf. 2.1.1] were encouraged 
by Mao to be used nationwide to engage the class struggle 
movement. Together with mass rallies, these up to a point 
replaced the conventional, formal mass media. Mao personally 
favoured these indigenous forms of communication which were 
simpler, cheaper, and based on face-to-face contact. He described 
this -- relying on the two forms of communication (i. e 
conventional media and indigenous means) -- as "walking on two 
legs", which he believed the most effective and efficient means 
to influence people. The situation continued until Mao's death 
and shortly afterward the arrest of Madam Mao-led Maoist group 
(i. e labelled "the Gang of Four") in late 1976. 
2.3.3 Media Evolution After Mao (1976 - 
2.3.3.1 Media Proliferation 
In his editorial introduction to the 1982 survey of the Beijing 
media audience, the f irst of its kind conducted on mainland 
China, Womack made some lucid observations into the new situation 
of post-Mao Chinese media development: 
The variety and quantity of print media have gone far 
beyond previous levels. Instead of quotations from 
Chairman Mao, TV digests are the most popular reading. 
the newspaper public is shifting toward more local and 
informal papers and away from the stodginess of the major 
provincial and national party papers. Technical, 
specialty, and professional periodicals are mushrooming. 
Television is beginning its great ascent in Chinese 
audience share. Within the journalism profession a new 
emphasis has been given to quality news reporting, 
investigative reporting, and experimentation. 
International news is quite accessible, both directly 
through Voice of America, the BBC, and Soviet Station and 
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indirectly through coverage in the Chinese press 
(1986: 14). 
The proliferation and expansion in the Chinese mass media in the 
post-Mao era is a remarkable achievement which can be observed 
from the vertical comparisons of 1978 (with population about 900 
millions) and 1990 (with population 1140 millions ) sketched in 
the following tables: 
Table 2.1 
Growth of Newspapers in Mainland China 
Year Newspaper til 
------------ 
% of Party's 
------------- 









1990 1,442 28.16% 139.86 
Source: the 1978 figure comes from 
, 
China Statistical Yearbook 
(1983), pp531; the 1990 figure comes from China Journalism 
Yearbook (1991), pp457. 
Table 2.2 
Growth of Periodicals in Mainland China 
Year Periodical titles Average total run ( mil) 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
1978 542 60 
1990 5,751 162 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (1991), pp755. 
Table 2.3 
Growth of Radio Broadcasting in Mainland China 
Year Radio stations NO-of receiver Per 1,000 Cov rage of 
( Mil ) inhabitants population 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
1978 93 75.46 80 30% (est) 
1990 635 262.26 235 78% 
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Source: the 1978 figure comes from China Statistical Yearbook 
(1983), pp379; the 1990 figure comes from China Statistical 
Yearbook (1991), pp 760. 
Table 2.4 
Growth of TV Broadcasting in Mainland China* 
Year TV stations No-of receiver Per 1,000 Coverage of 
( Mil ) inhabitants population 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
1978 32 3.04 3 15%(est) 
1990 509 165 145 80% 
* More detailed data are provided in appropriate chapters. 
Source: same as Table 2.3. 
As can be seen from Table 2.1, there were only 186 newspapers in 
1978; and the figure rose nearly 8 times to 1,442 in 1990. From 
January 1,1980 to March 1,1985,1,008 newspapers emerged 
(Chinese Journalism Yearbook, 1986: 121). In other words, one 
newspaper was started every other day. 
The biggest changes, however, came f rom the structure and content 
genres of the print media. Before 1978, the character of the 
Chinese press was monotonous and the phenomenon of the Party 
organ was overwhelming. In 1975, for instance, out of a total of 
180 newspaper titles, 152 (84.4%) were directly subordinate to 
various levels of Party committees concerns as their organs, and 
most of the rest of the papers belonged to Party-led 
organizations such as the Youth League, trade unions etc. Since 
1978, however, the size and volume of Party organs have been 
greatly reduced. The following Table is the structure of the 1990 
Chinese newspapers which shows the overall trend of post-Mao 
China's print medium. 
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Table 2.5 
The Struct ure of Chinese 
- -- 
Newspapers in 199o 
- ------- -------------------- 







-------------- -------------- ----- 
cir (mil) 
-- 







National 2 142.95 
Provincial 30 3484.42 
City-level 290 3332.14 
county-level 84 147.2 
Target papers 261 18.1% 2900.17 15.52% 
Workers 21 887.43 
Peasants 24 436.95 
Youth & Student 62 899.55 
Minorities 80 158.33 
others* 74 517.91 
Specialty papers 602 41.75% 6132.95 32.83% 
Economic 137 751.57 
scientific 75 310.96 
General/digest 16 1584.88 
Culture 42 627.01 
TV guides 55 915.97 
others** 277 1942.56 


















* Including those for defense, women, the elderly, non-ccp 
groups, overseas Chinese, and foreign-language papers. 
** including those for legality, education, sports, health, 
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population and social life, and occupations. 
The original source incorrectly sums up to 18,729.96 million 
copies (annual). 
source: Calculated from China Journalism Yearbook (1991), pp457. 
As can be seen from Table 2.5, while Party organs still retain 
their major position with 28.16% of the total titles and 38.04% 
of the total annual circulation, there has been a substantial 
improvement in diversity, with varied publications ranging from 
targeted papers (18.1% of the total titles), enterprise papers 
(9.36%), evening papers (2.4%) to specialty papers (41.75%). 
There are now newspapers managed by non-official organizations, 
run by various social and professional groups, owned by non- 
government units and even published by individuals (particularly 
in the period before 1989). Among them, the most remarkable case 
is the evening newspapers: 38 papers, which only make up 2.4% of 
the total titles, virtually have the share of 12.55% of the 
circulation nationwide. Others such as genera 1- interest, special- 
subject and digest categories also have gained popularity. 
Moreover, there are increasing signs that the Chinese press is 
moving towards a two-tier British-style newspaper market, namely, 
one for serious (or quality) papers, one for popular (or tabloid) 
papers. The former tend to deal with politics, economics, 
international relations and social life with the emphasis on 
information and analysis; the latter have a softer, more lively 
content with heavy use of human interest stories, sex (but less 
strong than, for instance, Britain's Sport, or Page three of The 
Sun) and violence. 
However, the increased diversity of the mass media does not imply 
that the Chinese media system has already become a pluralistic 
and politically autonomous one. It is still overshadowed by the 
Party's political power and constrained by the existing party- 
state control mechanism (e. g censorship, political, financial and 
administration pressures) . In fact, any further reform that leads 
to fundamental institutional change will face strong resistance, 
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and its success will ultimately depend on the success in 
transforming the party-state to a democratic state. 
2.3.3.2 Media Institutional Reform 
It has been in post-Mao ref orm era that the growth of the Chinese 
mass media have gained a real "great leap forward". This is 
particularly true in the case of the television industry which 
has experienced an unprecedented booming period, the speed of 
which compares with the development of television anywhere else 
in the world. In the meantime, considerable changes have also 
taken place in the media institution itself. By adopting a 
decentralization strategy with a degree of autonomy for running 
media (particularly at local levels), and introducing a market 
mechanism with increasingly commercial involvement, the reform 
of the Chinese mass media have opened a new chapter in which the 
institutional performance of the media have virtually departed 
from its original unified, centre-dominated, politics-in-command 
model. Thus a process, however long-term-transitional, of what 
Weber may call instrumental rationalization is underway, by which 
the forces of the state, local regimes and the media industries 
pursue their own goals with a diversity of interests. 
Significantly, the costs of the institutional arrangement and 
operaýfion have been reduced, and much progress (including many 
attempts) has been made in the practice of freedom of the press 
such as favouring greater informational openness, greater 
diversity in reporting, better representation of public opinion, 
increasing media oversight over policy-making and seeking greater 
editorial autonomy all of which could hardly have been thinkable 
in Mao's era. 
In a broad sense, the rapid expansion of the mass media in post- 
Mao China has facilitated social changes in a direction that is 
beyond the control of the party's dictatorship and towards the 
process of democratization. The massive increase of media 
products and audience size, the proliferation of the 
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communication means, have reinforced each other to create 
dynamics that have fostered a diversity of cultural and social 
sentiments at the expense of further weakening the Party's 
hegemony. It is Deng's hope that his economic reform programme 
would come to aid and maintain the party-state system. But the 
dynamics of the reform movement and new social formations created 
by the reform have led to the emergence of a less ideological and 
pluralistic mass media system and, furthermore, have driven the 
media towards democratization. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
TELEVISION IN MAO'S ERA ( 1958 -- 1976 ) 
--- A Historical Survey 
In this chapter, I have set out to examine systematically the 
historical development of Chinese television prior to Deng 
Xiaoping' s era (1958-1976) ;I have focused on its establishment, 
policy evolution, the change of programming content, the 
structure of its political/ideological control, and its 
operational models. As a result of this examination, I have tried 
to make two particular contributions to the current debate: 
1) Assessing the origins of Chinese television and its 
performance in Mao's era with particular reference to 
primary materials; 
2) Producing the argument, based on the above study, that 
Chinese television was a Political creation; that, although 
media development in communist China (with reference to 
television) was broadly in line with that of the Soviet 
Union, the Chinese case presents a unique experience with 
typically Maoist characteristics in pursuit of its radical 
ideological goal. 
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3.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
3.1.1 The Early Development of Chinese Broadcasting 
Radio broadcasting reached China by the end of 1922, roughly at 
the same time as the original BBC (the British Broadcasting 
Company) was established in London. It was introduced by 
westerners as a commercial operation in an attempt to exploit the 
virgin land of the huge China market. On Jan. 23.1923, an 
American journalist E. G. Osborn, financially sponsored by an 
oversees Chinese businessman in Japan for the purpose of selling 
radio receivers and other wireless equipment to China, set up the 
first radio station "Radio Corporation of China" from his own 
Shanghai department store. It was equipped with a 50-watt 
transmitting set, to broadcast news and music in the Shanghai 
area. However, the station only lasted three months and, in 1924 
the second station "The Kellogg Radio Company" was established 
by an American firm in Shanghai to provide a regular service. The 
British, French, Italian and Japanese soon followed suit, setting 
up their own stations around the urban areas particularly along 
the eastern coast of China (G. Lai, 1978: 155-156; Y. Zhao, 1987: 7; 
Z. Liu, 1988: 29-32). 
In August 1928, the Chinese Nationalist government formally set 
up its 50-kilowatt national network, "The Central Broadcasting 
Station" in its capital city, Nanking. Four years later, it 
installed a Garman-made, 75-kilowatt short-wave transmitter which 
was brought the whole China and most of Southeast Asia into its 
coverage. It was chiefly used for newscasts and was controlled 
by two state agencies: the Central Broadcasting Administration 
in charge of policy matters and the Ministry of Communications 
which administered the system. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War 
(1937 - 1945) Chinese radio broadcasting flourished briefly 
particularly in the private sector. Between 1932 and 1936,63 
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privately owned commercial stations went on the air compared with 
the 16 non-commercial stations emerging at the same period and 
controlled by various levels of authorities over the country. The 
radio sets reached more than 200,000. In 1936, the Ministry of 
communications revised the 1932 provisional broadcasting 
regulations (which set many restrictions on private radio 
stations) in an attempt to promote the industry. However, the 
Anti-Japanese War and the following the Civil War (1946 - 1949) 
between Jiang's Nationalist government and Mao's communists 
guerrillas seriously disrupted the process. Before 1949 the 
number of radio stations in "Nationalist" China was about a 
hundred (half of them privately run), mostly urban-based, with 
a total power capacity of 460-kilowatt. There were just one 
million radio sets at the time averaging 1.3 for every 1,000 
persons, also largely concentrated in big cities such as 
Shanghai, Peking and Naking (cf. Q. Bai, 1990: 10-11; G. Lai, 
1978: 161-162; Z. Liu, 1988: 34; J. Markham, 1967: 341-343). 
3.1.2 communist Experience 
From the beginning, Mao's communists developed radio broadcasting 
under political and military pressure in order to counteract the 
influence of the Nationalist authority. They paid high attention 
to this new medium in an effort to launch their own propaganda 
campaigns as part of the strategy designed for their 1949 nation- 
wide victory. In the spring of 1940, when Zhou Enlai, the first 
prime minister of communist China (1949 - 1976) brought back a 
300 watt transmitting set to Yanan from Moscow, the Communists 
started preparations for transmitting a radio service. By the 
end of 1940, the Communists set up their first radio station in 
the headquarters at Yanan. Under hard conditions, the "Yanan 
Xinhuna (i. e New China) Broadcasting Station", with the call 
letters XNCR, managed to provide a two-hour daily service, mainly 
broadcasting news and commentaries about Mao-controlled areas and 
party policies. It was housed in several cave dwellings halfway 
up a mountain with its electricity generated from the motor of 
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a used car which was fuelled by gas made by burning charcoal. At 
one point, the station had only an old manual gramophone, but no 
records. It was reported that Mao made his personal contribution 
and turned over to the station more than 20 records of his own 
(People's Daily, 15.9.1977). Undoubtedly, the Communists drew 
immediate benefits from using the radio broadcasting. on May 5 
1941, Mao gave his directive to the Party's Central Committee in 
which he remarked that "all liberated areas (i. e the areas under 
communist control) should regularly receive Yanan's broadcasts. 
If they haven't got a radio receiver set, they should try every 
means to get one" (cited in Z. Liu, 1988: 36). However, the station 
ceased to function two years later due to the technical problem 
of the transmitting set and it was not until 1945 that the 
station resumed services. As Mao's guerrillas were heading to the 
triumph of seizing state power, a relatively sizable broadcasting 
system was steadily built up by the communists in order to use 
the medium to mobilize mass support. By the end of 1948, there 
were 16 radio stations in communist controlled areas of Chang 
Kiakow, Manchuria, Shnkiang and eastern and northern China, 
providing news, bulletins on the war and official announcements 
as well as some entertainment programmes. Meanwhile, in an 
attempt to make the Red voice heard to people outside China, the 
communists also managed, starting from 1947, to provide limited 
English and Japanese services (Beiling Review, 22.2.1982: 20; 
W. Emery, 1969: 466-467). 
When the Communists took power and founded the People's Republic 
of China in October 1949, the development of the broadcasting 
industry, especially the radio network and rural wired 
broadcasting system, was immediately put on the Party's agenda: 
this mass medium had proven to be Powerful, indeed crucial, in 
establishing and consolidating the power of the Soviet type 
communist state. on 5 December 1949, the "Yanan Xinhua 
Broadcasting Station" was formally renamed as the national radio 
station, the "Central People's Broadcasting Station" (CPBS) , 
broadcasting about 15.5 hours daily of which roughly 50% was 
taken up by news and political-related programmes, 25% by 
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entertainment and the rest to educational and cultural 
programming. In April 1950, the Central Press (and Broadcasting) 
Bureau, the state agency which supervised and regulated the media 
communications at that time, issued a important policy document 
the "Decisions Regarding the Establishment of Radio-Receiving 
Networks" in which all levels of authorities, state institutions, 
factories, schools, Army units and public organizations were 
asked to do their best to install transmitting stations and wired 
loudspeakers and to train monitors (Y. Kang, 1982: 19). As part of 
the attempt to establish wired broadcasting system in the rural 
areas, the State Council announced a plan in 1955 to provide 
receiving stations free of change; the network, known as point- 
to-point radio communication, was patterned after the Soviet 
Union radio-diffusion exchange system. It employed a central 
receiver, with an amplifier and switchboard housed in a studio, 
to provide a service using wired loudspeakers connected with each 
household in the village and installed in any public space -- 
village squares, school playgrounds, rice paddies. communal mess 
halls, and even on treetops and telephone poles. With state 
promotion, the wired broadcasting system grew rapidly. It reached 
almost all of the more than 2000 counties in China with about 70 
million loudspeakers in the early 1960s to serve a 400 million 
rural population. Despite the underdeveloped economy at the time, 
by the end of 1965, however, a giant radio broadcasting system 
was established in Mao's China. There were 87 radio stations 
covering most urban areas with about 12 million radio sets; the 
county rediffusion stations stood at 2,365 accommodating 87 
million loudspeakers. In a sense, Chinese broadcasting 
communication was effectively integrated into the communist state 
system and used by the Chinese authorities to advance the social 
engineering program (cf. F-Yu, 1964: 123-131; J. Chu, 1978: 27-30; 
B. Womack, 1986: 25-26; W. Chang, 1989: 151-162). 
The early development of the Chinese television industry followed 
a similar pattern, but with its own distinguishing 
characteristics within rather unusual political circumstances. 
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3.2 A POLITICAL CREATION: The origins of Chinese Television 
Chronicle Of Events 
Feb. 1955 The Central Broadcasting Bureau (later called the 
Ministry of Broadcasting) makes a formal proposal to 
the State Council to establish the first TV station in 
Beijing. 
May 1956 China begins to experiment with TV equipment. 
Aug. 1957 Initial period of setting up the Beijing 
Experimental TV Station (China's de facto state 
television station at the time). 
1.5 1958 The Beijing TV Station starts to broadcast in the 
Beijing area, and some other provinces soon follow 
suit. 
1961-1963 Under the three-year austerity programme the number of 
Chinese TV stations (incl. relay stations) reduces 
from 36 to 8. 
1966-1969 All 14 TV stations in operation have virtually no 
service due to the Cultural Revolution. 
May 1973 Start of colour television broadcasting using the 
PAL system. 
Sep. 1976 Mao Zedong dies. 
Dec. 1978- Deng Xiaoping becomes China's paramount leader and 
launches the modernization movement. 
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3.2.1 Politics-in-Command and the "Great Leap Forward" 
As analysed in the preceding chapter, central to Mao's 
intellectual concerns after the 1949 victory of Chinese 
communists, were the need to keep the population keyed up for his 
continuation of the revolutionary course: the question was how 
to turn the latent revolutionary spirit into a powerful material 
force inspired by guerrilla warfare, and how to avoid the fate 
of a revolutionary socialist state evolving into a bureaucratic- 
technocratic dominatory state (a reference to the Soviet Union 
in Mao's mind) . As a result, Mao, out of a combination of 
commitment to constructing genuine socialism and his experiences 
with guerrilla warfare, developed his deep faith in the power of 
ideas with his solution of politics-in-command. He argued that 
man with proper motivation could transform his environment 
significantly and therefore, political considerations must take 
precedence over everything else in the formulation of policies 
or in the guidance of action (cf. Mao, 1964: 397-520). 
In the late 1950s, Mao's idea Of Politics-in-command began to 
prevail in the ruling Party as a guiding principle. The first 
crucial test was the "Great Leap Forward" in 1958. It was 
designed by Mao to modernize China in a single mass campaign 
chiefly by relying on the power of the mass revolutionary spirit 
to "catch up" with major western industrialized nations. The 
leadership even set a timetable to enhance the morale of the 
masses, for instance, to surpass Britain within 15 years 
(People's Daily, 1.1.1958). Of course, this was to be done by 
mobilizing mass political enthusiasm and participation which was 
believed to be the key for bringing the communist revolution to 
successful fruition in 1949. Thus with Mao's logic that the 
modernization of China and the transformation of the Chinese 
people's mentality were two sides of the same coin, politics-in- 
command and mass campaigning became the dominant approach. It was 
precisely under these social circumstances that Chinese 
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television was born, formed and developed [cf. 2.2]. 
3.2.2 The Pioneering Stage of Chinese TV 
In Feb. 1955 the Central Broadcasting Bureau made a proposal to 
the State Council about the possibility of setting up the first 
television station in Beijing. Soon afterwards, the broadcasting 
authority received a formal reply from prime minister Zhou Enlai 
saying: "This issue shall be included and discussed in the "Five- 
year Culture and Education Plan. " By 1956, two Chinese students 
having returned from studying television technology in the Soviet 
Union and Czechoslovakia, China began to experiment with some 
limited key items of television equipment. Given its 
industrialization level, China could take only this small step 
towards developing a television industry and there was no 
question of setting up a television station or providing a 
service at that time. However, the situation changed dramatically 
as a result of an accidental event. one year later, the Beijing 
Government discovered to its surprise that its Nationalist rival 
in Taiwan had Publicly transmitted a certain TV programme using 
equipment supplied by the "Radio Corporation of America" (RCA). 
Obviously the Beijing authorities had reason to feel threatened. 
Y. Mei, the general director of the Central Broadcasting Bureau 
at the time, clearly made this point in his later memoir (Mei, 
1988: 102): 
We were planning to set up our TV station in the early 
1950s and began some training and preparations. 
However, only when we got some information that the 
Nationalists in Taiwan were about to provide a TV 
service in Oct. 1958, did we become aware of its 
political implications and take a swift decision to 
set up our TV station ahead of the Taiwanese schedule. 
At that time the Soviet broadcasting adviser Cheranko 
told us that China lacked the basic expertise and 
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equipment to do so in the short term. We simply 
ignored his words and made up our minds to show the 
Taiwanese and the Soviets otherwise. 
Thus both sides of the Taiwan Straits competed to set up a 
television service, albeit with an ulterior political motive: 
both sides of the Straits claiming legitimacy to rule and 
represent all the people of China. Moreover, the worry of 
mainland China was reinforced by rumours that the Taiwan 
authorities were about to start a regular television service on 
Oct. 10.1958, the day Taiwan was to celebrate its National Day (in 
fact, not until on Oct. 10.1962, did Taiwan set up its first 
television station and provide the regular service) . In response 
to this challenge, the Broadcasting Authority in mainland China 
declared it would launch television broadcasting before 
Oct. 10.1958 as a top political priority, and quickened its 
preparation for establishing a television station. This also 
coincided with the "Great Leap Forward" which was then 
approaching its zenith. To some extent this irrational, peasant- 
style mass movement did inspire people to achieve some sort of 
miracles. There was a Mao saying popular all over the nation at 
that time that under the leadership of the Communist Party, as 
long as there are people, every kind of miracle can be created. 
Dominated by such passionate and optimistic devotion, Chinese 
television, despite its immaturity, began its own "Great Leap 
Forward". 
3.2.3 The "Great Leap Forward" Of Chinese Television 
At the end of 1957, a television delegation was sent to the 
Soviet Union and East Germany to learn from their experience Of 
running a television station and to ask for technical aid; the 
following year, China imported 200 Russian TV sets and produced 
a very small number of Russian models to supply the domestic 
market by hire purchase. In the meantime, the country brought 
together top technologists to tackle television technical 
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problems and made some progress. Shortly afterwards, the first 
1,000W transmitter together with a few other key items of 
equipment, were produced on an experimental scale. This was 
already enough to strengthen the position of the radical line to 
take further bold action. on April 7th, 1958, the Fifth National 
Broadcasting Conference, the top policy making instrument taking 
place every 2-3 years, was held in Beijing. The broadcasting 
chief Y. Mei proposed a policy report "Politics is the key to the 
Great Leap Forward in broadcasting work" in which he stressed the 
importance of putting political needs first and foremost in 
developing the broadcasting industry. Y. Zhou, the Party 
propaganda chief, on the other hand, told the conference that 
there were two ways to develop the broadcasting industry as well 
as to conduct propaganda work: one was to wait for material 
conditions to be met and rely on professionals; the other was to 
create the condition by the revolutionary spirit and rely on 
politics, the Party, and the masses. He then demanded that the 
second path be taken and called for a Great Leap Forward in all 
aspects of broadcasting to accelerate the pace of development 
(News Front, No. 5,1958). It was also reported that, as part of 
the Great Leap Forward, the first TV station would soon be 
established in Beijing followed by a national TV network within 
a few years. By then, there was every reason to encourage the 
Chinese broadcasting authority to realize its ambition of 
providing a TV service before Oct-10-1958 and , in this way, to 
win a political battle with the Nationalists in Taiwan as well 
as Western countries (Z-Guo, September 1990; S. Fang, October 
1990). 
At 19: 00, on May. 1.1958, International Labour Day, China's first 
television station -- Beijing TV Station (later renamed China 
Central Television) formally went on the air with one channel in 
the Beijing area only. The major equipment of the station 
included just four image-orthicon cameras, one Outside Broadcast 
van, and one 1,000 Watt transmitter (VHF, band 1, channel 2). 
Despite the inadequate equipment, very poor working conditions, 
with the staff operating on both transmission and production 
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amounted to no more than 50, and despite there being only about 
30 TV receivers mostly owned by governmental bodies at that time, 
the Beijing authorities chose that day to start a TV service in 
an effort to pursue their political and ideological goals. It 
initially broadcast twice, and later increased to four times a 
week for 2-3 hours per day. It carried news, documentaries, 
entertainment and educational programmes. The first night's show 
was rather dull. Here is the list of programmes forming the two- 
hour broadcast offered on the opening celebration (C. Zhuang, 
1985: 3-4): 
19: 05 Political talk about the future plan of the Great Leap 
Forward, by labour models; 
19: 15 "Going to the Countryside", a Political documentary; 
19: 25 Poem and dance, art performances; 
19: 50 "Television", scientific&educational documentary, 
supplied by the Soviet Union. 
Even by the standard of that time, the above programmes fell 
short of being a television service in a real sense. The Chinese 
ruling Communists, however, were quite satisfied with its 
political significance. The state news agency, "Xinhuall 
immediately announced the news to the world that the first TV 
station of the People's Republic of China was born in Beijing; 
others claimed that this was a victory for the politics-in- 
command strategy, and a demonstration Of the advantage of 
socialism over the system of Taiwan and its American-led allies 
(Y. Mei, 1987: 164). In short, the birth of Chinese television, 
imbued with Mao's radical passion, carried the hallmark of the 
mass media in the communist state: the Party's need to judge, 
conduct and interpret social events was of paramount importance. 
With the atmosphere of the Great Leap forward in the late 1950s, 
Chinese television entered its initial stage of development. 
Outside the capital Beijing, provincial people also showed great 
interest in television. They hurriedly set up one station after 
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another by every conceivable means. Thus many stations were 
inevitably of a poor standard. Jilin province, for instance, 
whose TV station was originally scheduled for around the mid-60s; 
in fact, "after five months utter devotion, the broadcasters of 
Jilin province successfully established a television station at 
the incredibly low cost of only 190,000 Chinese Yuan (approx 
$US100,000 at that time) as early as 195911 (China's TV Stations, 
1987: 116). However, after long inauguration period, Jilin 
province was still suffering from poor quality TV reception as 
well as other long term technical problems. From 1958 to 1960, 
at least sixteen out of twenty nine provinces had their own 
television stations offering two to three hours service for 
audience, despite the very small number of television receivers 
available (between a few to over a hundred sets in each 
province) . As far as the program production and transmission were 
concerned, all stations at that time had to rely on films and 
tapes being "bicycled" from one to another, a term used to 
describe sending TV programmes by any transportation means, such 
as plane and cars, due to the situation of the absence of 
electronic transmission (J. Howkins, 1982: 27). Moreover, the 
1960 National Broadcasting Conference set forth a timetable for 
all other provinces to set up their television stations by the 
end of 1962 with a target of 50 (Y. Mei, 1960). Obviously, this 
excessive target, like most of the Great Leap Forward, was the 
creation of boastfulness and totally unrealistic. In fact, during 
that time of ferment, slogans such as "Hard working and self- 
reliant", "Getting on with the job with indigenous (Chinese) 
methods" and "Making do with whatever is available" were so 
popular that they were almost like magic formulas in establishing 
television. By 1962, there were 36 Chinese television stations 
including some relay stations, the maximum number before the mid- 
1970S. 
3.2.4 Setback 
With the failure of the Great Leap forward, and the divorce 
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between China and the USSR which resulted in all aid from the 
Soviet Union being withdrawn in the early 1960s, the development 
of Chinese television immediately came to a stand-still. Just one 
year later in 1963, the number of Chinese television stations was 
heavily axed to a mere eight under the severe austerity policy. 
A dismal picture indeed! The crisis then deepened when another 
political storm further hampered the progress in Chinese 
television. This was the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). During 
its early period, the nation wide television service was 
virtually stopped; and not until the late 1960s did a select 
number of the stations again move to provide some programmes. 
3.3 THE EVOLUTION OF PROGRAMMING POLICY AND CONTENT 
3.3.1 Two Approaches to Policy Making 
There were two major approaches involved in conducting cultural 
and media policies in Mao's era. The first was Mao's radical 
approach based on his belief that "thought determines action". 
In arguing the power of correct thought and ideas, the People's 
Daily presented the following text concerning this key point of 
maoism: 
Work is done by man and man's action is governed by his 
thinking. A man without the correct political thinking is 
a man without a soul. If Politics does not take command, 
there can be no direction. In every job we undertake, we 
must always insist that politics take command and let 
political and ideological work come before anything else. 
Only when we are both thorough and penetrating with our 
political and ideological work can we guarantee the 
accomplishment of our task (editorial, 11.11.1960). 
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In other words, Mao believed that if people could be made to 
think correctly, they would accordingly act correctly. He argued 
that the mass media should be used to mobilize ordinary people 
into participating in the long revolutionary cause with the goal 
of revolutionizing man and creating a "New Man" society. 
In Mao's term, this was a revolutionary approach based on the 
principle of "from the masses, to the masses", which was later 
developed into mass mobilization and participation (cf. 1.4.2.3; 
2.2). Moreover, against the state paternalism adopted by the 
Soviet Union and the eastern European socialist states, Mao also 
concluded that the Soviet approach would inevitably breed 
bureaucracy, professionalism and an elitist culture and, as a 
result, alienate the Party from the masses. 
Thus, in theory, Mao's doctrine appeared to provide an 
alternative to that of conventional Stalinism and attracted much 
attention in the outside world; in reality, however, the radical 
approach was built on an extraordinary emotional appeal of that 
wishful thinking and a tendency to go to extremes. As H. Harding 
(1986: 15) remarked, the Maoist approach in general was "radical 
and populist and tended therefore to undermine political 
stability". Therefore, the practice of this approach often 
exalted the cult of Mao himself and created a chaotic situation 
(e. g the Great Leap Forward), or, even social turmoil (e. g the 
Cultural Revolution). In the historical context, this approach, 
as examined previously, gained the upper hand in the initial 
period of Chinese television and dominated the activities of 
television during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). 
In contrast to Mao's approach, the second approach, that of 
state paternalism, gave priority to the role of the state 
apparatus in national integration and its adjustment to the 
requirements for modernization. According to this approach, 
broadcasting was chiefly defined to develop national culture and 
education. Though it also paid attention to political/ ideological 
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propaganda in order to control the public mind, it placed much 
stress on the idea of the obligation to edify the audience within 
the frame of reference of author ity-de fined values. In this 
respect, this model tended to accord priority to 
institutionalization, modernization and professionalism. Apart 
from its political and ideological concerns, the combination of 
central administration, technocratic operation and a strong 
commitment to treat the audience as subjects of tutelage, 
virtually gives this approach an affinity with the broad base of 
classic public service broadcasting in Western Europe. Supported 
by Liu Shaoqi (then the State President) and Deng Xiaoping (then 
the Party General Secretary) state paternalism gained some 
progress in develoPing television, particularly in the early 
1960s and the early 1970s when the infant Chinese television 
industry suffered severely from the policy failure of Mao's 
radical approach. 
3.3.2 Three Periods of Policy Change and Content Analysis 
As I have indicated previously, the Chinese communists cemented 
the mass media into a rigidly Leninist framework. To discuss the 
programming content in Mao's era is largely to deal with the 
Party-state politics. In fact, it was the swinging of the 
unfathomable pendulum of domestic and international forces that 
shaped media policy in Mao's China. General speaking, the 
evolution of television programmes and the change of the policy 
can be divided into three periods: 
1) from 1958 to 1960; 
2) from 1961 to 1965; 
3) from 1966 to 1976. 
107 
3.3.2.1 Initial Period ( 1958 - 1960 ) 
During this pioneering phase, the service and operation of 
Chinese television remained unsophisticated and primitive in 
terms of production, technology and professional performance. It 
took some time before the Chinese Broadcasting Authority could 
form a television programming policy, as the regime had little 
knowledge on how to run the medium. In general, however, Mao's 
radical approach to the conduct of propaganda and cultural work 
including television remained in the ascendancy. 
Meanwhile, since it had always been held that television tends 
towards entertainment, some of the decision makers of Chinese 
television in the early days practised a programming policy with 
a large entertainment dimension. This position was justified and 
strengthened by the fact that few television stations had the 
ability to produce their own quality programmes, particularly in 
the area of news and current affairs which they could only 
broadcast irregularly with simple techniques and limited sources. 
The first news item was produced by the Beijing station on 15 May 
1958. It was a report, chiefly using photographs, about the 
successful production of a Chinese-made car. Two weeks later, 
Beijing TV station broadcast its first black and white news film 
concerning the content of the publication of the Party's 
theoretical journal EgA-f-lag. News programmes using talking heads 
together with stills and film became the main forms of 
presentation at this early stage (X. Li, 1991: 344). Meanwhile, 
China also tried to produce TV dramas. The first of its kind was 
"A Bite of Cabbage Cake" a story reminding people of the past 
miserable life under the Nationalist regime and of the present 
happiness under the Communists. The drama was broadcast live by 
the Beijing Television Station on June 15 1958, because China did 
not have recording facilities at the time (in fact, this 
situation remained little changed until the mid-70s) . In general, 
about 70% of all Chinese TV shows were devoted to films, dramas 
and various fine art performances. They should be imbued, 
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according to Mao, with revolutionary spirit. The following is a 
list of the programme schedule taken from the Beijing Station in 
1960 (source: C. Zhuang, 1985: 5-6): 
1960 Beijing TV Programme Schedule 
18: 30 Children's programme (Wednesday & Saturday) 
Culture and education (Monday & Thursday) 
Science and technology; also sports etc. (Tues & Friday) 
18: 55 Items with pictorial reporting 
19: 00 Entertainment variety 
19: 30 News 
19: 40 current affairs 
20: 00 Movies or Chinese operas or sports and ball games 
21: 40 News in brief and weather 
However, two themes -- the Great Leap Forward and the 
"Cold War" between the Soviet-led bloc and the American-led bloc 
in which China was at the time firmly on the Moscow's side -- 
dominated Chinese politics at that time. As a newly-born mass 
communication medium, television was, without delay, employed for 
serving these political objectives, although its influence was 
quite limited compared with that of radio broadcasting at this 
stage. In 1958 the Department of Propaganda of the Chinese 
Communist Party issued a directive laying down the principle for 
conducting and planning broadcasting (including television) 
programmes. It stated: "At present broadcasting should promote 
the propaganda of the Great Leap Forward. -.. Broadcasting should 
put more emphasis on implementation of the goals rather than on 
goals themselves, more on previous experiences, on model workers 
and on masses' creativeness" (New China Fortnightly, No. 11, 
1958, pp. 118-119). The policy issued here indicated the 
authorities/ intention to implement its priorities in programming 
content. Whether this should be fulfilled through sophisticated 
cultural entertainment, or through straightforward ideological 
propaganda was not always clearly defined, and often a matter of 
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political struggle between the Mao approach and the state 
paternalism. 
In response to some doubts about television's function in the 
implementation of the Party propaganda tasks, the Broadcasting 
Authority, at the time of the dominance of the Mao approach, 
firmly defended its stance that television should serve the Party 
as a propaganda tool, rather than an entertainment tool. Lou 
Dong, first director of the Beijing TV Station (1958-1962 
clearly made this point in a working report in Dec. 1958: 
Some think the function of television is merely to 
broadcast entertainment programmes such as movies, drama 
and art performances. We must point out this view is 
wrong. ... Television, like radio broadcalsting, is the 
Party propaganda tool as well as the Party news medium" 
(CCTV Files, 1957-1958, No. 9). 
Within that framework, television in this period was used as an 
adjunct to the massive propaganda campaigns of the Great Leap 
Forward, although within a limited scale compared with other 
media. Programming priorities were also dominated by a basic 
formula of "us v. s them", namely, the great achievements of the 
Chinese communists as well as those of other Soviet bloc 
countries on the one hand, and the deepening general crisis of 
the capitalist world on the other. Therefore, topics such as 
working harder, accomplishing wonders, loving the Party, hating 
American imperialism, giving thanks for Soviet aid and overtaking 
Britain within 15 years frequently appeared on the Chinese 
screen. 
Meanwhile, the Soviet television format began to be adopted in 
China and the labour division among reporters, editors and 
anchors also modeled the "big brother". TV reporters often 
borrowed the practices of shooting documentary film to cover 
their story, but they normally could not be seen and heard in 
their own programmes. This work was done in voice-overs, mostly 
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by TV presenters (Z. Guo, September 1990). 
In general, the content of television reporting at this stage was 
to a large degree subject to the Party priority of mass 
mobilization. The tone was dogmatic, the style artless, the 
quality poor and the skill primitive. Therefore, the audience 
response was unfavourable. According to an informal survey 
conducted by the Beijing TV Station in the early 1960s (with 
2,15o questionnaires representing about 120,000 viewers), one of 
the audience's major demands was to have more programmes with 
better quality. Even the television authority had no desire to 
deny this. In 1960, the Beijing TV Station made a self-criticism 
admitting that its reporting was "dull", "monotonous" and 
"insipid" (CCTV Files, 1960, No. 10). 
In contrast to its domestic performance, Chinese television made 
considerable headway in international cooperation. The most 
important development at this time was the establishment of a 
business-like relationship with the Soviet bloc, which enabled 
the newly-born Chinese television industry to enjoy immediate 
benefit. In July 1956, the Soviet Union first signed a bilateral 
agreement with China on broadcasting (including television) 
cooperation. After China inaugurated a television service in 
1958, a dozen countries mainly from the eastern European nations, 
soon followed suit. The agreements were: Sino-Romanian 
(Oct. 1958), Sino-Hungarian (April 1959), Sino-Polish (April 
1959), Sino-German (GDR) (April 1959), Sino-Czechoslovak (April 
1959), Sino-Bulgarian (Aug. 1959); and Egypt, Cuba, North Korea, 
Albania and Viet Nam also joined in later on (Chronicle of 
Chinese Broadcasting, 1987). 
The establishment of cooperation between China and the above 
countries during this period was a substantial factor in 
improving Chinese television. Starting from 1959, China developed 
an exchange project of television programme with the countries 
that had signed a cooperation agreement. In 1959, China received 
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about 1,000 foreign TV programmes including news, current 
affairs, features and TV dramas. The principal contributors were 
Hungary (459 items) and Soviet Union (349 items). At the same 
time, China sent out 61 television programmes in return. From 
then on programme exchanges steadily increased. Programmes 
provided by these countries also comprised a considerable 
proportion of air time in the underdeveloped Chinese television 
service. The Beijing TV Station, for instance, devoted a regular 
amount of airtime to foreign programmes from late 1959. In 
addition, about 30% of the movies on Chinese television at this 
period came from Soviet Russia and its socialist allies 
(C. Zhuang, 1985: 217; CCTV Files, 1965, No. 12). 
It should be understood that the increasing "cooperative 
activities" in Chinese television at the time were part of the 
Soviet strategy seeking ways to unify the bond of the "Big 
Socialist Family", in an effort to retain Soviet ultimate control 
over its Bloc. Thus the impact of the extensive introduction of 
pro-Soviet foreign programmes on the early development of Chinese 
television was enormous and twofold. on the one hand, it gave the 
backward Chinese television industry the impetus to improve its 
service; on the other hand, as pro-Soviet stories and Soviet TV 
format dominated the Chinese screen, Sovietization seemed to be 
an inevitable result. 
3.3.2.2 The Rise of State Paternalism ( 1961 - 1965 ) 
The fiasco of the Great Leap Forward and the break between China 
and the Soviet Union in the early 1960s drastically changed the 
balance of Chinese Politics. As the country was precipitated into 
a devastating crisis, the first priority faced by the authorities 
was to ensure the public quiescence and to unite the nation to 
deal with the abysmal situation. Thus, the Political pendulum was 
bound to swing and the adoption of the new pragmatic policy 
became a necessary act of historic adjustment. So far as the 
policy towards the mass media and cultural work was concerned in 
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this period, Mao's radical approach was declining, whereas state 
paternalism, led by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping was rising and 
eventually gained the upper hand. 
The significant policy shift took place in July 1961, when the 
Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party formally 
issued an important document on propaganda and cultural work 
known as the "Ten Articles on Art and Literature. " In several 
important ways, the document discarded Mao's approach, with the 
emphasis now on the quality of cultural activities and 
professionalism. To counter Mao's political penetration of 
people's everyday life, the new policy now called for the 
reduction of political-ideological indoctrination. Some advocates 
of state paternalism even, indirectly and bravely, criticised 
Mao's idea and his radical approach. Y. Zhou, for instance, 
concurrent deputy director of the Party Propaganda Bureau and 
minister of Culture, argued: " Politics will lose its meaning if 
we keep talking about it at every breath" (cf. People's DailV in 
an article of the Maoists attack on Zhouls argument, 15.7.1966). 
He also warned in June 1961 that radio and television should not 
always be used to propagate support for Mao (cf. F. Yu, 1978: 45). 
it is interesting to see that, under the new policy, artists and 
cultural workers were encouraged to provide non-political, 
educational, classical and entertainment items to meet the 
diverse needs of audience and readers. As a result, more 
attention was now paid to the media's education function (in 
terms of disseminating various kinds of knowledge) with more fine 
art works and performances, both traditional and contemporary, 
appearing, and more comedy films being shown. Popular taste was 
now acknowledged, and a certain degree of freedom in cultural 
activities was "guaranteed" by the Party again. As far as the 
journalistic work was concerned, the state president Liu Shaoqi 
issued a document in 1960, calling for a "professionally oriented 
broadcasting policy" with emphasis on using broadcasting to serve 
all kinds of audience and to cater to popular interest (J. Chu, 
1978). It was within that atmosphere that programming policy in 
Chinese television changed course. 
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In 1961, in line with the new pragmatic Party policy, the Beijing 
Television Station was quick to make a proposal on programming 
and reporting. For the first time, it was devoted to diversity 
and quality without so much as mentioning politics. It also 
stressed that programmes should cater to audience enjoyment. The 
response from the top policy makers to this initiative was very 
positive. The broadcasting chief Y. Mei praised this proposal and 
recommended it to all other stations. He pointed out that 
television programmes should be more associated with the daily 
life of the ordinary people than radiols. The content should be 
not only meaningful, but also attractive, with more entertainment 
elements (CCTV Chronicle, pp14). 
From then on the changes in Chinese television became evident. 
The result of the implementation of the new programming policy 
during this period can be seen in the growing number of 
relatively "pure" and "light" entertainment shows: in producing 
many quality children's programmes, in introducing more "know- 
how" programmes, in broadcasting a considerable number of 
classical plays and operas, and, in presenting a better balanced 
and more sophisticated content in programming and reporting. 
Therefore, the function of Chinese television during the post 
Great Leap Forward period tended to be more cultural and less 
political in its orientation. 
In the meantime, there was another important development in that 
a great deal of effort was expended on using television for 
teach ing-and- learn i ng activities. Despite very limited numbers 
of TV sets then (around 50,000, but they were mainly publicly 
owned with the "collective watch") , educational TV programming 
provided wider access to higher education. In his pioneering book 
of "Mass Communication in China", Howkins even credits China as 
"the first country in the world to have a television university". 
Starting in 1960, he remarks that the Chinese "Television 
University" was "a full decade before the UK's Open University" 
(J. Howkins, 1982: 44). Of course this comment should be understood 
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in a narrow sense, since educational TV service in the US, the 
UK, the USSR and Japan already existed at that time. 
In March 1960, the "Television University" was initiated in 
Beijing and its example was soon followed in Shanghai and several 
other provinces which owned TV stations. In general, the 
educational service offered basic courses ranging from science, 
technology, literature to foreign languages. Between 1960 and 
1965, these "Television universities" enrolled about 40,000 
students and more people benefited from the service (X. Xu, 
1987: 123-124) . By any standard, 
the newly-born Chinese television 
industry made a considerable contribution to China's educational 
development. 
As far as international news coverage was concerned, there was 
some progress during this period. Because of the Sino-Soviet 
split, Pro-Soviet stories suddenly disappeared from Chinese 
screen and Chinese television virtually stopped broadcasting TV 
programmes provided by its Soviet counterpart. Consequently, 
international reporting was now very limited and low-key. 
However, the situation improved somewhat later on, as Chinese 
television stations started to make contact with a few Western 
commercial TV companies. In 1963, China formally signed a 
contract with VISNEWS Ltd ( UK ) for the exchange and purchase 
of TV programmes. From then on China used more and more VISNEWS 
materials to cover international affairs though they were re- 
edited to serve propaganda and ideological needs (The 
Contemporary Chinese Broadcasting, Vol-2,1987). 
3.3.2.3 The Cultural Revolution ( 1966 - 1976 ) 
During this period, Chinese television experienced two phases. 
Generally speaking, the first three years (1966 - 1969) can be 
identified as the first phase, with the remaining years the 
second phase. 
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In the first phase, the nation-wide television service virtually 
stopped as a result of the Popular practice at that time called 
"Stop working (or studying), make revolution". This chaotic and 
absurd situation was revealed by the announcement for the 
suspension of service issued by the Beijing TV Station shortly 
before the station ceased to operate. Here is the solemn 
statement: 
In order to answer Chairman Mao's call that you people 
should be concerned about the important affairs of our 
country and should continue the great Cultural Revolution 
to its full extent, we have decided in the coming year of 
1967 to launch an all-out general offensive on a tiny 
number of capitalist power holders within the Party. So, 
from January 3 1967, our station will stop running normal 
service except on important matters and occasions (cited 
in C. Zhuang, 1985: 8). 
By contrast, radio broadcasting was extensively used by Mao and 
his radical supporters. Every one of Mao's "supreme instruction" 
and the Party's new decision firstly reached the masses through 
radio broadcasting, usually a day ahead of the newspapers. To 
some extent, broadcasting messages was regarded as authoritative 
instructions to conduct the masses carrying out the Cultural 
Revolution (cf. J. Chu, 1978: 31-32). 
In the second phase, the resumed television service was very 
limited and it was under the stifling control of Maoists. 
Television, as in other mass media during that period, was fully 
engaged in totally one-sided and blatant propaganda which was 
characterized by falsification, exaggeration and paranoia. Many 
types of television programs, mostly cultural and entertainment- 
related, ceased to exist. Not a single TV drama or TV series, for 
instance, was made and broadcast between 1967 and 1976. A 
visiting British broadcaster was incredulous when, in 1970, he 
found that 18 out of a total of 26 minutes of the main evening 
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news bulletin one night in Beijing consisted of rolling captions 
of Mao's words with Mao's paean music in the background (cf. 
J. Howkins, 1982: 28). Another foreign observation was made by an 
NBC news team in Hong Kong by monitoring Guandong provincial TV 
output for three weeks in January 1970: "The TV schedule 
commenced at 7p. m. with the appearance of Maofs portrait and the 
singing of "The East Is Red", China's unofficial national anthem. 
The opening program was a newscast consisting of several film 
stories on topics such as the commemoration of a hero, the work 
of an educated youth in a remote village, the reception of 
foreign visitors by the Chinese leadership, and the "heroic 
struggle" of the North Vietnamese. Next came revolutionary ballet 
and films, usually old Chinese movies about the anti-Japanese war 
or the war against the Nationalist Chinese. ... Sign-off on 
Canton (i. e Guandong) TV came at 10: 30 P. M. " (cf. J. Chu, 
1978: 37). 
As a matter of the fact, entertainment was reduced to such a 
minimal level that only approved "revolutionary arts and 
performances" could pass for broadcast and the so-called "Eight 
Model Operas" sponsored by Madam Mao, were repeated endlessly on 
the screen. The situation changed little till 1976 when Mao died 
and the Cultural Revolution ended. 
3.4 MAO'S PERSPECTIVE OF CULTURALAND MEDIA CONTROLS 
It has been acknowledged that cultural activities and media 
performance under Mao had been designed primarily to -maintain and 
reinforce political authority and the ideological homogeneity of 
the Party; not surprisingly, the development of Chinese 
broadcasting in that era was, to a large extent, politically 
overpowering, aesthetically weak and socially malfunctional. This 
was made possible by adopting the following measures (L. Zhang & 
Y. Huang, 1992). 
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3.4.1 "Welfare" Model 
Mao's cultural approach and the Party's enthusiasm for 
broadcasting as a medium with substantial political and 
educational capacities, facilitated at least some sort of 
formation of the "welfare" model. Of course, the welfare model 
also accounted for the harsh and insufficient economic situation 
at the time. For people, of the rural areas in particular, who 
were not even well-fed and often illiterate, media consumption, 
especially television, was almost inconceivable. Like food, 
cooking oil, clothing, transport and other living necessities, 
broadcasting services (i. e radio in the urban areas, wired 
broadcasting in the rural areas and television in the 
metropolises) was also provided, heavily subsidised by the state, 
to the large majority of the population. Almost every household 
in the rural areas, for instance, was offered a loudspeaker free 
of charge and television receivers were mostly purchased by the 
public bodies as a kind of welfare benefit to enhance the 
cultural life of the public (apart from the political concerns) . 
Thus, Mao's China developed a method of media consumption called 
"collective listening or viewing" in which the media production 
was highly and evenly, in the service of the communist state, 
distributed and consumed by the public. 
3.4.2. Control of Entertainment 
The broadcasting medium in Mao's era was not only seen as the 
most powerful political tool of the Party, but also as an 
influential and accessible means of entertainment. It was due in 
part to the short supply of entertainment and, consequently, the 
absence of a popular culture. The scarcity of cultural resources 
at the time was striking. Between 1958 to 1965, China produced 
and sold only 26,000 TV sets. Even in 1978, there were only about 
3 million TV sets in China, a tiny figure against a population 
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of 800 millions then. With minimal technology and resources 
available, the mass communication system in Mao's China remained 
its indigenous and pre-modernization stage with the strong 
characteristics of communist totalitarianism -- pervasive, 
penetrating and intense. The worst came in the period of the 
Cultural Revolution when most entertainment activities such as 
western dancing, literature, music and even fishing or gardening 
were labelled as "bourgeois life styles" to be banned forthwith; 
moreover, almost all Chinese tradition and cultural heritage was 
attacked and censored [cf. 2.2]. In such a repressive political 
conteXt, broadcasting entertainment programming was employed to 
serve the Party's political and ideological needs and, as a 
result, to provide the audience with a cultural life within the 
framework of Mao's class struggle. 
3.4.3. Centrally-Planned Economic Control 
The command economy in the Party-state presented a non-market 
pattern of administrative domination, within which cultural 
production and distribution were dictated by the Party's ends 
through a bureaucrat ica 1 ly-planned structure. In other words, the 
political power is directly engaged in redistribution of 
surpluses created elsewhere in material production to support 
cultural institutions in general and the mass media in 
particular. It not only determined the way in which economic 
performance of the media was to be operated, financed and 
distributed, but also, through it, how the effectiveness and 
dominating power of a ruling ideology in a totalitarian state, 
could be safeguarded and harmonised. This provides some 
explanation why this model functioned well to the Party's 
benefit. The broadcasting industry, as a technological and 
capital-consuming activity, a powerful means of mass 
communication and a major propaganda instrument, granted the 
state an ideal area in which to exert its full planning power at 
the disposal of the Party's will. Thus broadcasting production, 
for instance, from "theme" to "genre", from distribution to 
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transmission was all carefully planned according to the political 
needs at the time. In a similar vain, how much money should be 
spent on developing television was not only dependent upon the 
overall development of material production, but also, probably 
in a more determined sense, conceived of, and treated as a 
political/ideological issue to be dealt with. All stations were 
operated in a absence of a modern economic accounting system. 
From this point of view, we know that revenue necessary to run 
television came 100% from the state budget; but, we do not know 
how it was distributed and divided in either overt or covert 
orms. 
3.4.4. A Preliminary Assessment: Financing Chinese TV in Mao's 
Era 
Nevertheless, the Party-state system had its own economic 
alternative to operate cultural activities and to conduct media 
production. The conventional method was simply to separate the 
software from the hardware. While there remained some forms of 
commodity exchange in maintaining labour and capital costs, it 
virtually disassociated the production of television programming 
from economic activities. Therefore, the sources of the financial 
support of Chinese television in the initial stage of the 1950s 
and 1960S can be understood in two parts: countable and 
uncountable. Countable expenditure on labour maintenance (i. e 
staff wages) and equipment was normally within the jurisdiction 
of the "planned economy" covered by the state budget. Uncountable 
costs involved cultural resource distribution, programming 
production, dissemination and exchange, which, in the context of 
Mao's China, was subject to direct state arrangement without any 
monetary mechanism involvement. In other words, it was free of 
charge and integrated within a unified system in which a 
commercial motivation was virtually denied. 
According to some statistics now available, I shall try to make 
a preliminary reckoning of financing hardware (i. e the labour and 
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capital costs) in Chinese television industry. For the Beijing 
TV Station and others provincial stations such as Shanghai, 
Tianjin and Guangzhou, the state spent about $US 800,000 each on 
capital expenditure in the initial stage. Meanwhile, with the 
average number of 50-70 staff in each station at the time, for 
each TV stations the state paid costs of labour maintenance and 
renewal of equipment ranging from $US 50,000 to 70,000 annually 
from 1958 to 1976. (cf. China TV Stations, 1987). During that 
period, the annual national expenditure on the broadcasting 
industry including radio, wired, external and television was 
estimated between $US 40 to 50 millions. Television expenditure 
could account for 20% to 25% (cf. Y. Zhao,, 1987: 26). 
on the other side, it is important to note that the high cost of 
filling air time in other social systems did not exist here. All 
the TV stations at that time enjoyed almost unlimited access to 
cultural material for broadcasting. These included virtually free 
live transmission of various theatre dramas, sports and arts 
performances as well as lots of new movies. It was common 
practice then that every new film would be shown on the 
television screen a few weeks ahead of the premiere. In 1961, for 
instance, the Beijing TV Station showed 244 film, 51 of which 
were premieres. As early as January 1960, the Ministry of Culture 
and the Beijing Municipal Party Committee even made a joint 
decision that all new movies should be sent to the Beijing TV 
Station at least two weeks in advance of the premiere. (cf. CCTV 
Files, No-12; Chronicle of Chinese Broadcasting, 1987: 131). These 
practices reflect an important financial feature in the Party- 
state system that the profit motive has played virtually no role 
in running the mass media. It is impossible, therefore, to find 
out the real cost of providing a television service at that time., 
though some inferences may be drawn. 
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3.5 STRUCTURE AND OPERATION 
The Chinese broadcasting system was designed to set up a separate 
supervisory arrangement with the aim of ensuring that the Party 
had pre-determined power to monopolise information and public 
opinion. Specifically, the structure of Chinese television in 
Mao's era had two noticeable characteristics: 
One of them was that, politically, it constructed a copy 
of the Soviet vertical control system which was highly 
compartmentalized, enabling the Party to exercise pre- 
determined power over broadcasting. So, a dual hierarchy 
of party and government organs was employed for 
conducting and supervising television operations. In 
practice, the Party side, through its functional 
Propaganda and Personnel Bureaus, provided the political 
line, issued directives and placed officials in the 
key posts. On the government side, the Broadcasting 
Authority executed the Party's policies and dealt with 
the television business ranging from programming 
performance to technological development. Thus the Party 
effectively cemented the television structure into an 
authoritative consistent whole. 
The second characteristic was that, technically, Chinese 
television at the time was far from having a pyramid 
functioning structure in terms of the relations between 
respective stations. This was mainly due to the inherent 
deficiencies in the establishment of Chinese television 
as examined previously. As China's de facto state 
station, the Beijing TV Station could only play a 
regional role in the nation wide operation with little 
influence and authority on others. In addition, a dozen 
of the established regional stations were quite separate 
from one another. Each station (including Beijing) 
usually communicated with allthorities above, and not with 
one another, though they sometimes exchanged programmes 
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under the arrangement of the Party Propaganda Bureau, or 
the Broadcasting Authority, but not initiated by 
themselves. 
Relevant to this underdeveloped state of Chinese television at 
the time, the internal structure of each station was simple. It 
was normally divided into four functioning sections with about 
50/70 staff altogether. They usually included: 1) administrative 
office, 2) news and current affairs group, 3) arts and 
entertainment group, and 4) technical and logistic group. The 
whole external and internal structures can be seen in the 
following diagram: 
Control Structure of Chinese Television 
Party Propaganda & Personnel Bureaux 
Broadcasting Authority (ministerial Level) 
station Station Beijing TV Station Station 
AB Station Yz 
Internal Structure of Beijing TV Station 
Party & Administrative Office 
INews&Current affairs Arts&Entertainment Technical&Logisticl 
I Group Group Group I 
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With such a structure, Chinese television thus operated strictly 
in line with Party interests. In 1958, the Broadcasting Authority 
set three major tasks for the newly-born television industry: 
propaganda, education and entertainment. To secure these goals, 
it practised so-called "self-censorship" enforced by the 
station's decision makers. Routine material that mainly concerned 
entertainment programmes, did not require approval but 
occasionally needed prior consultation with top officials in 
charge of ideological supervision. However, programmes such as 
news, political education and other sensitive topics would either 
be referred to higher authorities or directly follow the 
instructions of Party leaders. It should come as no surprise, 
therefore, that forming television policy and conducting its 
activities became an essential part of Party work. 
3.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Many of the broadcasting experiences of the Soviet Union and 
Eastern Europe were not applicable to mainland China. While the 
Eastern Bloc mainly relied on state paternalism to develop its 
broadcasting industry, the Chinese communist leadership, by 
contrast, benefited much from Mao's charisma and built up 
broadcasting in general and television in particular by using the 
similar method employed for mass political campaign. In view of 
the development of Chinese television, I want to argue that the 
decision to launch television broadcasting at that time was both 
immature and ill conceived. Motivated by political and 
ideological needs, and impelled by the Great Leap Forward, the 
whole foundation of the Chinese television industry was thus 
dictated more by will power (so-called "revolutionary spirits") 
than by the social reality, particularly regarding the 
underdeveloped economic capability and the general poverty in 
society at that time (approx $US 150 per capita GNP) . As a matter 
of fact, the given Chinese context plus the impact of the "Cold 
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War" in the 1950s led the Chinese Communists to create 
television broadcasting for political ends. Chinese television, 
with its inherent deficiencies, was inevitably condemned to a 
difficult, erratic and frustrating future in the short to medium 
term. 
However, the failure of Mao's Politics-in-command strategy of 
building a modernized China and the catastrophe of the Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) brought the whole nation so close to the 
verge of collapse that a change of direction and approach in the 
post Mao era was compulsory. The development of Chinese 
television thus entered a wide-ranging stage of reform . 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
OPENING A NEW CHAPTER 
Decentralization Strategy and China's Burgeoning Television 
In all established communist states, media centralization is 
essential for the ruling Party to monopolize its power over 
society. Generally speaking, four control mechanisms are employed 
in mainland China to maintain the centre-local relation. These 
are 1) administrative control pattern (through the operation of 
a bureaucratic system and personnel arrangement) , 2) ideological 
control pattern (through providing an official doctrine to cement 
the people's opinion), 3) political control pattern (through 
political campaign and policy adoption) , and 4) economic control 
pattern (through resource distribution and remunerative 
measures). Since the Chinese communists took power in 1949, all 
the f our patterns have played important roles in the Chinese 
media centralization. In Mao's era, ideological and political 
methods were apparently more favoured and more effectively used 
by the decision makers. However, with the progress of the 
economic reform programme and de-politicalization in post-Mao 
China, the relationship between the centre and the localities has 
increasingly involved the different interests concerned and thus 
the old political control pattern in media institutional 
operation hardly worked. As a result, the economic control 
pattern has gradually become a dominant paradigm in the conduct 
of the central power and local interests in the 1980s. This is 
particularly the case in the television industry, and the 
adoption of the decentralization policy in 1983 is an 
extraordinary measure which has had a profound impact on all 
aspects of mass media development as well as the society. 
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Moreover, the mushrooming of the Chinese television industry and 
the establishment of its new two-tiered structure since the mid 
1980s, has enabled the medium to play a leading role in the mass 
communication system through which it changed the public 
consumption of the mass media with the evolution towards the 
television-led media environment. It is through these 
developments that television becomes the most efficient 
information, entertainment and advertising medium in the post-Mao 
China. 
The aim of this chapter is to provide an analysis of: 1) the 
process of China's decentralization movement on television 
structure, 2) the rapid development of the television industry, 
3) the changing relationship between the centre and the 
localities, and 4) the impact of television expansion and the 
emerging television-led media system in post-Mao China. But 
first, let us briefly look at the television medium in the 
recovery stage of the early post-Mao era. 
4.1 EARLY POST-MAO DEVELOPMENT ( 1978 - 1983 ) 
As noted, with the replacement of Mao's radical approach, the 
gathering momentum of China Is modernization movement in the post- 
Mao era also paved the way for the rapid development of Chinese 
television. 
4.1.1 Recovery stage 
Recovery and change from the stifling control of Maoism in the 
television medium f irst occurred in the content of television 
programmes with a gradual move from an extreme propaganda 
orientation to a relatively information and entertainment 
oriented programming. In 1978, Chinese television network, for 
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the first time, broadcast live the World Cup Football March held 
in Buenos Aires, Argentina, via satellite transmission. In 1979, 
with increasing audience pressure for more and better TV shows, 
the Chinese broadcasting authority made a bold decision to 
purchase foreign programmes, particularly TV dramas and soaps 
from the West. The first few included "The Man from Atlantis" 
(TAFT-HB Productions, US), "Anna Kareninall (BBC, UK), "Robinson 
Crusoe" (BBC, UK) and "Katasa Shiro" (Japan). Also many popular 
western films were imported and shown by television such as 
"Death on the Nile" (UK) , "A Respected Prostitute" (France) , and 
several Chaplin movies. They received public acclaim. Since then 
the purchase and trade of foreign TV products has become a 
regular practice and a considerable proportion of air time is 
taken up by the imported materials, which have often played a 
controversial role in Chinese politics. In TV dramas/films, for 
instance, the 1985 figure (the official data available from that 
year) shew that the foreign programming took up 32.3% of the 
total number in this category. In fact, the trend has continued 
in recent years and largely owing to the concerns of the cost- 
effectiveness in programming production. An hour of imported 
television series only cost $US 500 to $US 800, four to eight 
times cheaper than that of a series produced domestically 
(information provided by Jin Wenxiong, broadcasting researcher, 
the ministry of Broadcasting, in interview with the author, 
Beijing, october 1990). Between 1988 and 1989, overseas TV 
dramas/films (including Hong Kong's, Macao's and Taiwan's) 
reached 1874 and 2073 respectively, accounting for more than 40% 
each year; and, according to a survey, the average audience 
rating for these programmes on Chinese television was about 22% 
(cf. Chi ta Broadcasting Yearbook 1986,1989,1990; J. Chen, 1991). 
Meanwhile, the Chinese Broadcasting Authority began to redress 
Mao's radical line and returned to the traditional state 
paternalism to develop television. In so doing, investment 
efforts were made by the state to improve the network service, 
technology, professional performance and management. However, 
this was no easy job for the revolutionary leaders as one Hong 
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Kong journalist observed: "China has saddled herself with a task 
which her leaders are not fit to perform. The leaders may be and 
actually are professionals in revolution, in guerrilla warfare, 
but they are amateurs or novices in administration and in the 
running of corporate business" (K. Chang, 1984). 
4.1.2 China Central Television and the Development of Network 
In the late Mao era, 28 regional stations were established in 
each of the provincial capitals except Tibet in mainland China. 
By the middle of 1970s, the de facto state station -- the Beijing 
TV Station could, at least in theory, provide a national service 
to large parts of the country through the cooperation of regional 
stations via microwave trunk lines. However, this was far from 
being a network in any real sense. 
A major step towards that direction was taken in 1978 when the 
Beijing Television station was well defined as the central 
government station and renamed as China Central Television (CCTV) 
under the direct administrative control of the state broadcasting 
ministry. The national network was formed by two basic 
requirements: 1) provincial and city-level station would be 
responsible for sending their news-related programmes to CCTV for 
comprising a national service; 2) CCTV's main national and 
international news bulletin was required to simulcast on all 
local stations. Technically, these were done either through an 
opt-out system arrangement or CCTV had exclusive right to use the 
particular frequency (or the local channel) according to the 
appropriate condition. With providing a regular national service 
and its authority over programming performance, CCTV has, since 
then, developed into a more sophisticated organization and played 
the key role in the network operation. Its structural model can 
be largely seen as a miniature of the organizational pattern of 
the lower-level station in the national broadcasting system. The 
executive power of the station is vested in the hands of the 
director under which functional operation is conducted, while the 
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station office of the party committee has ultimate political 
power. In the early 1980s, the institution employed over 1,000 
people and by the end of 1989 the figure of CCTV staff doubled 
to nearly 2,500. Among them professionals related to program 
production made up about 40%, technicians 22%, political and 
administrative personnel 20%, and logistic workers 18% (China 
Journalism Yearbook, 1982: 36; The Advancement of Chinese 
Broadcasting, 1990: 105; China Broadcasting Yearbook, 1990: 39-40) . 
In general, the internal structure of CCTV is divided into three 
functional sections: the political & administrative control 
section, the programme production section, and 
technical & logistic section (see the following table). 
Table 4.1 
organizational Structure of China Central Television (CCTV) 
Political Control Section Program Production Section 
office of Party Chief Editorial Board 
committee News Dept. 
office of Party Commission Feature Dept. 
for Discipline Inspection General Entertainment Dept. 
personnel Dept. TV Drama Production Centre 
Financial Dept. Sports Dept. 
Security Dept. Overseas Program Dept. 
Administrative Office Economic Program Dept. 
Foreign Affair Dept. Children Program Dept. 
Audience Research Group Advertising Dept. 
Technical Section Logistic Section 
Relaying Dept. Goods & Equipment Supply 
Videotaping Dept. Division 
Film Developing & Service Company 
Printing Dept. Property Management 
Acoustics & Lighting Dept. Division 
Engineering Dept. Data Centre 
Sources: CCTV Thirty Years ( 1958-1988 ), 1988: 694; 
The Advancement of Chinese Broadcasting, 1991: 105. 
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4.1.3 CCTV Programming 
As a national station, CCTV is well equipped with 20 up-to-date 
studios and in recent years has spent more than 10 million US 
dollars on imported equipment alone. Every day CCTV offers two 
sets of national services, each transmitting about 15 hours of 
programmes throughout the country on hundreds of regional and 
local stations which can receive signals from Beijing via 
communication satellite links and retransmissions facilities (cf. 
China Broadcasting Yearbook 1990). Like other television stations 
in the world, in the post-Mao era, CCTV offers a colourful 
selection of programmes which contains news, entertainment, 
education and public information. 
The news programme is considered the pillar of the CCTV schedule. 
it is not surprising that the central authority makes every 
effort to determine what the people should know through the 
information service and as such, television news is regarded as 
the most effective way to communicate with the public and promote 
the task set by the ruling elite of the day. Currently, CCTV's 
news is broadcast nine times daily with 100 items on average, of 
which nearly half were broadcast in the evening national network; 
and news-related programmes account for about 13-15% of the total 
number of programmes. The 19: 00-19: 30 network service which 
relays domestic & foreign news throughout the country is the most 
important one with very high viewing. In 1987, a nation wide 
survey showed that the network news commanded 42.5% of the 
regular national television audience roughly equivalent to 250 
million viewers, and is estimated to reach 50% in recent years 
(The Advancement of Chinese Broadcasting, 1991: 10). 
International news remains most popular among viewers. Supplied 
by VISNEWS, ASIAVISION, CNN and other foreign agencies via 
satellite, CCTV has edited and broadcast 10-15 minutes worth of 
world news daily since 1980. This has by and large enabled the 
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Chinese people to see what really happened outside China. 
Domestic news is dominated by the theme of modernization and 
economic reform, with the majority of the coverage devoted to the 
"positive side of the society", meaning the Party's achievements, 
as required by authorities as the principle for conducting 
reporting work. I shall provide further analysis of this issue 
in the later chapters. 
There is always a heavy demand from audiences for entertainment 
and it comprises a large part of CCTV programmes. It includes 
various shows, sports, TV dramas, soaps, feature films and art 
performances. In the early years, new feature films were more 
readily available on television than in the cinema [cf. 3.4.4]. 
However, in post-Mao China this is no longer the case as box- 
office profit becomes vital to the film industry. As the TV set 
rapidly entered a large majority of Chinese homes and there was 
increasing viewers' pressure for more new films, the film 
industry took tough measures to protect its interests by only 
allowing some selected films (usually under the condition of not 
affecting the box office) to be shown on TV after a six-to- 
twelve-month run in the cinema (Y. Ling, 1981: 21-23). Thus the 
Chinese TV industry has to find its own way largely by 
strengthening its own ability to produce more programmes. That 
is why the prevalence of TV shows and TV plays/films has greatly 
increased in the 1980s. In 1980, for instance, CCTV screened 103 
plays. By 1984, the figure stood at 478 and is now around 1,100 
annually (China Journalism Yearbook; 1989: 9; W. Chang, 1989: 223). 
CCTV educational and public information programmes deal with 
issues of culture, morality, social and family relations, science 
and technology, and educational topics. It also offers foreign 
language teaching. In general, most of these kinds of programmes 
have touched people's feelings and received a popular response. 
It has approached "everyday life and common sense" with aspects 
such as career, friendship, love, marriage and so on. Many are 
in praise of people and things contributing to on-going economic 
reform; some recalled the sufferings during the period of the 
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Cultural Revolution; others criticise bureaucracy, traditional 
backward-looking values and various other problems (Y. Ling, 
1981: 23). The following are the two days programmes (a weekday 
and a weekend) taken from CCTV's two channels in September 1979, 
which give some concrete indications of Chinese television 
contents in the early post-Mao era (source: Howkins, 1982: 38-41). 
Thursday, 27 September 1979 
CHANNEL 2 
17: 30 Algol programming (No. 22) 
18: 20 English lesson (No. 3,15-16) 
19: 00 News 
19: 25 Live coverage of the finals of the Men's and Women's 
Volleyball Championship at the national games. 
CHANNEL 8 
19: 00 comic dialogue: Sons-in-law on trial 
19: 20 Film: "Morning Songs from the Prairie" 
21: 20 News 
Sundav, 30 Ser)tember 1979 (the eve of the National Day) 
CHANNEL 2 
A collection of programmes from Beijing and elsewhere to 
celebrate the 30th Anniversary of the Founding of the People's 
Republic China. 
8: 30 From Shandong province: 
A children's program; Film: "Who is Best? "; A 
documentary; opera: "Tales from the Top of the Wall". 
11: 00 From Guangdon province: 
A documentary; Music: Solo songs; A children's film; 
Opera: "Choose a Son-in-Law,,; Music and dance. 
13: 30 From Shanghai: 
News; Two documentaries, one is about the educated 
youth of Shanghai, the other is about a hundred years 
of Shanghai's changes. 
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14: 00 From CCTV: 
An introduction programme about making-up of the Peking 
Opera; A children's program; Live coverage of the 
banquet of the closing ceremony of the national games; 
Song and Dance. 
19: 00 News 
19: 20 Live coverage of the Banquet of the State Council to 
celebrate the National Day. 
19: 50 Meeting of the Conference of Outstanding Workers 
20: 00 Around the world: Industry in Kuwait 
20: 15 Around China: The River Min flows on 
20: 45 Theatre: "Future Summons" 
CHANNEL 8 
19: 00 Around China: The happy Dai people 
19: 15 Film: "Investigation of a Wife" (Hong Kong) 
21: 10 News 
21: 25 World Knowledge 
To sum UP, with the establishment of a national network service 
and the advancement of CCTV and other regional stations, it 
seemed that modernizing the Chinese television industry was 
pursued under state paternalism in the early 1980s. However, the 
centralization strategy could provide no solution for further 
grassroots development. As the economic reform rapidly progressed 
and in consequence, the capability of central authority to 
deliver resources was increasingly weakened, a movement towards 
changing the development strategy was well underway. 
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4.2 DECENTRALIZATION STRATEGY: to be or not to be? 
4.2.1 Changing Macro-Contexts 
Changes in the macro-background Of political economy took place 
both inside and outside China. Since the 1970s, world capitalism 
has experienced a new phase which has been described as 
"disorganized capitalism" or "post-Fordism" (cf. S. Lash & J. Urry, 
1987; K. Offe, 1985; Lipietz, 1987). It is generally characterized 
by deregulation (or, re-regulation) marketization and 
globalization of capital movement with the rising tide of neo- 
liberalism which had enormous impact on socio-economic 
development, particularly in the communications industry at 
global level. That general tendency has been presented even more 
persistently, strongly and wide-rangingly in post-Mao China with 
a movement of decentralization, as the priority set by Deng's 
leadership was to tackle the unworkable structure of the 
centralized command economy. 
Towards the end of the 1970s China, 's reform programme began 
experimenting with decentralizing the economy, whereby the 
central planning institution increasingly relaxed its direct 
control over distributing economic resources and industrial 
activities. The basic idea of this decentralization policy was 
to give the grassroots enterprises more power to determine their 
own economic performance with self-responsibility for gains and 
losses. In this way, it seemed that several steps, though far 
from being sufficient and systematic, were taken by the ruling 
elite in that direction. Starting from the early 1980s, the 
central administration initiated a system of financial 
responsibility concerning investment and profit distribution. The 
system devolved some important discretionary authority to the 
enterprises and local governments. As a result, the cage 
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imprisoning locality and industries was slowly opened in the 
direction of building up the economic dynamics. However, the move 
also brought about some serious consequences which to a large 
extent were unanticipated and unintended by the decision makers 
in Beijing. In the first place, the central government rapidly 
lost its control over financial resources. Taking state revenue 
as a proportion of national income for example, it accounted for 
37.2% in 1978, then decreased to 26% in 1984, and to only 19.2% 
in 1988. Moreover, the percentage of such revenue controlled by 
the centre also fell from a high of more than 70% in the 1950s, 
to 60% in the early 1980s, and to 42.8% in 1989. In the second 
place, the structure of its capital investment and accumulation 
programme also rapidly shifted away from central authority to 
regional and local institutions. During the 1978-1988 period, 
capital investment outside the state planning sector (i. e either 
by individual enterprises, or by local authorities) grew from 
16.7% of total investment to 67% (China Statistics Yearbook 1983- 
19sq; C. Cheng, 1990: 22-23). In effect, the implementation and 
expansion of such decentralization measures have dramatically 
altered many aspects of centralized economic control. Therefore, 
economically, the emergence of local autonomy under the current 
reform movement, gradually formed a favourable base for taking 
the initiative of decentralization in the Chinese broadcasting 
industry. 
Meanwhile, Deng and his reformers set a Political and ideological 
framework for policy makers to take some further bold measures 
to promote industrial growth. In August 1980, Deng Xiaoping made 
an important speech in an enlarged Politburo meeting in which he 
viewed the problems that were impinging upon China's economic 
progress. These included the old Politics-in-command thinking, 
the excessive concentration of central power within its 
institution and the bureaucratism. He then concluded that there 
was a need to adopt pragmatic politics in order to serve the goal 
of national modernization (Deng, 1984: 302-305). Clearly, its 
intention at the time was to encourage some sort of 
decentralization initiatives. Liao Gailong, one of Deng's 
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supporters and a reform-minded ideologist, took an even more 
radical attitude towards the existing Party-state centralization 
system. Also in 1980, he gave the bluntest and boldest analysis 
so far ever seen within the ruling elite on the problem of 
centralization. In particular, he strongly criticised misguided 
Leninist political theory and its serious consequences. He 
virtually demanded an end of centralism: 
Lenin's political theory neglected the democratic aspect 
of proletarian dictatorship, and attached too much 
importance to the aspect of violent suppression. He even 
said that proletarian dictatorship was "iron" 
dictatorship not bound by any laws .... This dictatorship 
over-emphasized the role of force and emphasized the role 
of not being bound by anything. Thus, the power of the 
party and the state became over-centralized in the hands 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and 
finally became over-centralized in the hands of one or a 
few leaders .... Thus, over a long period of time, it 
seemed to us that socialism was centralism, a high degree 
of centralism (my emphasis); that the concentration of 
power in the hands of a party central committee and then 
in the hands of leaders was socialism (Liao, 1980). 
In short, the interaction of these economic, political and 
ideological changes had a decisive influence on the direction of 
development of Chinese broadcasting. As a result, the pressure 
to adopt a decentralization development strategy in the 
television industry began to mount. 
4.2.2 Policy Debate and Consensus 
In the context of the process of central Power retreating, the 
main impetus to the growth of the Chinese television industry 
actually came from below, not above. As early as 1980, there were 
signs that many local authorities, particularly in the newly-rich 
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coastal areas, started to challenge the existing centralized 
policy regarding broadcasting development which meant that local 
level institutions had no authority to engage in the business of 
broadcasting. They actively lobbied the policy makers by boldly 
demanding Beijing's sanction to set up and run their own local 
stations. He Dazhong, chief engineer of the ministry of Chinese 
Broadcasting and one of the major architects of decentralization 
policy concerning broadcasting, described the situation at the 
time: 
From 1949 (i. e the year that the communists took power), 
the development policy of Chinese broadcasting was 
characterized by centralism. This was employed as a 
practice called "Centre First and Local Second". In 
particular, the power to run the television service was 
only bestowed on the authorities concerned at central and 
regional (i. e provincial) levels. In other words, the 
local cities and counties were not allowed to engage in 
television business. After 1978, however, things had to 
be changed as economic reform progressed. With 
decentralization measures implemented and the degree of 
local autonomy enlarged, the vast majority of local 
institutions (e. g cities, counties township and 
enterprises etc. ) which benefited from the new strategy, 
strengthened their hand. Now they had more money at their 
disposal and were more interested in developing 
television at their local level. At one time the 
situation became so peculiar that the Beijing side had no 
money and the local side had no authority to invest in 
the television industry. Because of this, the development 
of Chinese television remained in a state of stagnation. 
Entering the 1980s, many people from the local levels had 
a strong desire to set up a television station, but their 
demands were all rejected by the broadcasting authority 
due to its contravening the existing regulations. (D. He, 
1990: 607). 
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Thus, by 1982, the issue became so acute that tension was running 
high between the centre and the localities, and the heated debate 
on policy reform was inevitable both within and without 
broadcasting circles. Among many arguments employed to change the 
existing regulation was the one made by the influential He 
Dazhong, the man in charge of the technological development of 
Chinese broadcasting. He provided four reasons why a new 
decentralization policy was urgently needed. First and foremost, 
the increase of local autonomy and the implementation of 
financial responsibility system (i. e an economically viable 
practice mainly concerning the change of fiscal distribution) had 
changed the balance of the relation between the state and the 
local units in general, and the overall investment structure in 
particular. Second, the de-collective rural reform, in dismissing 
Mao's peasant commune's system, since 1978 had improved the 
peasants' living standard and increased their leisure time. As 
a result, people who were becoming more wealthy in rural areas 
were now eager to have a TV set and there was a growing demand 
for access to a local television service. Obviously, the existing 
centralization development policy could never meet the demand, 
and as such, became a major obstacle to progress. Thirdly, many 
cities in prosperous areas showed a great deal of enthusiasm for 
setting up a station and running the service with their own 
revenue. Lastly, the enormous nation-wide demand for a TV set in 
the post-Mao era had strongly stimulated the output of the 
television receiver industry, and this in turn further compelled 
the central authority to find a solution focusing on quantitative 
development of the service supply side. He Dazhong concluded that 
it was time for adopting a new development strategy which would 
benefit all sides by pursuing decentralization reform (D. He, 
1990: 606-608). 
Wu Lengxi, the minister of Chinese Broadcasting at the time, was 
another major advocate of decentralization in the Chinese 
broadcasting industry. In his view, broadcasting communication 
should not only be treated as a political and ideological 
apparatus as it always has been in China, but also be treated as 
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an economic entity in the process of China's modernization. As 
such, the key to the development of radio and television media 
largely became a question of capital accumulation. In his plain 
words, it was a matter of spending money, and finding someone to 
pay. The decentralization policy is thus designed to initiate 
people at the grassroots levels involved in the broadcasting 
industry and make them willing to pay (Wu, 1984: 96). This was"a 
policy to bring the initiative of the local people and various 
sections of society into full play" (Wu, 1984: 116). The logic of 
the argument is simple: in order to speed up Chinese broadcasting 
development, you have to find money outside the state treasury; 
in order to get extra money, you have to change the existing 
entery rule (i. e centralized regulation), and concede its 
planning supremacy to the rest of society. In a word, something 
must give. 
There were some people, however, who regarded the power to run 
the broadcasting service as too important to delegate to local 
agents and other units. Hong Minsheng, deputy director and 
editor-in-chief of China Central Television (CCTV) , strongly 
criticised the proposed decentralization initiative and described 
it as a policy of which "haste makes waste". He, among many 
others, argued that there were far more negative than positive 
effects should such a strategy be implemented. It would result 
in serious consequences which could include 1) a chaotic 
administrative situation; 2) a weakening of the authority of 
central and regional television; 3) driving stations into a 
plight of unnecessary competition; 4) a degrading, rather than 
improving, the quality of programming; and 5) an enlargement of 
the gap of access to the services, making information-rich areas 
richer and information-poor areas poorer (Hong, recalled the 
debate in a personal communication to the author, Beijing, Oct. 
1990). 
Between these two arguments, stood the people with a moderate 
view who, though readily admitting the problem of the existing 
policy, took a rather cautious attitude towards the 
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decentralization approach. They were inclined to take a balanced 
position which endorsed some degree of decentralization on the 
one hand, and stressed the importance of continuing central 
dominance on the other. To them, decentralization could only be 
used as a makeshift measure to supplement the inadequate 
performance of the centralized approach. Zhao Shufu, a senior 
broadcasting policy maker, put his view in this way: In order to 
speed up the development of Chinese broadcasting, we should 
adjust our existing policy which was, in many ways, outdated. The 
new policy should give local people incentives to develop 
broadcasting. However, this also should be done without detriment 
to the leading role of the central institution (Zhao, 1989: 212- 
219; he also provided a detailed outline of the debate in 
conversation with the author, Beijing, Oct. 1990). 
In the same vein, some others expressed their concern that it was 
premature to introduce radical decentralization measures, but 
they tended to agree that the existing centralization strategy 
should be modified. 
Perhaps in policy formulation, one of the major factors that 
dictates the choice is the balance of costs and benefits, risks 
and opportunities. If the Chinese leadership f irmly committed 
itself to the economic reform with the effort of increasing 
productivity, then the rules of the game would be altered in a 
way that ought to opt for reducing the cost of institutional 
operation. As in the case of post-Mao China, the conduct of 
policy affairs is further compounded by Deng's pragmatic thinking 
which identifies ways and means with the target of modernization 
performance with minimum concern for ideological offence. As a 
result, the pro-decentralization argument was favoured and got 
more popular response among the policy makers. The consensus was 
thus to head for decentralization and three conclusions were 
gradually reached: 
1. ) the central government could no longer cope with the growing 
demand for developing local broadcasting industry, in particular, 
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with the regard of resources allocation; 
2) therefore, the existing centralized policy must be changed; 
3) the proposed new approach should be focused on the 
quantitative development through incentives to local people and 
enterprise initiatives. 
4.2.3 New Strategy: Arrival of a 4-level development policy 
Before I continues my analysis, it is necessary to explain the 
use of "level" in the Chinese context and the division of the 
Chinese administration system. In mainland China, the whole 
nation has been divided into four major levels since 1949: the 
central, the regional (i. e provincial), the local city and 
county. Below the fourth level there are also township, district 
and village levels. The first two levels (i. e central and 
regional) are directly under the jurisdiction of the state and 
are regarded as the centre of state institution; the rest are 
local levels. Territorially, China now has 30 regional units (i. e 
provinces), about 450 city units and 1,900 county units, which 
make up the major sectors of the Chinese administrative control 
system. The significance of this division, however, not only lies 
in its governmental operation but also in its organizational 
control. In principle, everyone in society must belong to one 
unit, and every unit belongs to a level of governmental authority 
mentioned above. The unit is not only concerned with 
administration, but also with economic performance and 
political/ social activities. The peculiar thing is that all units 
ranging from manufacturing to television stations receive 
different treatment and authority to do their business according 
to the defined level they belong to. In the area of television, 
for example, if the central authority took a policy to develop 
central and regional stations, it meant that only the central and 
regional institution was allowed and financed to run the service. 
The so-called decentralization in Chinese television development 
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chiefly meant that the central authority ceased to take 
responsibility for the arrangement of grassroots television 
development and simply transferred its power to local levels. 
The gathering momentum of the process of major policy changes 
concerning broadcasting development culminated in 1983 when the 
China Eleventh National Broadcasting Conference, the top decision 
making instrument attended by chief executives of all major 
stations (TV and radio), policy makers and leaders in 
broadcasting administration, convened in Beijing to review the 
existing policy and formulate the new one. The Chinese 
broadcasting authority finally decided to adopt a new strategy 
called "four-level development policy", in an effort to speed up 
the pace of Chinese broadcasting development in general and 
television in particular. In effect, the move was a major shift 
in the direction of decentralization in industry which was 
coupled with the appropriate features of the sweeping economic 
reform movement across China at that time. 
Realizing the importance of having an effective policy to meet 
the goal of the growth, the broadcasting authority finally came 
to form a new strategy and put forward its proposal before the 
eleventh conference. In the opening speech, the broadcasting 
chief Wu Legnxi articulated a "four-level policy of developing 
radio and television": 
In the past, we conducted the centralized approach with 
official sanction given to the authorities of the central 
and regional levels concerned to establish and manage our 
broadcasting service. This is particularly the case with 
regard to television development. Now the macro contexts 
and conditions have greatly changed since the 1978 reform 
programme initiated by the Party. In response to the new 
situation with growing pressure of demand from both the 
general public and local governments, and in order to 
accelerate our broadcasting development, we must adjust 
and reform our existing regulation and bring the 
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initiative of grassroots people (i. e local cities, 
counties and townships) into full play. Therefore, we lay 
down a two-point new policy for future development: 
--- four-level development and management of radio and 
television service; 
--- four-level mixed coverage. 
From now on, local people can be engaged in the 
broadcasting field by setting up their stations and 
running their service provided they meet the required 
condition (i. e mainly refers to financial conditions and 
ensuring the priority of transmitting a certain number of 
central and regional programmes). The local authorities 
are bestowed with the major role of managing and 
financing the local service while the broadcasting 
central authority supervises local performance through 
policy consultation and administrative instruction. our 
principle is simple and clear: whoever invents, should 
benefit. We believe that this new developing policy will 
inspire local people to strive for success and so advance 
our cause (Wu, 1984: 64-65,92-93). 
This speech still employed some Chinese official cliches such as 
"to bring local initiative into full play" to justify the policy 
reform. In three important respects, however, the minister's 
statement suggests that the rules of regulating Chinese radio and 
television development began to change. First, it involves a 
substantial reduction of mandatory operation conducted by the 
central institution with a shift of developing priority to local 
levels - Secondly, 
the economic performance for the first time 
became a necessary condition of entry to the broadcasting field; 
in other words, it is financial power that is now given sanction 
to run the service. Finally, the right of the investor is 
generally acknowledged, and the boundary of exercising power is 
preliminarily defined; in this way, the relation between the 
centre and localities is defined in a marginal way towards the 
direction of economic rationalism. 
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As far as the issue of spectrum arrangement was concerned, in 
order to solve the problem of spectrum shortage, an opt-out 
system was adopted: most of the local stations could only enjoy 
limited spectrum, so they should relay certain programs of CCTV 
and regional stations as the condition to use the frequency in 
the area. After the completion of transmitting programmes of the 
national network, these local stations opt out and broadcast 
their own programmes. In some other areas where frequency can be 
met the need, CCTV (now more and more relying on the satellite 
transmission), the regional station and the local station can 
exclusively use each own spectrum without interfering one 
another. 
At any rate, the designed decentralization drive in this respect 
was to bring about a degree of dynamism; and as the question of 
"to be or not to bell was solved, the situation was soon to 
change. 
4.3 NEW DYNAMICS 
4.3.1 The Burgeoning of the TV Industry 
The implementation of decentralization policy in 1983, together 
with the growing commercial involvement led by advertising 
provided a dynamic impetus to the television industry. A new 
chapter of the Chinese television development has, since then, 
been opened. Since I will analyze the impact of commercialization 
on Chinese broadcasting in the next chapter, I shall focus on the 
process of decentralization program and the progress of the 
industry in this chapter. 
In October 1983, the Party's ruling politburo issued a central 
committee's document "on a Programme Of Radio and Television" in 
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which the "four-level development policy" was approved to replace 
the old centralized one. Now, to run television, a typical 
example would be: a local level broadcasting unit would make an 
effort to raise funds; it needed about one million Chinese yuan 
(i. e US$ 250,000 in 1988) to set up a county-level TV station and 
three to five millions for a city-level station. A major part of 
the revenue would come from the local authority in question, 
however, in recent years, in some southeastern areas, revenue 
from commercial sponsorship and enterprises, or even from bank 
loan, has been rapidly increased. When the money became 
available, the local institute presented its case to the 
provincial broadcasting authority to be granted a license (since 
1988, however, the power to grant has been again referred to the 
Broadcasting Ministry in Beijing) . Once the license was granted, 
the station could provide its local service and enjoy a large 
degree of autonomy in organization, operation, and management. 
The central body virtually had no mandatory power to dictate to 
the local service, and no financial responsibility either. The 
precondition for that agreement, was that every local station 
must give priority to transmitting a certain programmes -- 
especially news and current affairs -- of CCTV and regional 
stations. 
Nevertheless, once the opening was created, the latent initiative 
of local power swiftly manifested itself, and the development of 
Chinese television experienced a rapid growth and a wave of 
reform in which the industry changed out of all recognition. To 
begin with, let's look at the development of the supply side -- 
the growth of the stations and transmitters. The following tables 
give the general picture of the advancing pace from 1978 to 199o. 
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Table 4.2 
The Growth of Chinese TV Station & Transmitters (1978 - 1990) 
Prior to the Period of the New Policy (1978 - 1983) 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Year Station % incr. Transmitter % incr. 
1978 32 n. a 
1979 38 18.8% n. a 
1980 38 0% 2,469 
1981 42 10.5% 4,117 66.8% 



















1980 - 1983 
------------------- 
67 * 6% 
-------- 
Under the period of the New Policy (1984 - 1990) 
--------------------------------------------------------- 
Year Station % incr. Transmitter % incr. 
1984 93 78.8% 91708 30% 
1985 202 117.2% 12,159 25.2% 
1986 292 44.6% 15,177 24.8% 
1987 366 25.3% 17,570 15.8% 
1988 422 15.3% 19,876 13.1% 













1984 - 1989 80.9% 1984 - 1989 28.5% 
Sources of table 4.1 & 4.2: China Broadcastinq Yearbook, (1986) ; 
(1987) ; (1988) ; (1989) ; (1990) ; Concise Broadcasting Dictionary, 
(1989: 420); China Statistics Yearbook, (1991). 
As the above tables indicate, prior to the implementation of 
decentralization, the growth of Chinese TV stations was very slow 
and solely relied on the investment scheme of the central and 
regional authorities targeted by the planner's unified 
arrangement. Before 1983, there were only about a dozen city- 
level TV stations mainly located in the minority areas and 
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sponsored by state projects. Furthermore, during that period, 
much effort was made to set up transmitters and relays, the 
average annual increase of transmitters stood at 1,600 from 1980 
to 1983. The aim of the strategy was clear: to build up a 
centralized structure. In other words, this is a centralized 
investment model to develop a television industry copied from the 
Soviet Union. 
When the new policy was introduced in 1983, the development of 
TV stations took of f immediately at the grass roots level. As can 
be seen, the most rapid expansion occurred between 1984 to 1987 
with an average increase rate of 98%. As a result, by 1992, the 
number of local stations reached over 550, covering approximately 
70% of local cities and 25% of local counties (People's Daily, 
2.19.1993). The policy spurred the initiatives of local 
authorities and the growing manufacturers, many of which now 
began to sponsor a local television service. Thus a great deal 
has been achieved in terms of the quantitative development in the 
industry. 
Meanwhile, the decentralization programme also strengthened the 
industry's capacity in television transmission and penetration. 
The broadcasting authority could now concentrate its resources 
to develop Hi-Tech-led communication technology. In April 1984, 
China launched its f irst experimental television communication 
satellite, aiming at bringing programmes to the remote and 
mountain areas. As part of efforts to solve the long-term problem 
of reception in the remote areas, two more communication 
satellites were launched in 1986 and 1988; and three transponders 
on the INTELSAT were rented in 1985. There were 4,609 satellite- 
receiving earth station in 1987, and the number increased to 
12,658 in 1989 (W. Xie, 1988: 17; China Broadcasting Yearbook, 
1990: 529). 
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4.3.2 TV Sets Production and Sale Market 
Meanwhile, the dramatic boom of the local TV industry further 
accelerated the post-Mao consumer revolution after 1978. 
In the late 1950s, China began to produce television sets on a 
small scale and the annual output merely remained at 3,000 - 
5,000 sets during the 1960s. Later on, TV set production received 
a modest boost with the increasing output from 17,800 in 1971 to 
184,500 in 1976 as the Maoist leadership became aware of the 
importance of this new medium for propaganda. However, only a 
total of 925,000 TV sets was produced between 1958 and 1977 
(f igure cited from concise Broadcasting Dictionary, 1989: 422-424) 
-- an insignificant figure 
in such a large country. 
The modernization movement launched in 1978 provided a good 
opportunity to increase the production of television sets. As 
table 4.3 shows, the output and retail sales of television sets 
grew steadily from about half a million in 1978 to nearly 7 
million in 1983. However, it was the 1983 decentralization 
strategy of developing the Chinese TV industry that produced the 
most successful boom in TV set production. Accordingly, a 
substantial marketing demand for TV receivers was created. By 
1984, the output and sales of TV sets went up sharply to lo 
million and 13 million respectively; and three years later the 
two figures were almost doubled. In addition, the increasing 
number of imported sets (on average two million annually, mainly 
from Japan) further spurred this massive TV proliferation. Today 
China's TV set production has become the largest in the world 
with an annual output of more than 25 million. The following 




China's TV Production & Retail Sales ( 1978 - 1989 
-------- 















1978 0.517 0.004 0.551 
1979 1.33 0.009 1.8 
1980 2.49 0.032 3.64 
1981 5.39 0.152 6.35 

















1984 10.04 1.34 12.93 
1985 16.68 4.35 21.57 
1986 14.6 4.15 21.98 
1987 19.34 6.73 23.26 









Total (84-89) 113-38 36.3S 128.11 
source: For the figures of 1978 to 1982, from Concise 
Bro idca5tina Dictionary, appendix section, 1989: 423-424; also 
from the PolicV Studies of Radio & Television, 1989: 518-520; and 
from -China 
Statistics Yearbook (1986), (1987), (1887), (1988), 
(1989), (1990). 
Today, China has built up a sizable television products industry. 
Of the country's 30 provinces, 25 had established their own 
television factories by the end of 1980s. Through 1982 more than 
50 television factories produced all types of TV sets plus spare 
parts for family use as well as for various others. As far as the 
product quality is concerned, its main performance specifications 
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are close to that in other countries. China also imported a dozen 
colour-TV assembly lines from developed countries to improve its 
product quality and, in recent years it has started to export TV 
sets and other related products to countries competing in the 
world market (cf. W. Chang, 1989: 216-217). 
4.3.3 Expansion of Private TV Ownership 
Related to the development mentioned above is a rapid expansion 
of private television ownership. During Mao's era, private 
ownership of a television receiver was often not only politically 
denounced as "seeking a bourgeois pleasure style", but also 
economically unfeasible to most Chinese families. The price of 
a 14-inch black and white TV set, for example, was the equivalent 
of two years' income, so television sets were, usually 
collectively owned by public units such as factories, institutes 
and peasants' communes. However, this situation has dramatically 
changed in post-Mao China. With the progress of economic reform 
and the increase in people's income, owning a TV set is no longer 
a dream. This phenomenon first occurred in large cities such as 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou where TV broadcasts were already 
available. When the development of local TV stations in the mid- 
1980s started, it rapidly spread to the rural areas. A Chinese- 
made 14 inch black-and-white set now costs about E80, or three 
times the average monthly income, and the same size colour one 
can cost E 200-250. The price is still high for the average 
family, but in a country where housing is still largely supplied 
by the state free of charge (there have been some changes 
regarding private purchasing property in some cities since 1990, 
but the scale is too small to reckon) and while private ownership 
of a car is still unrealistic, a television set has become the 
most popular durable goods on the purchasing list in most Chinese 
families. By 1990, it is reported that the number of TV receivers 
in China was over 170 million with a viewing public of over 700 
million which means that China has 150 sets/per 1,00o 
inhabitants. According to 1990 UNESCO statistics, this figure is 
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far above that of Asia (53 sets/per 1,00o inhabitants, 1988) and 
equal to that of the world average (148 sets/per 1,0oo 
inhabitants, 1988). Specifically speaking, Chinese television 
ownership in rural areas was 44.4% of households; in urban areas, 
almost every family had at least one set and the proportion of 
the b/w to colour was fifty-fifty. That is to say, in a nation 
where the current level of GNP has only reached about US$ 500-600 
per capita, the ownership of TV sets in China has already reached 
a level as high as that of countries such as Malaysia where the 
GNP is over US$ 2,000 per capita. The following table depicts the 
trend. 
Table 4.4 
China's TV Ownership & Viewership ( 1978 - 1989 ) 
Year No. of Receiver TV Viewership No. of TVs/100 household 
( million )( million ) (urban area) (rural area) 
1978 3.04 80 
1979 4.85 120 
1980 9.02 200 
1981 15.67 250 57.65 0.39 
1982 27.61 320 73.31 0.87 
1983 36.11 370 83.2 3.99 
1984 47.63 450 84.1 7.24 
1985 69.65 540 87.42 11.74 
1986 92.14 570 92.8 18.8 
1987 116 590 99.4 26.72 
1988 125 650 103.15 34.2 
1989 165 700 107.18 41.13 
Note: Among 1.1 billion Chinese population (1990), abou 
t 37% are urban residents and 63% are rural residents. 
Source: for total number of TV sets and TV population, see 
Concise Broadcasting Dictionary, 1989: 423-424; 1987 National TV 
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Audience Survey, in A Collection of the Chinese Media Surveys, 
1989: 349; and also The Advancement of Chinese Broadcasting, 
1991: 5; for the number of TVs/ per 100 household, see China 
Statistics Yearbook, from 1982 edition to 1990 edition. 
4.3.4 New Structural Model 
Since 1983, the organizational structure of Chinese television 
has changes profoundly. A federation with Pluralistic features 
has replaced the old centralized one. However, one should notice 
that this is very much sensed in terms of a delicate practice, 
and very much depends on the Political climate of the day. In 
other words, it has been achieved without constitutional 
guarantee. The medium, at least in theory, is still controlled 
by the Party especially with regard to political and ideological 
matters. The following illustrates the old and the new models. 
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THE OLD CENTRALIZED STRUCTURE OF CHINESE TELEVISION 
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As noted, the implications of this new model are reflected on 
financial, administrative, managerial and programming production 
areas. Broadcasters at local units in particular, now have more 
autonomy to run their own television service. 
As far as the structure is concerned, the four levels can be 
further divided into two types -- central control and local 
control. In other words, China's current broadcasting 
organization consists of a two-tiered system: state-led 
institutions and local confederative institutions. on the one 
hand, there is the centre-linked institution of CCTV and 30 
regional stations that are continuously subject to state 
management (though these stations have become more and more 
market-oriented in recent years); on the other hand, there are 
large numbers of local-level stations which to some degree are 
controlled by the local broadcasters and largely subject to non- 
political/administrative means to maintain their service. In a 
broad sense, the four-level stations are also competing with each 
other in pursuing their own political and economic goals in 
society. The result of such a movement of structural change is 
very encouraging: First, the old centralized broadcasting system 
is being replaced by the new-federation style one which favours 
building a democratic media system in the process of communist- 
state transformation. Second, the change has produced new social 
forces in mass communication in China, laying down an important 
social foundation for progress in the future. 
4.3.5 New Paradigm of Centre-local Relationship 
To a remarkable extent, shifting paradigms of centre-local 
relationship in broadcasting structure and operation have had 
important implications for the exercising media power. As pointed 
out by Curran et al., recognition of the power of the media 
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raises questions as to how and by whom this power is wielded. 
Answers to these questions have been sought through the 
investigation and analysis of the structures and practices of 
media organizations (Curran & Gurevitch & Woollacott, 1982: 16). 
The emergence of the structural decentralization in the Chinese 
television industry has decisively shaken the Party' media 
control system. The central authorities concerned cannot easily 
impose their will upon the local stations without facing 
resistance and making concessions. To the centre, one major 
impetus to adopt decentralization in 1983, was the state's 
attempt to solve the long term problem of lack of investment in 
the industry by allowing local units to run their own services 
with their own revenue. The central authorities intended to 
continue political and ideological dominance by transmitting 
their programmes through local stations. In 1983 and 1984, the 
Broadcasting Ministry issued directives demanding that the local 
stations give priority to the programmes of central and regional 
stations. In 1988, the authority reaffirmed this principle with 
some tough restrictions (cf. Radio and-Television Broadcasting 
in China, 1984: 192; Z. Ai, 1989: 74-76). In reality, however, these 
instructions from the centre are often, if not always, ignored, 
or merely partially obeyed, because the new structure in general 
has increased the power of localities. As remarked by J. Yu: 
Post-Mao television is also characterized by the rising 
autonomy of local stations vis-a-vis CCTV in Beijing. 
Local units gained more power in making decisions during 
the reform decade, both in politics and in television. 
Local stations, supported by advertising and program 
sponsorship, were encouraged to develop their own 
programming. Thus, their dependence on CCTV was weakened. 
Instead, they built close ties to pursue regional 
interests (J. Yu, 1990: 86). 
The building of close ties among local stations has been 
progressed steadily in recent years. In programming, production 
and distribution, for instance, local stations have taken some 
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measures to strengthen their ties. Currently, three popular forms 
have been operated on a regular basis among the local stations- 
First, they exchange programs, sometimes for free, sometimes for 
a fee. Second, several station may pool manpower and investment 
to co-produce a better program or a set of programs. Third, they 
may manage a certain types of services within a regional scale 
to get mutual benefits and to reduce the operational costs (cf. 
J. Yu, 1990: 76). 
4.3.6 Problems of Local Stations and Confrontation between 
the Centre and the Localities 
By the end of 1990, the number of local stations reached over 470 
accounting for about 70% of city units and 20% of county units 
respectively. However, compared with the central and regional 
stations, local-level stations face a number of difficulties, the 
three major ones being a shortage of funds, relatively poor 
ability to produce their own programmes, and a lack of qualified 
professionals. As the new policy is one of financial self- 
reliance, the pressing issue facing local broadcasters is how to 
get sufficient revenue to maintain the service. Their efforts 
have led local stations to rely on buying/exchanging cheap but 
attractive soaps and on selling more airtime to advertisers. In 
reality, however, the development is uneven, particularly for 
those stations located in the southeastern prosperous areas and 
those in the rather underdeveloped areas, where the extent and 
degree of these common problems can be quite different. In 1986, 
a study commissioned by the Ministry of Broadcasting found that 
some local programmes, especially news, were popular. Several 
other empirical surveys in the past few years have also confirmed 
this. The following table provides a general outline of the 
capability of TV programme production and service offering time 
in each of the four level stations. It is calculated by the 
author on the basis of statistics provided by the Chinese 
Broadcasting Yearbook and a documentary book titled "The 
Adva_ncement of Chinese Broadcastincill. 
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Table 4.6 
Capability of Programme Production & service Time in 
Each of China's Four Level Stations 
(time unit: hour/weekly) 
By the end of the 1980s Program Production Service time 
CCTV (two national channels) 70 230 
Regional Station (1/2 chl) 30-35 60-100 
City Station 12-15 25-35 
County Station 5-7 12-20 
As can be seen, there is a clear gap between the central-regional 
stations and the local stations in providing the service. While 
the local stations are unable to produce many original 
programmes, they, nevertheless, try every other means including 
program exchange, purchase, co-production and even piracy to fill 
up air time in order to survive, obtain greater autonomy, and 
attract commercial sponsorship. It comes as no surprise, 
therefore, that the law of market forces has more power to 
determine local stations' fate and future. As a result, there is 
often conflict between the centre and localities over the 
distribution of air time as they fight to maintain their 
interests. For instance, as we mentioned above, the central 
broadcasting authority in Beijing has demanded several times that 
local stations transmit the central and regional programme 
unconditionally, but the local stations either take little notice 
of this directive, or, they use weaker transmitters to broadcast 
CCTV and regional services leaving the more powerful transmitters 
for their own programmes. This is quite a common phenomenon which 
someone described as "the small eats the big" (Ma, X. 1989: 229). 
most programmes for transmission also include advertising which 
is priced according to national or regional audience size. It is 
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precisely this economic concern that provokes contending 
interests. The local broadcasters argue: "Why should we transmit 
their advert i sement- including programmes without receiving a 
penny of their advertising revenue? Besides, if we merely 
transmit their programmes, who is going to buy our advertising 
time? " (cited from my personal communication with broadcasting 
policy makers in Beijing, Oct. 1990). It is important to point out 
that the economic performance of television stations has deeply 
influenced in the relationship between the centre and the 
localities. As a result of the emergence of a two-tiered system, 
local stations have a formidable power base allowing them to 
withstand pressure from the centre. 
4.4 TOWARDS A TELEVISION-LED MEDIA ENVIRONMENT 
Driven by the modernization movement in PoSt-Mao China, Chinese 
television has experienced an unprecedented boom in the last 
decade, and this in turn has changed the practice of mass 
communication in China with a profound impact on society as a 
who le. The very presence of television demonstrated the fruits 
of the economic reform progress, its audiovisual combination 
proved to be more attractive than radio and newspaper and made 
it a domestic necessity. By the end of the 1980s, television 
entered most Chinese family homes. As a result, television began 
to transform people's mentality, providing new access to 
information and entertainment. It opened a new window on the 
outside world for a tightly controlled society and brought many 
innovations to the notice of the public, especially in the vast 
rural areas where the majority of Chinese peasants had little 
chance to enjoy cultural life due to their impoverished 
condition, limited media input (mostly through wired broadcasting 
system) and poor literacy (there is still more than 30% rural 
illiteracy) . By any standards, Chinese television has become the 
most powerful means of mass communication, entertainment and 
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advertising. As a result, Chinese mass communication is changing 
from being dominated by press and radio to being television-led. 
4.4.1 Changing Media consumption of the Chinese Public 
Until the early 1980s, radio and newspapers were still seen as 
the media most predominantly used by the Chinese public. Early 
empirical research shows that radio broadcasting had a high 
reception in the rural areas, whilst newspapers enjoyed a large 
readership in urban areas. This was partly owing to the different 
levels of literacy and partly owing to the fact that the 
authorities set up a vast rural network of wired broadcasting 
throughout Mao's era. Accordingly, most Chinese people perceived 
the outside world through newspapers and radio broadcasting. The 
first large-scale audience surveys conducted by the Chinese mass 
communication researchers in the regions of Zhejiang province, 
Jiangsu province and the capital of Beijing in 1982 and 1983, 
provided detailed evidence. 
Table 4.7 
Regular Use of the Mass Media by the Chinese Public 
---------- 


























- - - --- 






-- -- ------ 
32.6% 
------------- 
Note: "regular use" is defined here as an individual using the 
medium at least more than three times a week. 
Source: China Journalism Yearbook, 1983,1984. 
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Table 4. a 












































Source: the sane as table 4.7. 
By the mid 1980s, however, the situation started to change as the 
development of Chinese television reached a breakthrough point 
both in terms of hardware (e. g station, TV set production) and 
software (e. g programme, service) . Since then, research has shown 
that people now rely more on TV as their regular news and 
entertainment medium. For instance, by 1987, the regular media 
users in the region of Jiangsu province devoted to television, 
reached 70% of the people (S. Ji, 1989: 321), a sharp 45% increase 
compared with the appropriate figure in 1983 (see table 5.9). The 
evidence suggests that television has become the number one 
medium used by the Chinese public. Here are some more examples 
to demonstrate this point. 
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Table 4.9 
1987 National Audience Survey: the Public Use of the Media 
(N= 24,893, in %) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Frequency of use TV Radio Newspapers 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Daily 54% 35% 32% 
Regularly (3-4/weekly) 24% 21% 17% 
Sometimes (1-2/weekly) 16-0o 19% 18% 
Occasionally (1-3/monthly) 5% 9% 11% 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: 1987 Survey of the National TV Audience, from China 
Broadcasting Yearbook, 1988. 
Table 4.10 
Beijing Public's Major Access to the Reception of News (1986) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
year TV Radio Newspapers Others 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
1986 41.7% 30.2% 26% 1.2% 
Compared With 1982's 28.2% - 5.3% - 12.9% - 4.5% 
------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Audience Survey Report of Beijing People's Radio Station, 
from he Chinese Media Survevs, 1989: 451 
The rapid increase in TV viewing has undoubtely affected the 
public's consumption of other media. In 1985, a targeted survey 
was conducted in Nanjing, the provincial capital city of Jiangsu, 
which provided the specific information on the subject. It 
confirmed that, 25% of Nanjing residents reduced their radio 
listening time considerably owing to watching more television, 
6% even said they stopped listening entirely, and 12.8% of the 
people either cut down on their reading, or did not read 
newspapers at all (cf. "TV Communication situation in Nanjing", 
from the Chinese Media Surveys, 1989: 420). on 
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average, Nanjing residents spent 59% of their spare time on 
television viewing. In other words, watching TV takes up most of 
people's leisure time. 
In another relevant development, the Chinese film industry has 
been seriously affected by the popularity of television as it 
proved to be a major source of entertainment. According to the 
report of China Film Time on 28 Feb. 1987, --an influential 
Shanghai-based professional newspaper, between 1979 and 1985, 
there was a 17% fall-off in the number of screening and a 43.5% 
decline in admissions to the cinema in urban area. In the 
countryside, whilst audience admissions continuously dropped, 
over 40,000 of the 150,000 mobile projection teams that serve the 
rural area folded up. In effect, the late 1980s saw a further 
decline and a series of crises in the film industry largely due 
to the rapid growth of Chinese television. In 1990, film 
admissions of Chinese audience dropped to 16.2 billion -- the 
lowest level since the 1960s; whereas, television ownership 
reached 50% of Chinese families and TV viewing commanded more 
than 700 million people. The following table of cinema attendance 
in China reveals such a tendency. 
Table 4.11 
Cinema Attendance in Mainland China ( 1977 -- 1990 
(in billion) 
1977 1979 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 
------------------------------------------------------------- 29.4 
29.3 27.2 26.5 21.7 18.7 16.2 
source: China Film Yearbook and China Statistics Yearbook (1980 
- 1990) . 
From these facts, my observation is that the media consumption 
of the Chinese public has been transformed to the television-led 
formulation, and so has the adjustment of Chinese mass 
communication structure. 
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4.4.2 The Emerging TV-led Media Environment: the Global Trend 
Historically, the world experienced two communication revolutions 
which greatly altered human civilization. The f irst one was that 
verbal communication developed into written communication which 
took place around the beginning of Christian times; the second 
one which started in the seventeenth century was characterised 
by the invention of the press medium and its subsequent 
replacement of elite communication with mass communication. A 
press-led media dominated the public communication up till the 
early 20th century when radio broadcasting emerged as another 
major source which co-existed with the press. With the 
development of the new electrical technologies that underpinned 
the culture and leisure industries, however, since the late 
1950s, we have witnessed a third wave of the communication 
revolution sweeping the world that has led to a new era of 
television-led multi-media environment. This process has been 
gathering momentum which has not only reshaped public perception 
of the outside world, but also the style of mass entertainment. 
Clearly, the dominant medium is television. As we can see from 
table 4.12, in the last f if teen years, television development has 
made giant strides and the growth rate has been the fastest 
compared to that of the other media. Generally speaking, in the 
developed countries, the new communication revolution has entered 
its mature stage of development, and this trend is increasingly 
expanding to the rest of the world. As we can understand it for 
obvious reason the press development in the majority of the 
developing countries can never reach the level that developed 
countries now enjoy. Apart from the backward economy and poor 
literacy of these countries, the long term restriction lies in 
the constant scarcity of raw material (i. e paper) production and 
distribution. In other words, existing natural paper resources 
are unable to meet the demand of consumption in the world. As far 
as the dynamics of mass media development are concerned, it is 
clear that the press is declining, and whilst the radio still has 
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some space to grow, it remains secondary to television and the 
long term trend is towards static state, only television is 
keeping up the pace of rapid advance. 
Table 4.12 
The Growth Trend of the mass Media in the World (1975 - 1988) 
( in 



















No. of Dailies 8.7% -4.6% 2.7% 
Circulation (est) 27.5% 14.4% 76% 










No. of transmitters** 46.7% 35.3% 79.1% 
No. of receivers 82.5% 43.8% 253.9% 










No. of transmitters 202.8% 168.3% 872.5% 
No. of receivers 82.6% 56.8% 317.1-0, 








-- -- ------ 
Annual cinema attendance 8.4% 22.2% 63.2% 
*DDC, DPC: developed countries and developing countries. 
Number of world radio and TV transmitters covers the period 
between 1975 to 1987. 
Film data do not include China and covers the period 
between 1975 to 1987. 
Source: UNESCO Statistical Yearbook, 199o. 
In post-Mao China, the general tendency of mass media consumption 
and development is very similar to that of the world. As this 
chapter shows, television development reached a breakthrough 
point in the 1980s, whilst radio broadcasting has remained stable 
and the press industry has diminished. 
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once seen as the backbone of the Chinese mass media, the press 
no longer takes the leading position in today's Chinese mass 
media family. There was an increase in growth in newspaper 
numbers and circulation in the early 1980s and the phenomenon 
culminated in 1987 when on average per 1,000 inhabitants had 
167.5 papers and 49 dailies respectively. However, its 
development, since then, has stepped down and has been 
constrained by considerable problems such as the shortage of 
paper supply, economic difficulties, the fall of readership and 
circulation etc. In addition, this has been further hampered by 
the alarming 1989 Beijing tragedy as the Party has re-tightened 
the scale and the numbers of press development. It is reported 
that scale of press development in 1990 reduced to the level of 
1983. As an industry, the Chinese press medium has passed its 



































1951 n. a 390 
1961 n. a 260 
1971 n. a 195 
1981 143 476 
1982 150 659 
1983 168 792 34.6 94 
1984 220 1,049 44.7 29.1% 133.1 41.6% 
1985 225 1,716 44.7 0% 146.6 10.1% 
1986 247 1,813 46.9 4.9% 153 4.4% 
1987 268 1,880 49 4.5% 167.5 9.5% 
















Note*: the 1989 figure is not the final published one. 
Source: f igures f or the 1951,1961,1971 numbers of newspapers f rom 
China Statistics Yearbook, 1983; the 1989 figure is calculated 
from the report of Press & Publication (1.2.1989), figures for 
the rest from China Journalism Yearbook, 1982-1989. 
Radio broadcasting development has shown a similar tendency. 
Wired broadcasting in recent years has reduced both in scale and 
degree. Meanwhile, from 1985 to 1989 the growth of radio 
receivers proceeded at a glacial rate just remaining at the level 
of 23-24 per hundred people, and the speed of radio broadcasting 
development slowed down with more attention being paid to 
television. Although, the quality of radio programming and 
transmission continue to improve, numbers of radio users have 
declined. 
Table 4.14 
The Growth of Wired Broadcasting in China ( 
- - 















In rural area(%) 
-------------- - 








1981 2,643 1.2% 
1982 2,631 -0.04% 
1983 2,619 -0.05% 44.8% 
1984 2,570 -1.87% 43.3% 15,052(hr) 
1985 2,668 3.8% 42.1% 15,339(hr) 1.9% 
1986 2,560 -4% 41.6% 15,167(hr) -1.1% 
1987 2,576 0.6% 41% 14,830(hr) -2.2% 














Yearbook, 1983, 1984; for the rest of the part, from China 
BroadgAagj. iýn Yearbook, 1986-1990. 
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The conclusion is obvious: modernization of the Chinese mass 
communication system has come to the point where television plays 
the dominant role in the multi-media environment. 
********** 
The centralization of the electrical media particularly 
television, could hardly claim to be rare. However, what is 
unique to the Chinese case presented here is the innovation of 
a decentralization strategy and its achievements in a 
transitional communist China. By allowing local broadcasters to 
enjoy a degree of autonomy and marginalizing the power between 
the centre and localities, the costs of institutional 
arrangements and operations have been reduced to a large degree 
and the development of Chinese television has thus experienced 
a decade of boom. Significantly, many new social forces have 
brought into being a freer and more dynamic media system. Despite 
the fact that the Chinese central authority still maintains its 
political control over the television medium, the authority has 
conceded many of its other powers to the localities and the 
broadcasters. If the decentralization solution has proved to be 
essential to the dynamics of the industry, another significant 
adoption in television development has been commercial forces led 




5.1 COMMERCIAL COMMUNISM AND MEDIA ACCUMULATION 
s. 1.1 "commercial communism,, 
it would scarcely be controversial to state that the current form 
of Chinese communism has been changed out of all recognition in 
terms of its defined doctrine and historical praxis. In effect, 
since the late 1970s, China has experienced much of its socio- 
economic transformation through Deng's reform characterised by 
the adoption of a market-oriented approach which pushes 
industries (including the communication media) to pursue 
commercial interests as a way to realize capital accumulation. 
Despite being apparently inconceivable and ironic, the peculiar 
term 'commercial Communism" (from Z. Brzezinski, 1989: 145) is now 
widely employed to identify what has been happening in post-Mao 
China. it is our view that the importance of the "Commercial 
communism" phenomenon relies to a large degree on the 
understanding and interpretation of the word "Commercial" and its 
unusual association with "Communism" (L. Zhang & Y. Huang, 1992). 
This juxtaposition presents a number of questions: Why would a 
market-driven approach and commercialism be adopted by Chinese 
communism? How well can commercialism itself function under the 
auspices of the remaining Chinese communist system? Where can 
this trend lead, and with what social consequences? Can 
communism really be commercialized or reformed by pursuing a 
market-oriented economic liberalization? 
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This chapter attempts to provides a descriptive account and a 
sociological interpretation of the post-Mao commercialization of 
Chinese television industry. The main purpose is to examine the 
role that the market approach has played in reshaping the 
structure of Chinese television and the process of 
commercialization in the industry with particular reference to 
the impact of increasingly retargeting resources via commercial 
means. As the advertising industry is of critical importance in 
the process, we shall provide an analysis of the development of 
the Chinese advertising industry and its powerful influence on 
the finance, operation, production and organization of Chinese 
television in the last decade. Finally, we attempt to address the 
problem of commercialization caused by the contradiction between 
the existing Party control structure of the medium on the one 
hand, and the rapidly emerging economic autonomy of the medium 
which has been increasingly left to market forces on the other. 
We argue that the market approach and the expansion of commercial 
forces in the context of the Chinese reform programme to some 
extent may favour a peaceful evolution of media pluralism, while 
also transforming the communist totalitarian state and allowing 
a commercial-oriented and open society to emerge. Furthermore, 
such an evolution may also favour long-term media democratization 
in China, although we should not idealize commercialism, or deny 
its problems. 
5.1.2 Problems of the Communist system 
Whatever merit it nay have, the established Soviet-style 
communist system, by its very nature, is alien to the commodity 
economy. Marx's arguments for the abolition of the system of 
private enterprise, for the replacement of the existing relations 
of capitalist commodity production to fit the high-speed 
productive forces developed from advanced capitalism, for the 
creation of an optimal society based on the premise of human 
altruism and through social engineering, for guiding mankind to 
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the stage of Uberf lussgesellsehaf t without material scarcity, are 
all regarded as the philosophical foundations of the system. The 
historical praxis, however, is that the "established communist 
system", from the Soviet Union to China, is contrary to Marx's 
predictions and prerequisites. It did not evolve from mature 
capitalism, but rather, from so-called "Asiatic society" (e. g 
China) or "Semi-Asiatic society (e. g Russia) . Its rise and 
success largely depended on a Leninist Party exercising 
totalitarian power over every aspect of the society through armed 
force and through symbolic force (such as censorship and 
propaganda) . Its economic solution, known as the command economy, 
has been implemented on the basis of the non-market environment 
and bureaucratic resource allocation. 
In short then, the established Soviet communism was a 
nomenklatura institution that was designed primarily to maintain 
Party monopoly control over society and a central planning 
structure that was also unable to tackle the economic problem of 
scarcity effectively. More acutely, this is a system that can 
deliver neither social justice, nor freedom, nor enough goods. 
The essential traits of the established communist system, 
especially its "dictatorship over needs", politico-ideological 
dominance and the giant centralized bureaucratic machinery, go 
against the grain of commodity production and the market 
discipline which are seen as the locomotive behind the 
development of modern society. It thus tends to generate 
persistent contradictions and dilemmas within the system which 
inevitably belie all its promises and once-widely-held utopian 
fantasy. In the end, maintaining and maximizing totalitarian 
control becomes the very existence of the system in itself. 
Therefore, the system contained an underlying tendency towards 
social retardation and self-paralysis wherever it was established 
(cf. 1.4]. 
On the other hand, however, the failure of the system constantly 
drove the communist pragmatists to seek alternative solutions. 
A partial reform program with the adoption of a market-oriented 
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approach was thus not only possible, but also apparently 
promising for continuing the dictatorship of the Communist Party 
in a way that, hopefully, could move the economy and give some 
vent to people's material aspirations. In the case of the Chinese 
communist experience, Mao's death and Deng's regaining of power 
in 1978 signalled such a change of direction with which much of 
the obsolete utopian social engineering and politics-in-command 
guideline were dismissed in order to ensure the survival of the 
Party-state (cf. 2-2]. 
5.1.3 The Adoption Of A Market-oriented Approach 
Given the Dengist commitment to modernising China, and 
considering the reality of the unworkable socioeconomic structure 
on the one hand, and the general poverty (approx $US 150 per 
capita GNP at the time of the late **70s) on the other, the 
paramount question facing Deng was: How could his reform 
programme be approached, even just in terms of capital 
accumulation? The choice was very limited and was determined to 
a large degree by the problem of the existing communist system 
itself. The market approach was thus rapidly introduced in an 
attempt to save a ruined economy and recurrent crisis stemming 
from the praxis of Party-state totalitarianism. Indeed, the new 
development strategy was now designed to proceed to the long-term 
assimilation into China's planned economy of such alien forces 
as private ownership, foreign investment, competition, 
commercialization etc. Therefore, the process of a prolonged 
period of quasi-capitalist economic development would certainly 
have deep influence and overwhelming impact on cultural 
production as well as communication industries. 
With regard to the underdeveloped Chinese TV industry, the option 
of the new process can be narrowed down to the point of increased 
reliance on the market mechanism and commercial means in 
realizing capital accumulation for the growth of media 
industries. In this sense, the development of the Chinese 
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advertising industry is essential to this change. What we have 
witnessed, since 1979, is a new alien force headed by advertising 
and backed by international capitalism, entering the forbidden 
domains of Chinese mass media industries with television being 
seen as primary target, and beginning the process of 
commercialization. 
5.2 THE GROWTH OF THE CHINESE ADVERTISING INDUSTRY 
5.2.1 Historical Background 
According to recorded materials, the original advertising in 
ancient China could be traced back to around 1,000 BC when goods 
displays, highflying banners, and street hawking were employed 
to promote sales or attract customers in trade fairs and some 
shop business activities. In a famous Song Dynasty (960 - 1279) 
painting "Riverside Scene on Qingming Festival", we can see shops 
have signboards of many shapes and colours with the names of the 
shops or the goods on sale. Before the nineteenth century, 
however, advertising development throughout Chinese history was 
slow and remained in its primitive stage. Signboards, highflying 
banners, shop decorations and brochures were the main forms of 
Chinese advertising (J. Liu, 1987: 20-21). 
It was not until the late nineteenth century when the western 
powers headed by the British and French forcefully entered China 
accompanied by, among many others, modern communication means 
such as newspapers, magazines, and radio broadcasting, that a 
significant change in Chinese advertising took place. During the 
1920s to the 1930s, an advertising industry started to flourish 
in China: most of the newspapers, radios, magazines and books 
carried a lot of commercial advertising with many of them chiefly 
relying on the income of advertising to run the media. For 
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instance, Shen Bao (Shanghai Journal) and Daqonct Bao 
(Lilmpartial), the two most influential private-run newspapers 
prior to communist China, devoted half of their space 
(approximately 5-6 pages) to advertisements at that times. As the 
business grew, the first modern Chinese Advertising agency was 
set up in 1926. By 1946, there were about 100 advertising 
agencies, many of them foreign owned, operating in China, and the 
figure increased gradually reaching nearly 200 before 1949 
(X. Zhang, 1990: 127, X. Yu, 1991: 19-20). 
5.2.2 The Fate of Advertising in Mao's Era 
Commercial advertising in Mao, s era was reduced to a minimum. 
In fact, the fate of advertising has proved an interesting and 
distinctive parameter through which a better reading of Communist 
deviance from and indifference towards capitalism can be reached. 
By 1956-1957 Chinese Communists accomplished so-called 
"socialist-ownership transformation" in which all private-owned 
business and industries were taken over by the state; as a 
result, Chinese private advertising agencies (e. g there were 108 
in Shanghai before 1956) ceased to exist overnight. Moreover, 
commercial advertising activities were virtually forbidden from 
1954 to 1978. In return, street hoardings were converted into 
,, political Slogan" or "Big Character" boards, and neon lamps, 
previously used for advertising products, were imprinted with 
mottoes such as "Long Live Chairman Mao" and "Long Live the 
Communist Party of China". Probably the activities most 
equivalent to advertising in Mao's era were promotions for the 
products of means of production and for cultural performances in 
libraries, cinemas and theatres which were seen as being harmless 
to socialism (G. Yu, 1986: 2). 
As the mediator between production (or, supply) and consumption 
(or, demand), advertising is always associated with the modern 
market economy and the mode of capitalist production. Under 
communism, therefore, abrogating advertising was perfectly 
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identified with its ideology as well as its centrally planned 
economy which had supported the former. In conjunction with this 
praxis, advertising of a commercial nature was made a social and 
political taboo, labelled as a "parasitic activity" and was 
firmly rejected in Mao's era. Indeed, when the Soviets in the 
late 1950s carefully reintroduced advertising on a limited scale, 
the Chinese not only remained unaffected, but also criticised it 
as further evidence of the development of Khrushchev-led Soviet 
revisionism (i. e deviating from Marxism-Leninism) and their the 
betrayal of socialism (G. Yu, 1986: 2; R. Stross, 1990: 489). 
However, as we discussed above, Post-Mao China's new leadership 
has concluded that the only way to maintain power now lies in 
taking advantage of whatever capitalism can offer to develop the 
Chinese economy; thus it is merely a matter of time before we see 
a revival of the Chinese advertising industry. 
5.2.3 Rehabilitating Credit of Advertising in Post-Mao China 
The acceptance of advertising in communist China was not only an 
economic matter, but also, and probably more importantly, a 
politico-ideological one. As a common communist saying has it: 
everything is impossible unless it is grounded in the "correct 
Marxist thinking 11. Thus, prior to its practice, restoring the 
credit of the use of advertising in Post-Mao China was very much 
a political task pertinent to the maintenance of communist power. 
Needless to say, this had to be done through the re- 
interpretation campaign employed by the Party's mass media. 
The first significant move towards rehabilitation came on January 
14,1979, in a commentator's article of the very influential 
Shanghai-based newspaper Wenhui Daily, headed "Reinstating the 
Proper Credit of Advertising". The author, Ding Yunpeng, claimed 
that advertising in capitalist countries had contributed to their 
economic successes and deserved study in socialist countries too. 
As the title already shows, the article argued that advertising 
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had many positive functions in the service of the current 
modernization program (cf. R. Stross, 1990: 485-486) . In supporting 
this commentary, a major trade journal of the media pointed out 
that advertising can be used to "promote the production of 
society, and to meet the material and cultural needs of the 
people" (journalism Front, 6/1979: 55). In a similar vein, 
editorials in the Party's People's DailV, barely veiled its 
enthusiasm for advertising. Boldly enough, it was concluded that 
commercial advertising should be introduced without delay to 
bridge gaps "between production and marketing" and to speed up 
"the flow of commodities". It was also proclaimed that 
advertising was a very "necessary" requirement for establishing 
"a prosperous and active market" in modern socialist China 
(People's Daily, Oct. 1.1979). It seemed that the tone which was 
set to justify the merit of advertising during that period was 
mainly concerned with its economic advantages in guiding social 
needs. 
1982 saw the complete legitimization of the reintroduction of 
advertising to China. The State Council, China's Cabinet, issued 
China Is f irst advertising regulation, the "Provisional Regulation 
for Advertising Management", on February 6,1982. it includes 
nineteen articles in which the aims of advertising are 
propounded: 
1) Promote and expand the circulation of goods; 
2) Guide the consumers; 
3) Enliven the economy; 
4) offer conveniences to the life of the people; 
5) Develop international economic relations and trade; 
6) Enhance socialist moral standards. 
The regulation also stipulates some codes for conducting the 
business --- that the truth must be ensured in advertising, that 
perpetrators of false advertisements will be obliged to bear the 
losses of users and consumers, that food and medicine can only 
176 
be advertised with certified approval from the authorities 
concerned, and that private citizens are not allowed to engage 
in the business. It also empowers the authorities to impose 
penalties on advertisers found violating the rules. These may 
include revoking licenses and temporarily shutting down the 
company concerned (cf. Beijing Review, Jan. 7.1982: 6-7; Central 
Administration for Industry and Commerce, 1982; S. Seligman, 
1984: 13-14). 
In many respects, the f irst regulation remained in its premature 
stage. Nevertheless, China's fledgling advertising industry had 
at last come out of the POlitico-ideological shadow and was fully 
accepted by the Party and society. Since then, the rapidly 
growing industry has played an increasingly important role in 
reshaping China's communications structures in general, and the 
television industry in particular. This will be explored below. 
5.2.4 Rapid Development 
As China's economy is gathering momentum towards marketization 
and moneterization, commercial advertising has been strikingly 
successful. Since 1982, the Chinese advertising business has 
become one of the top growth industries with overall 30%-50% 
increase in demand annually. By 1982 the total turnover of the 
advertising industry had reached 150 million Chinese Yuan; four 
years later, in 1986, the volume of the business had increased 
f ivef old to 845 million Yuan. In 1992, the total billings further 
increased to 6,780 million Yuan. This figure roughly accounted 
for 0.3% of China's GNP. Of course, compared with 1% of the level 
of industrialized countries, the scale of China's advertising is 
still very small but the pace of its growth is fast increasing. 
Today, advertising is becoming ubiquitous in China. 
Among the domestic sales, the largest category of advertising 
business is now from consumer products. In 1990, for example, 
these accounted for 47% of total advertising spending, increasing 
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by 9% compared with 38% in 1982; the percentage of nonconsumer 
goods (e. g machinery, equipment) dropped from 35% in 1982, to 
25.8% in 1990, with a speedy growth applied to service areas such 
as insurance, tourism and banking (cf. China Industry & Commerce 
Newspaper, 30.11.1991; Y. Xu, 1990: 307-309; H. Jin, 1991; Z. Guo, 
1988: 20-21; S. Seligman, 1984: 12-16). 
Meanwhile, the establishment of various advertising agencies has 
also mushroomed throughout China, as the industry has quickly 
become an important part of the emerging structure of China's new 
market-oriented economy. The first few advertising firms were set 
up in Shanghai and Tianjin in 1979 and the business soon spread 
to other cities with a heavy concentration in the prosperous 
south-eastern coastal regions. Whereas in 1980 there had been 
only 10 advertising agencies in China, by 1991 there were over 
12,800 agencies in operation employing a total of 132,400 people 
(Peop-le's DaLily, 21.8.1992) . In 1986, China' sf irst multinational 
joint venture in advertising was established and the figure 
increased to 14 in 1991. Today, the industry does business with 
1,076 Chinese newspapers, 2,197 magazines, over 500 radio 
stations and 500 TV stations which are said to reach more than 
80% of Chinese population (S. Seligman, 1984: 12-17; Y. Zhi, 
1990: 15, H. Jin, 1991). 
The fast development of the Chinese advertising industry in the 
last decade has been closely linked with the overall progress of 
China's market-oriented economic reform. The manufacturers now 
have to market most of their products and therefore, as the new 
popular saying has it, "Run an advertisement somewhere, and you 
can expect production to go up in no time" (Beilincl Review, 
No. 22,1987: 20). In the booming south-east China, it is reported 
that spending on advertising accounts for 3-4% of the annual 
sales values of many enterprises (L. Zhang, 1990: 16). During the 
period of the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing, for example, iianlibao 
Drink Co of Guangdong Province spent 15 million yuan advertising 
its products (ibid). The following table provides the official 
statistics of the overall growth of China's advertising industry 
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between 1979 to 1991 except for 1980 when data was unavailable. 
Table S. 1 
THE GROWTH OF CHINA'S ADVERTISING INDUSTRY (1979 - 1991) 
---- ---------- -------------- 
















3.981 N/A 2,100 16,000 
1982 150 N/A N/A 
1983 234 2j500 30,000 
1984 365 56% 4 000 50,000 
1985 605 65.7% 6: 000 60,000 
1986 845 39.7% 7,000 81,000 
1987 1,112 31.6% 8,000 90,000 
1988 1,602 44% 9,000 100,000 
1989 2,000 24.8-0. 10,000 110,000 
1990 2,500 25-0o 10,950 125,000 














$1 = 1.9 Yuan in 1982,3.0 in 1985,3.7 in 1988 and 4.8 in 1990 
Source: Beiling Revie , 1987 No. 22, pp 20; China Market, 1990 
NO-12, pp 15-19; China Advertising Association (cf. H. Jin, 1991), 
people's Daily, 9.5.1991; The China Business Review, May-June 
1986: 9-10; China Times (Weekly) , 21.6.1992, No. 25, pp64; EeQple" s 
Daily, 21.8-1992; also based on estimates drawn from government 
agency and academic researches. 
As can been seen from Table 5.1, the rapid rise of the Chinese 
advertising industry in the last decade is following its own 
logic to achieve autonomy and economic Power. Functioning as a 
bridge between communication media outlets on the one hand and 
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manufacturers needing to advertise on the other (Leiss et. al, 
1990: 160), advertising in Post-Mao China, has thus created an 
increasingly reliable alternative base for the economic survival 
of the mass media, gradually transforming the nomenklatura 
framework into a more pluralistic structure with the 
implementation of the market mechanism to serve a commercial 
interest other than the Party's. In this sense, one man's new 
power is another's abandonment of old praxis. Meanwhile, with 
China's door opening ever wider, foreign advertising agencies 
have quickly stepped in recognising the attraction of a huge 
potential long-term market. Consequently, the introduction and 
expansion of overseas advertising, along with its massive hard 
currency, has increasingly become a business posing irresistible 
temptations. 
5.2.4 Foreign Trade Advertising 
As early as 1979, a group of US advertising experts was invited 
for the first time to communist China (to Beijing and Shanghai) 
to offer their know-how to their Chinese counterparts. Delegates 
included advertising executives from N. W Ayer, ABH International, 
Compton Ad. Inc, and Doyle Dane Bernbach International, Inc. all 
large professional firms. Also in the same year, the first 
foreign advertising agency was set up in Beijing to deal with the 
business from overseas customs, while a major Japanese 
advertising firm, Dentsu, reached an agreement with the Shanghai 
Advertising Corporation to promote the sale of Japanese goods. 
The largely unexploited and potentially huge Chinese market had 
caught the eye of the international capitalism. As a result, more 
and more transnational agencies led by Japan and America, moved 
in to occupy a place in the newly-born Chinese advertising 
market. By 1986 many leading international firms including Young 
& Rubican, Dentsu, Saatchi, Burson Marsteller, Hill and Knowlton, 
J. W. Thompson and Ogilvy Group, all had their branches in China 
(cf. S. Seligman, 1984; 1986). Their confidence was apparently 
grounded on the successful experience of the Japanese, who had 
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spent a great deal of money and energy in promoting their 
products in China. For instance, by 1987 over 87% of China's 
colour televisions, 68% of its refrigerators, and 63% of its 
vehicles were Japanese imports; and Japan's goods accounted for 
37% of the total import products to China (O. Shell, 1988: 344; 
H-Ma, 1991). Others soon followed suit: General Foods 
successfully introduced its Maxwell House Instant Coffee and the 
synthetic orange drink, "Tang" to the Chinese masses in the late 
1980s. There was even rivalry in advertising between Kodak and 
Fuji and Nescafe and Maxwell House (O. Shell, 1988: 345; P. Dunnett, 
1990: 185). 
In the meantime, the amount of foreign advertising trade 
increased steadily. It was reported that, in 1979, China's 
advertising sales to foreign clients was about US$2 million 
(journalism Quarterly Spring/1982: 45). By 1982, it grew into a 
US$ 7.7 million business, and the figure reached US$ 20 million 
in 1985, roughly accounting for 10% of China's total advertising 
revenue (S. Seligman, 1984; 1986). In 1986, the Beijing 
Advertising Corporation alone grossed US$ 5 million from runing 
advertising for foreign companies (Beiiing Review, No. 22, 
1987: 19) - In recent years it has stood at a volume of US$ 40 
million. However, from mid-1989 immediately after the Tianamen 
massacre, to mid-1991, the number of foreign advertisements in 
China substantially decreased with annual business values of only 
about US$ 25/30 million. As far as advertising spending on the 
medium is concerned, television is the most favoured of all media 
by foreign clients. In 1987, for instance, American advertisers 
alone put some US$16 million of commercials on the Chinese 
television. However, Japan has been the biggest foreign 
advertising supplier, contributing over 60% of the total foreign 
business revenues (Data provided by the Advertising Dept. of 
China Administration for Industry and Commerce, in interview with 
the author, Beijing, Oct. 1990). Table 5.2 gives the 1988 figures 
of the top eight foreign advertising sales in China, indicating 
this trend. 
181 
Table S. 2 
Top Foreign Spenders on Advertising in China ( 198a ) 
(in British sterling) 
Company Total (E) TV Out of Total 
Toshiba 107,498 72.86% 
Hitachi 99,849 63.83% 
NEC 90,556 75.72% 
Nestle 54,037 100% 
Casio 51,003 47.45% 
Mitsubishi 45,909 48.05% 
Ricoh 45,202 69.51% 
Kodak 41,756 100% 
Source: Marketinq Week March 23,1989: 42. 
S. 2.5 The "Demonstration Ef f ect" 
The growing influence of foreign advertising, together with other 
western trends ranging from numerous consumer goods, technology, 
education, cultural productions to the value system itself, has 
inevitably evoked a general phenomenon called the "demonstration 
effect" --- a powerful image demonstrating the higher standard 
of living and consumption in developed western society. This 
thereby tends to increase the dissatisfaction amongst members of 
other societies with the way in which they live and with what 
they are and thus stimulates people's tendency to demand a higher 
level of consumption in the less developed countries. Within this 
scenario, transnational advertising is often charged with being 
a kind of Trojan Horse undermining the social, political and 
economic developments of the society in question (cf. H. 
Schiller, 1969; F-Inglis, 1972; Leiss et al., 1990; K-Frith & M. 
Frith, 1990). 
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While accepting in some respects the validity of this point, 
however, it seems to me that this "demonstration effect" in the 
r-ontext of China, contributed to the process of liberating people 
from totalitarian communist rule. In this way, it has some 
positive functions. Prior to Deng's open door policy, for nearly 
three decades (1949-1978), under the Chinese communist 
governance, the living standard of the Chinese people had been 
kept at a subsistence level. As wages were frozen and all staples 
were strictly rationed, people were denied most modern consumer 
goods. They suffered from both material poverty and political 
purges. In 1978, for example, when most of the households in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong owned a colour TV set, only one black-and- 
white TV was available for every 330 people in mainland China; 
in 1980, when disposable income reached US$ 1,161 per capita in 
Taiwan, the figure in mainland China was about US$ 150 per capita 
--- only 13% of that of the Taiwan's (cf. C. Cheng, 1990: 21; 
A. Liu, 1988: 23). 
once the "demonstration effect" exercises its converting power 
by, among many other things, western commercials, it becomes all 
too clear that the confidence of "the superiority of the 
socialist system", which the communist regime had consistently 
inculcated among the Chinese people, has been totally shaken by 
the consequences of the failure of the one time all-powerful 
might of the Party's propaganda work. In the first place, 
however, with the isolation of China, the Party to a large degree 
successfully convinced the Chinese people that they were living 
in the best society that mankind could ever have; and that people 
in the western world, by contrast, suffered from an abyss of 
misery with the general crisis and imminent collapse of the 
capitalism. Now, all this propaganda indoctrination has suddenly 
been exploded by the "demonstration effect" and the subsequent 
general disenchantment with communist praxis. Indeed, the open 
door also nailed the Party's ideological lie so that the ruling 
legitimacy was irremediably damaged. As Chinese people consume 
more information from the outside world, they become more anxious 
183 
to change their own primitive and impoverished conditions. As a 
result, they start to repudiate past experience and eventually 
demand a fundamental political reform. 
5.3 OPENING UP PANDORA'S BOX: Commercials and Chinese TV 
"Commercialization in Chinese television is just like 
opening up a "Pandoral's Box", the negative effects of 
which, such as growing sex and violence on the screen, 
you cannot control" (Prof. Cao Lu, Broadcasting 
researcherf in interview with the author, Beijing, 
September 1990). 
, 'our objective is to find effective ways to promote the 
development of Chinese television and to get the money to 
do so even if it means to harm or sacrifice some 
doctrine. We have no time to argue those "-isms" and 
would rather leave them to the older generation to 
discuss" (Wang Gongfa, administration officer of Shanghai 
Broadcasting Bureau, in a conversation with the author, 
Shanghai, October 1990). 
"We all know that many viewers as well as some VIPs 
dislike commercials on the air. But, if you consider the 
simple fact that 30% to 70% of television revenue in 
major stations now comes from advertising and other forms 
of commercial sponsorship, then the question will be 
looked at in a different way. In effect, because the 
state was unable to give enough money to run a television 
service, the broadcasters have to turn their eyes on the 
market approach and the choice of introducing commercial 
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sponsors is largely pre-determined. Anyhow, this is a 
very necessary step towards the positive change in the 
nature and function of the Stalinist media model and no 
other alternative can be practically conceivable in the 
situation of China (e. g starting from "glasnost"). So, we 
should be happy with it" (Dr. Guo Zhengzi, broadcasting 
researcher, in a discussion with the author, Beijing, 
September 1990). 
These are different views of the debate in response to the 
growing impact of commercialization on the Chinese TV industry. 
As far as the audience is concerned, the majority are in favour 
of television advertising, but most Of them are dissatisfied with 
the quality of the advertising product. A 1987 survey conducted 
in Beijing revealed that 37.4% of the Beijing public relied on 
TV advertisements as their major access to consumer goods 
information; while only 11.4% was accounted for by press' 
advertisements and by 7.1% for radio's (Z. Liu & J. Wang, 
1988: 230). The results of the following opinion polls conducted 
on a nation wide scale in 1987, also confirmed this impression. 
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Table S. 3 
TV Audience's Attitudes to Commercials ( 1987 










- ---- ---------- 
very necessary 20 20 20 
necessary 55 55 54 
unnecessary 25 25 25 
Ad. Ouantit 
not enough 2 1 2 
just OK 25 24 26 
too many 74 75 72 
Ad. OualitV 
good 22 20 26 
just so-so 42 37 51 
poor 36 43 23 
Source: 1987 National TV Audience Survey, in A Collection of the 
Chi iese Media Surveys, 1989: 367. 
TV Industry: Heading for New Command of Commercial Power 
When the f irst advertisement in Chinese history was shown on the 
Shanghai TV screen in January 1979, no one could possibly have 
known what sort of domino effect it would have upon the 
formulation of commercial television in post-Mao China. In 
effect, the majority of people at the time were still preoccupied 
with the thought that commercials belonged to capitalist 
parasitism, or a kind of "Pandora's Box". Constrained by the 
contradiction between the statel's economic inability and the 
popular desire to expand the television service, however, the 
success of the TV development strategy was to put more emphasis 
on self-reliance with an incentive to generate large financial 
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resources beyond those of the state. In other words, it is now 
necessary to reorganise television as an industry incorporating 
commercial forces. In fact, as China has embarked on 
reconstructing its economy since 1979, the progress of market 
involvement in Chinese television has been so fast that 
commercial sponsors, particularly via advertising, are becoming 
a major driving force behind the industry. As a result, the 
performance of Chinese television has moved decisively beyond the 
original paradigm of politics-in-command and the laws of 
commodity production have played an increasingly important role 
in reshaping the industry in response to the need for capital 
accumulation and the market demand. 
Before 1979, Chinese television has never carried a single 
advertisement and revenue necessary to run the service came 
entirely from the state budget. Now a large proportion of 
television programming revenue ranging from 30% to 70% for 
hundreds of Chinese TV stations is being funded by advertising 
and other trade activities (Z. Guo, 1988: 20-22). China's state TV 
station -- China Central Television (CCTV), for instance, 
requires at least 75/80 millions Chinese yuan (approx US$ 20 mil 
in 1988 exchange rate) to run two major channels each year; and 
only receives one quarter of this, about 20/22 million yuan, from 
the central government annually; it has to, and is also able to, 
obtain up to 65/70 million yuan from advertising alone (data 
provided by Hong Minsheng, the deputy director of CCTV, in 
interview with the author, Beijing, October 1990). This presents 
a striking contrast to (the former USSR and now) Russia. In 1991, 
the advertising revenue only comprised 4% of the state television 
company's annual budget. Even more commercial-oriented media, 
until recently have been getting no more than 10% of their 
revenue from advertising (A. Izyumov, 1992: 33). 
The following table provides figures for ten top central and 
regional stations with the volume of advertising business against 
the revenue from the governmental budget. The tendency is now for 
the development of Chinese television to become increasingly 
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dependent on commercial involvement backed by advertising. The 
changing economic position of the Chinese TV structure indicates 
that the market now has increasing power to regulate the 
industry. In this way, commercialization of Chinese television 
is well underway. 
Table S. 4 










Ad. Income Government Income 
------- ------------------ 






Guandong Provincial TV Station 32.5 15 (est) 
Shanghai Municipal TV Station 28 18 
Beijing Municipal TV Station 12.6 7 (est) 
Zhejing Provincial TV Station 10.4 6 .5 
Tianjin Municipal TV Station 10.2 8 
Fujian Provincial TV Station 7.8 8 (est) 
Shandong Provincial TV Station 7.5 10 
Sichuan Provincial TV Station 7.3 10 (est) 






Sources: China Market, 12/19go: 15; The Advancement of Chinese 
Brotdcasting (1991); Cultural Economy and Cultural Manaclement: 
AS Lrve i on Shanghai cultural economy and administrative -Rolicv 
(1989); also draw from personal communications with the 
authorities concerned. 
In retrospect, the brevity of the Pioneering phase and its 
achievements are quite remarkable. The first TV ads. was produced 
and appeared on the screen at 17: 05 on the Day of the Chinese New 
Year, January 28 1979. It was an advertisement for a famous 
Chinese medicinal liquor and lasted one minute and thirty 
seconds. Nearly seven weeks later, the Shanghai TV Station took 
another brave step in broadcasting the first foreign commercials. 
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At 18: 51, on March 15, a one-minute advertisement for the Swiss- 
made wrist watch "Radoll was put out (cf. Shanghai Cultural 
Yearbook, 1987: 133; F-Lin, 1988: 54). 
The first two advertisements, however, inevitably caused a 
sensation and controversy at that time. Zhou Fanyang, the man in 
charge of the Shanghai broadcasting service then, and the major 
advocate of TV advertising in China, was under heavy pressure 
from some orthodox people. He was accused of going a bit too far 
and possibly undermining the political nature of the mass media 
in China and the Party's control over them. At the same time, he 
also got some strong support both from within and without the 
Shanghai TV Station, and his Party boss even guaranteed that if 
anything went wrong, the station Party secretary himself rather 
than Mr. Zhou, would take full responsibility (interview with 
Mr. Zhou by the author, Shanghai, Oct. 199o) . Of course, this 
concern was understandable at that time, but later proved to be 
unnecessary. On the contrary, the new pragmatic ruling group was 
actually in favour of introducing the market approach to 
accumulate capital and deal with the long term stagnation of the 
industry. Besides, the choice was acceptable only because the 
leadership believed, at least then, that the approach required 
neither alterations in the role of the Party concerning the mass 
media nor demanded political changes. All in all they saw it as 
a useful method which could serve the modernization programme. 
In November 1979, therefore, the Party Propaganda Bureau which 
is in ultimate charge of media affairs, formally issued a 
document to approve this policy and permit commercial activities 
(mainly referred to as advertising here) in media operations (cf. 
The textbook: An Introduction to Journalism Theories, 1985: 127). 
In effect, TV advertising revenue was soon regarded and 
officially endorsed as the crucial financial resource for 
maintaining and developing the industry as a whole. By the mid- 
198os CCTV, the provincial network and most of grassroots 
stations had established their advertisement departments (or 
sectors) dealing with the task of generating capital. Meanwhile, 
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there were many innovations in an attempt to work out a new 
financial framework to run television. In October 1984, for 
instance, CCTV was endorsed to conduct a pilot scheme on how 
financial arrangement with state funding and commercial revenue 
should be settled. As a result, CCTV signed a contract with the 
state treasury, claiming full financial responsibility for either 
loss or profit provided a three-year fixed state budget (cf. The 
Advancement of Chinese Television, 1991: 106-107; Hong Minsheng 
also provided information about the issue, in interview with the 
author, Beijing, October 1990). However, it should be pointed out 
that technological investment and construction of a Chinese 
station's infrastructure still relies on government 
appropriation. 
The officially-endorsed policy "to get money from the 
marketplace, not from the state" has, in fact, not only pushed 
the industry into the commercial battlefield, but also inspired 
the initiative of many stations and broadcasters. Shanghai TV 
network may prove to be typical and one of the most successful 
among them. Its advertising revenues increased to a great degree 
from 0.49 million yuan in 1979 to 170 million in 1992 (see table 
5.5). It has also been reported very recently that the Shanghai 
Broadcasting Authority has been blueprinting a new fully 
commercialized television service; this proposal suggests the 
creation of a "share-financed" television station (Gu-fen-tai), 
named "The oriental Television station". Its setting up and 
operation are to be entirely funded by the selling of shares and 
generating advertising profits, virtually stripping away all 
state financial support. By the end of 1992, the initial shares 
of the oriental TV Station were issued and the station began to 
offer some services (information provided by a staff reporter 
from Shanghai TV, who is currently visiting the UK; also China 
Times Weekly, No. 55,17.1. -23.1.1993: 74-75). 
190 
Table 5.5 
Advertising Revenues in Shanghai TV Network ( 1979 -- 1992 
(in million of Chinese Yuan) 







1985 6.48 0.957 
1986 12.27 2.24 
1987 15.01 1.89 
1988 18.51 2.59 
1989 26.60 3.13 
1990 30.00 4.50 
1992* 170 (including foreign Ad. income) 
* 1992 f igure is cited from China Times Weeklv, No. 55,17.1-23.1, 
1993: 74 . 
Source: Collection of Reference Materials on Shanghai Radio & TV, 
for the figure of 1979 to 1983; the rest data are provided by the 
Shanghai Broadcasting Authority. 
As commercials have become an indispensable condition for running 
a television service, the trading volume has grown rapidly. In 
1979, only 3.25 million Chinese yuan of advertising business 
went into the TV industry. In the next decade, the business 
increased at an annual rate of 50-60 percent, and reached 561 
million yuan in 1990. With the volume of another 91 million yuan 
of commercials on the radio broadcasting included, advertising 
sales in Chinese broadcasting accounted for more than 26% of the 
total China advertising turnover in 1990. The figure is roughly 
equal to that of the press (27% of the total). Table 5.6 gives 
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the annual f igures of the successive growth of commercials in 
Chinese broadcasting from 1979 to 1990. As can be seen from the 
Table 5.6, in recent years, television has become the top medium 
in attracting advertising investment from both domestic and 
foreign clients (see for example, Table 5.2), and its increase 
rate of advertising sales has been accelerating with the highest 
speed compared with that of all other major media. 
Table 5.6 
Growth of Advertising Sales in Broadcasting ( 1979 - 1990 









% of total 
------------- ------ 
1979 3.25 N/A 
1982 10 6.5% N/A 
1983 16.2 6.9% 18.1 7.7% 
1984 34 9.3% 23.2 6.4% 
1985 68.7 11.4% 26.7 4.4% 
1986 115.1 13.6% 35.6 4.2% 
1987 169.3 15.3% 47.2 4.2% 
1988 271.8 17% 70.3 4.4% 
1989 361.2 18.1% 74.6 3.7% 
1990 561 22.4% 91.4 3.7% 
Source: same as table 
In order to protect the domestic advertising market and earn more 
hard foreign currency, China opted for a "dual price" policy in 
which the cost of foreign commercials on Chinese television is 
usually five to eight times dearer than that of domestic ones, 
based on the different scales of audience penetration. The ratio 
of one slot in a national peak-time TV show, for instance costs 
just around US$ 2 cent for 1,000 viewers but could cover more 
than 700 million audience in China. Table 5.7 summarizes the 
category of the spot advertising price in Chinese television. In 
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recent years, the price has seen some changes because of 
inflation and the devaluation of the Chinese currency, but the 
basic charge scale and the rate system remain the same. 
Table 5.7 
Advertising charges in Chinese Television ( 1988 
(in US dollar) 
Channel Level To Foreign Client TO Domestic Client 




















* According to the latest report, from January 1993, CCTV 
increased the advertising rate by 100%, especially its 19: 35- 
19: 40 "best golden time of advertising" from $US1,750 per second 
to $US4,400 per second applied both to foreign and domestic 
clients (Sing Tao Daily, 13.1.1993). 
Source: mainly based on interview materials from Hong Minsheng, 
deputy director of CCTV, in Beijing, October 1990; Dr Guo 
Zhengzi, broadcasting researcher, in Beijing, September 1990. 
So far we have mainly examined the central role of a flourishing 
advertising business in the process of reorganizing the Chinese 
TV industry. At the same time, it should be noted that there are 
many other forms of commercial sponsors and business engaged in 
the TV industry. Because of the difficulty of collecting 
information, it has not been possible to analyze the performance 
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of the non-advertising business in detail. In general, however, 
the development of these commercial activities has become more 
vigorous as the structure of the national economy has been 
directed towards commodity production. Chief among them are the 
business of audio-visual products run by stations, and bargains 
with foreign companies (a subject to be covered later on) . There 
are clear signs that the volume of non-advertising transactions 
in the TV industry is steadily growing with an estimated 
proportion of 20% to 50% of overall business turnover. In 
Shanghai, for instance, between 1984 to 1988, about 48 million 
yuan of non-advertising commercial income went to Shanghai radio 
and television stations. This figure accounted for 36.4% of the 
total commercial billings. Another conspicuous example comes from 
jilin province where, in 1987, the non-advertising commercial 
income reached over 10 million yuan, accounting for 64% of the 
total business turnover (cf. The Advancement of Chinese 
Broadcasting, 1991: 397; also interview with Wang Gongfa, 
Shinahai, October 1990). 
5.3.2 The Current Situation of Chinese TV Financing 
Since we cannot obtain the data for the state budget or local 
authorities spending on Chinese television (since the 1983 
decentralization policy, the disposal of money for local stations 
has been referred to the local authorities), we are not in a 
position to show, by employing the necessary break-down 
statistics, how far the on-going commercialization of the 
Chinese TV industry has progressed now, or, to what extent the 
industry is dominated by commercial forces. According to one 
figure released in an official publication, the overall 
broadcasting revenue (they include wire and wireless 
broadcasting, external broadcasting and television) from central 
and local governments reached about 2,200 million yuan in 1989 
(The Advancement of Chinese Broadcasting, 1991: 7). To the best 
of my knowledge, around 50% of the total revenue for Chinese 
broadcasting would be spent on television development and nearly 
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one-third of the total TV revenue (i. e J, JoO mil) actually went 
to the construction of station infrastructure which normally 
belongs to investment projects separated on the budget spending 
list. The cost of the remainder would be mainly divided into four 
parts: 1) service maintenance, 2) staff wages, 3) technology 
investment and equipment renewal, and 4) programming production. 
According to recent experiences of major stations, the state 
revenue could barely meet the needs of the first two parts, while 
in the case of the third and the forth part spending largely came 
from various forms of commercial income, particularly advertising 
sales, which stood at 361 million yuan in 1989 and 561 million 
yuan in 1990. In this sense, we can reasonably conclude that 
commercial revenue plays a crucial role in Chinese TV production 
and its impact will have long term effect in changing the nature 
of the media model in communist China. As a result, we would 
argue that the introduction of the market mechanism has not only 
redistributed the resources of the TV industry, but also 
drastically altered the medium from a non-economic entity -- the 
Party's political instrument -- towards a new business-like 
industry. 
5.4 IMPACT ON PROGRAMME TRADE AND PROGRAMME STRUCTURE 
It has become evident that, with the on-going media 
commercialization and rapid change in cultural consumption, the 
TV industry has also switched on its programming 
production and structure in response to the emerging market 
formation. In that process, there are two main market factors at 
work, which have demonstrated a viable commercial nature: 
Firstly, with China joining the world cultural market, foreign 
advertisers and other businesses concerned have become involved 
as the main suppliers of large amounts of foreign programmes; 
secondly, domestic commercial sponsorship has become a major form 
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in TV production with particular reference to entertainment- 
related programming. 
5.4.1 Joining the World Cultural Market 
With the global cross-industry expansion movement, market forces 
tend to produce two economic consequences with respect to 
cultural production: (1) Cultural production is bound to 
integrate into capitalist industry; (2) The surplus of capital 
flux in the world cultural market is constantly seeking to expand 
its power globally with a special interest in exploiting those 
untapped or potential markets. In the contemporary world, 
television is of particular importance in facilitating the 
targeting goals set by the transnational media organizations to 
pursue their global marketing interests. Because of the medium's 
high technology concentration and high spending on production 
with the unique nature of its cultural commodity in terms of its 
immateriality and public good characteristics, there is a general 
tendency within the national TV industry towards the process of 
integration of the world cultural market led by the western 
industrialized nations. The growing transactions of international 
TV products flowing from the West to the East, the North to the 
South, and the English speaking countries to the non-English 
speaking world, reflect this trend (cf. J. Tustall, 1977; 
H-Schiller, 1984; R. Collins, 1989; R. Collins, N. Garnham and 
G. Locksley, 1988). 
As for the case of China, two important considerations further 
impelled the industry to join the world cultural market: one is 
the conflict between the enormous pressure from the public for 
increasing the service and the decreasing TV revenue from the 
state with the demand of the resulting programme deficit being 
met; the other is the extremely popular appeal of western audio- 
visual products with the relatively cheap price (e. g just about 
US$ 500 for a 50 min TV drama, at about 20% of the domestic 
production cost) and flexible purchase methods (e. g on a barter 
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basis). According to a pro-official explanation, there are four 
purposes for importing foreign programming. The priority in 
practice is to fill the increasingly expanded airtime on 
television, and the remaining three to promote cultural exchange, 
to improve the quality of domestic-made programming, and to 
diversify TV programmes (X. Lu, 1990: 8-9). Thus, since 1979, a 
gathering momentum towards active transaction within the world 
cultural market has been clearly perceived in the outlets of the 
Chinese television service. 
5.4.2 Foreign Programme Trade 
In 1980, China Central Television (CCTV) started to broadcast a 
series of Japanese cartoons with programme- length commercials 
targeted at children. It was based on the barter agreement 
between Chinese stations and foreign agencies. Under such an 
arrangement Chinese stations are allowed to sell their 
advertising time to certain foreign companies in return for the 
free copyright of foreign programmes. The innovation of this 
barter system proved attractive and flexible with a transmission 
being provided ready-made to a television channel by an 
advertiser (or advertising agency) in exchange for advertising 
screentime instead of a cash deal (cf. A. Mattelart, 1991). This 
system is particularly favoured by the developing nations and now 
practised world wide. In the early 198os, the strategy was also 
successfully used by western advertisers to enter the Chinese 
market. 
Between 1982 and 1984, six American television companies made 
such contracts with CCTV. Cooperative deals of this type have, 
since then, been encouraged as the Chinese side obtained free 
foreign programmes without spending hard currency or even earning 
foreign money through selling air time to the foreign advertisers 
(S. Seligman, 1984: 16-17). The success of the 1984 deal between 
CCTV and American's CBS Inc. further highlighted this promising 
business. According to the contract, CBS agreed to provide 64 
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hours of "off-the-shelf" programming from 1160 Minutes", Dr. Seuss 
cartoons to NFL football to CCTVIs network in exchange for 320 
minutes of advertising time. CBS managed to sell 10 packages of 
32 minutes advertising per annum at a flat rate of US$ 300,000 
to 9 foreign sponsors including several Fortune 500 firms; while 
CCTV took responsibility for marketing the air time and shared 
half of the revenue paid by the foreign advertisers. A dozen 
other foreign companies, mainly American, soon followed suit. 
Disney, for instance, contributed its universally acclaimed 
IlMickey Mouse and Donald Duck", RCA and Paramount Pictures with 
"Star Trek", 20 Century Fox with "To Be or Not to Bell (c/f 
Beilinq Review, No. 45,1986: 58; O. Schell, 1987; C. Schmuck, 1987). 
Local stations also caught on to the idea. Guangdong, Shanghai, 
Tianjin, Sichuan and many others made deals with their freshly- 
discovered programme traders and advertisers. In 1986, for 
example, Lorimar-Telepictures, producers of "Dallas" and "Falcon 
Crest", signed an agreement with Shanghai trading 500 hours of 
American TV programming to Shanghai television in return for 
commercial time which it was entitled to sell to its clients 
(o. Schell, 1988: 343). The Shanghai International TV Programming 
Trade, coincidentally with The Shanghai International TV 
Festival, has been held regularly every two years since 1986. The 
total of transactions often reached over US$ 1 million (L. Xia, 
1989: 54). Between 1985 to 1986, national and local stations got 
650 to 750 TV dramas or telefilms annually from overseas, and the 
number was reported to reach 1800 in 1988 (H. Cao, 1990: 57). In 
the 1991 Sichuan international TV program trade fair, China 
bought over 1,900 foreign TV programmes ranging from TV dramas, 
soap series, documentaries to children's cartoons (Legple's 
Daily, 22-10-1991). These developments had a significant impact 
on the Chinese TV industry, pushing it to integrate with the 
world cultural market. As a result, the existing production 
relations dominated by the Party's monopoly power were sharply 
weakened, and the influence of "the demonstration effect" became 
very pervasive. 
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5.4.3 orientation of Domestic Programme Production 
As the Chinese TV industry opened up to the cultural market and 
commercial practices, it came into collision with the existing 
production structure of the former political and ideological 
mandate. Yet, with Party Political power over the mass media 
still unchallengeable, it becomes all too clear that to develop 
an information-oriented service is more inconceivable than to 
develop an entertainment-oriented service. Thus the target of TV 
production is more likely to put emphasis on the entertainment 
side. In the last decade, Chinese television viewers have 
experienced the booms of the game show, the soap drama, the quiz- 
show and the audience- involvement contest. There has been a 
growing tendency towards commercially-backed entertainment. The 
trend is reflected in Table 5.8. 
Table S. a 
comparison of TV Programming Structure in China in the 198os 













Entertainment 22.8% 64.25% 69.7% 
Special Topic 12% 9.42% 8.5% 
Education 29.2% 10.48% 6.5% 
Public Service N/A 5.56% 6.4-0. 
others 25% (est) 
Source: For 8/9/10.1981, mainly from Zhuang, Introduction of 
Chinese Television, 1985: 123. The statistics here mainly 
refer to national network, other data being unavailable. 
Programmes categorized as "other" include teaching courses. 
Statistics for 1987 provided by the Chinese Broadcasting 
Association, cf. InterMedia, Autumn 1988; for 1988, from the 
Ch q Yearbook (1989), pp 490. 
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The Chinese TV industry gradually came to appreciate the 
television programme as a kind of commodity (F. Zhong, 1988: 22). 
Commercially-sponsored entertainment programmes, including the 
game show, soap drama and quiz show, have played a very important 
role in shaping the outlook of the network as a whole. In order 
to increase production capacity and diversify means of 
programmes, many commercial innovations were introduced. Take 
Shanghai television, for example: In 1984, the Shanghai 
Broadcasting Authority initiated a programming policy of what is 
called "using commercial means to support the production of 
quality programming". This included: (1) paid programme services, 
that is, for certain programmes, such as educational programme, 
the TV station is encouraged to co-sponsor productions with 
outside institutions related to the nature of programme, such as 
universities, scientific reseach institutions and some government 
agencies; (2) seeking financial sponsorship, both domestic and 
foreign, to assist entertainment programmes. In that case, the 
sponsoring bodies usually either donate an agreed sum of money 
or, in competition-oriented programmes such as game show and quiz 
show, provide products they manufacture as prize reward to the 
network. The sponsors, in return, receive publicity promoting not 
only their goods but also their public image, as programmes of 
this sort are mostly named after their sponsors; (3) setting up 
its own business company to sell audio-visual products (L. Xia, 
1989: 47-49; Shanqhai Culture Yearbook, 1987: 133). 
Since 1984, most (entertainment-related) production has been 
largely funded either by enterprises' advertising revenue or 
other forms of commercial sponsorship. In TV drama production, 
for instance, China produced 2,700 TV dramas in 1989,90% of them 
directly or indirectly sponsored by commercial or manufacturing 
sector. In 1992 Coca-Cola Corporation sponsored a Chinese 
television soap I'Seahorse Bar", and the condition for signing 
that contract was that the Coca-Cola became the only soft drink 
available in the drama. Every time, according to the contract, 
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a character has a Coca-Cola, s/he must say "what a wonderful 
flavour it has", and this cost the Coca-Cola company $US 8o, 000 
in return (The Guardian, 19.2.1993: 22). Since 1984, Shanghai TV 
Station has conducted many audience-participating competition 
shows, including "Casio Family Singing Contest", sponsored by the 
Casio Electric Organ Co. , "Popular Singing Competition" by the 
Nescafe Company Ltd., and "Foreigners Singing Chinese Songs" 
sponsored by the local commercial sector (F. Lin, 1988: 55-56). 
In recent years, there has been some new development in 
programming production. Some television soap operas were produced 
by a group of independent screenwriters and producers. They have 
to make their soap operas popular in order to cover the entire 
poduction cost as well as to make profits. They now can directly 
sell their products to the TV station which bid highest price for 
that soap opera (personal communication with Professor Tong Bing, 
February, 1993). 
5.5 A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD: THE PROBLEMS OF COMMERCIALIZATION 
It would be unwise to assume that the market approach (and its 
accompanying commercialization) is a panacea. It has its own 
limitations and problems as many people, critical scholars in 
particular, have rightly analyzed. One of the consequences in 
Chinese television has been the growing and excessive power of 
commercialization without proper public regulation. As a result, 
the success of the process also tends to undermine itself. It has 
thus become a double-edged sword combining both the merit and 
vice of the market operation. On the one hand, it has shaken and 
reformed the Party dominance media model and produced a more 
dynamic structure largely subject to the "invisible" market hand 
rather than the Party's mandatory rule; on the other hand, sooner 
or later, it is bound to be dominated by the commercial principle 
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at the expense of social responsibility. China is no exception 
to the rule. Moreover, there is a potential conflict of cultural 
and economic interests between the national development and 
global capitalist expansion. 
The growing commercial involvement in Chinese television within 
the framework of command institutions has made coexistence 
between the two extremely difficult. Their institutional 
incompatibility subverts further reform by either producing 
problems of runaway corruption or an effort to return to the 
past, both of which resolve nothing and cause serious social 
consequences. In addition, matters are easily aggravated by 
China's inefficiency and, compared to the West, a near-absence 
of a legal system to control commercial activity in the TV 
industry. 
The emerging commercialism has created problems. The make-quick- 
money-or-quit approach, now widely spread throughout the 
industry, has contributed to a large degree to the deterioration 
of programming quality. In 1986, for instance, more than 500 TV 
dramas among 1,500 produced and submitted to CCTV that year were 
not passed for showing, most of them due to their inferior 
quality rather than the political and ideological concerns (China 
Film -WeeklY, 
13.6.1987). As far as advertising concerned, it is 
not unusual now for fraudulent commercials to appear on the 
screen. Through their agents, many broadcasters and manufactures 
often co-operate closely with each other for the sake of their 
own profits - It is also not surprising to see that some TV dramas 
as well as many other TV products are now designed according to 
the sponsors, needs. Money has become the only thing that matters 
to some stations. Sex and violence are beginning to emerge on the 
screen in the battle to maximize the return on advertising sales; 
commercials continue sometimes for over 30 minutes non-stop (in 
some occasions even 40 minutes) in contravention of programming 
schedules in prime viewing time, regardless of numerous 
complaints from the audience. Currently the price for the 
domestic market has jumped from US$loo to over US$500 per minute 
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just for allowing a sponsor's self-made programme on the air. In 
order to find more money, many stations' authorities turn a blind 
eye to the question of corruption such as bribery, or granting 
a relatively high commission by Chinese standards to anyone who 
is able to make a deal. In many cases running the business all 
depends on how much money or how large a "gift" the clients have 
to bribe the broadcaster regardless of how the audience might 
suffer, provided those who profit from it keep quiet (the 
information provided by the broadcasters and researchers 
interviewed by the author in China September-October 1990). 
As a matter of fact, the abuse of media power is happening not 
only in the broadcasting industry, but also in other mass media. 
However, these negative effects and limitations of the market 
approach are evident particularly in the context of a society 
where resource distribution is determined by the bizarre 
combination of the emerging market mechanism and the old 
nomenklatura apparatus. Indeed, the danger in undigested adoption 
of the market mechanism without instituting the essential 
political reform lies in its creating social injustice and 
building up social tension. It is, therefore, perfectly justified 
that, while the importance of the wealth-creating potential of 
the market approach in boosting the Chinese TV industry shold not 
be underestimated, one must also bear in mind that a proper 
system to regulate the commercial performance in line with media 
democratization is urgently needed. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
Throughout the chapter, we have analyzed how the 
commercialization in Chinese television industry has changed the 
communist media structure and performance in an evolutionary way. 
We argue that the process of commercialization in the development 
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of Chinese television has had a profound effect in reshaping the 
resources distribution, programming production, financial 
expenditure and economic relations of communist media 
institutions. For such a purpose, we try to answer the question: 
What is the impetus to the reform movement of the Chinese TV 
industry in general, and to the changing media economic relations 
in particular? This is a question which is seldom addressed, but 
has significant implications in understanding (1) the unique 
nature of the Stalinist media model; (2) the validity of 
different approaches adopted by the different societies to 
develop the communication industries. We have illustrated and 
stressed the positive role of the market approach in the process 
of the breakdown of communist totalitarianism. 
Meanwhile, we provide an alternative analysis with reference to 
the television case study in an attempt to demonstrate that, 
under the circumstances of Deng's particular style of reform and 
the context of Chinese society, China has created its own pattern 
of social structural transformation that is distinctive from that 
of other communist or pre-communist states. We also address the 
problems and flaws of commercialization, and by no means do we 
regard the market mechanism as the only solution to solve the 
problems. Commercialism has indeed created certain serious 
consequences, but it may be the only feasible way, under the 
present conditions, to successfully transform a communist society 
to a more open and liberal one through "peaceful evolution", not 
"bloody revolution". In this way, it is a price we may have to 
pay in order to achieve such an objective. Therefore, accusations 
of any kind concerning this matter will not justify turning the 
clock back to the Mao's era. While the issue of regulating media 
performances and overcoming the problems brought about by the 
commercialization, in both legal and professional terms, needs 
to be addressed, the underlying tendency of current media 
commercialization is likely to lead to the emergence of less 
ideological control and a more dynamic media system in China. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
TELEVISION: THE CULTURAL FORUM AND SOCIAL CHANGES 
--- The case of the TV series "River Elegy" 
The coming of television in China has had a profound impact on 
social changes within society. As a Potent cultural forum, 
television is the electronic amplification of social 
contradiction. Its rapid development has fostered cultural 
pluralism and contributed to the decline of the Party cultural 
monopoly in a way that is related to the nature of cultural 
production and the television medium itself. While television 
reflects social changes, television in China also facilitates 
social changes in a direction that is beyond the control of the 
dictatorship and towards the process of democratization. The case 
of the TV series "River Elegy" in the late 1980s of China, 
illustrates this trend to a great extent, and thus highlights the 
plight of the Party media institution. 
But, how can television do so? What is the relationship between 
television performance and culture? To some extent, if we see 
television programmes (as well as other media offered services 
and messages) as a cultural performance, then, what is the nature 
of cultural production and its materialized cultural products? 
In an abstract sense, any human product possesses value. From the 
political economy point of view, under the condition of the 
commodity production system, specifically, the modern capitalism 
system, a cultural product is also a commodity, and as such, it 
has use-value and exchange-value. Within that given system, the 
importance of the dichotomy of use-value and exchange-value 
reflects the existing social relations of the capital and labour 
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division that to a large degree determines the formation of 
cultural performance, and the form of cultural management. By 
contrast, in a non-commodity production environment, in this 
case, the Soviet model system, the commodity nature of cultural 
performance is absent, and its cultural production is thus 
determined by Party monopoly power. So, what is the nature of 
cultural products concerned with that society? How is the 
phenomenon of Soviet cultural production formed and maintained? 
And what is its material base? What, coupled with the operation 
of the social system, is the relationship between cultural 
production and the Party's political management (i. e the Party 
cultural hegemony)? and finally, and probably more relevantly, 
how, after a decade of Deng's reform program, to what extent the 
cultural performance has been changed in the post-Mao China? 
Crucially, these questions are embedded in questions concerning 
the structure of social relations and attached to some key 
development of the social formation. In this chapter, therefore, 
I devote my attention to discussing these issues. In part One, 
I attempt to establish my theoretical framework by examining some 
key lineaments of the nature of cultural production on the one 
hand, and the role of the mass media (i. e in this case, mainly 
television) on the other. Within that framework, part Two is the 
case study of the TV series "River Elegy" that focuses on 
television performance in the context of social transformation 
in post-Mao China. Finally, I explore the underlying 
contradiction of media behaviour within the reforming structure 
of Chinese commercial communism in the Deng's era by making an 
inquiry into the institutional change in part Three. 
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6 .1 MEDIA PERFORMANCE 
AND CULTURE PRODUCTION 
6.1.1 Problematic Cultural Identification 
in a Party dominated, established communist state, the role of 
culture and cultural management are primarily identified with 
instrumental utility in the service of the Party's needs, and 
essentially regarded as a Political and ideological matter. 
Accordingly, official culture with its sanctioned forms is the 
one and only legitimized culture that is exclusively elaborated 
and developed by the authorities. In the light of this cognition, 
"the purpose of cultural activities, " declared by the Chinese 
communist Party when deciding on the culture programme, "is to 
enhance the people's socialist consciousness and foster communist 
ethics and love for the motherland so as to work for the cause 
of socialism and help bring up a new generation" (Beij ing Review, 
oct. 12.1981: 9) - 
However, the nature of culture and the complicated relationship 
between cultural activities and the institutional means of the 
cultural management suggest that the above mentioned cultural 
identification in the Party-state is fraught with problems and 
more likely to produce counter-effects. The fallacy of this 
understanding and approach is obvious. Culture is not singular, 
unified and univocal. On the contrary, it is multiple, divergent, 
creative and various. "Culture is above all the sphere for the 
expression of difference 11 (N. Garnham: lggo: 161). Therefore, it 
can never be managed by mandatory power or authority. Moreover, 
the validation of this point is reinforced by the material forms 
that culture takes, the communication that culture performs and 
the messages that culture transmits. 
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6.1.2 Television As Cultural Medium 
Culture is a process of communication which can be hardly one- 
sidedly determined and interpreted. To some extent, modern 
culture is also a mediated culture which is intimately related 
to the performance of the mass media; whereas the media are the 
means to materialize cultural development through the creative 
activities of human beings in its broadest sense. The message 
owner, the message producer, the message sender and the message 
receiver are all involved in the interlocking dialectic process 
of construction, cooperation, conflict and confrontation. It is 
through these institutional practices and contradictory 
development that the ultimate outcome is achieved. In this way, 
the relationship between the cultural performance and the media 
conduct has become ever more sophisticated and multidimensional 
(cf. D. McQuail, 1992). 
The television medium, for instance, is embodied in a process of 
"an electronic amplification of contradiction" (a term cited from 
J. Lull, 1991). On the one hand, the programmes that the medium 
provides would certainly be influenced, benefited and fostered 
to a large degree by the dominant powers, social elites and 
economic sponsors. It thus tends to produce intended effects to 
confirm the existing social order as already concluded by many 
western critical scholars. On the other hand, even in the most 
controlled society, it is not possible for television to deliver 
programmes that can only be defined, perceived or identified in 
one way to serve the designed purpose. As J. Lull pointed out, how 
people interpret television's messages do not simply reflect the 
aims of the producers and the apparent implications of programs 
do not necessarily reveal the meanings that audience take away 
from viewing (J. Lull, 1991: 214). Therefore, such targeting 
effects can never be approached without facing constant 
challenges or potential subversive consequences. In the long- 
term, therefore, the effectiveness of strict control employed by 
the coercive methods (e. g censorship, decree) on television is 
fatefully fraught with troubles and inclined to be unworkable. 
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one of the pivotal facts which contribute to this phenomenon is 
that the broadcasters, while they control the discourse, are 
unable to control the context. In addition, they cannot control 
the way that audiences will react on their programmes 
(P. Scannell, 1989: 149; J. Lull, 1991). Because of these intrinsic 
restrictions, there is a tendency for communicators to affiliate 
to the situation of their audience; and adjust media performance 
with those circumstances (P. Scannell, ibid. ). Thus the practice 
of the television medium, whilst generally influenced by the 
macro social and cultural movements and largely determined by the 
particular pattern of the socio-economic system, tends to be 
diverse, provocative and contradictory. This is the case even 
under highly-controlled circumstances. As Newcomb and Hirsch 
perceptively put it: 
In its role of central cultural medium (television) 
presents a multiplicity of meanings rather than a 
monolithic dominate view. It often focuses on our most 
prevalent concerns, our deepest dilemmas. Our most 
traditional views, those that are repressive and 
reactionary, as well as those that are subversive and 
emancipatory, are upheld, examined, maintained, and 
transformed. The emphasis is on process rather than 
product, on discussion rather than indoctrination, on 
contradiction and confusion rather than coherence 
(1986: 62). 
To sum up, I suggest that television can act as a two-edged sword 
to produce both intended-and-un intended and desired-and-undesired 
effects; that, with the characteristics of being multipolar, 
lightning-fast and Polysemic, the cultural identification of 
electrical media performance is closely associated with the 
diversity of human sentiments as well as reflects more 
fundamental social and economic changes. Thus a pluralistic 
culture tends to be, in the long run, fostered, among many 
others, within the practice of the television medium and the 
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process of widely-raging social communication. 
6.1.3 The Phenomenon of Cultural Monopoly and the Nature of 
Cultural Production in the Party-State 
In this section, I regard television performance (also applied 
to other media) as a kind of cultural production and television 
(and other media) offering service or messages as a type of 
cultural product; in this way, I extend my study into the issues 
of a widely-raging cultural realm by focusing on the relationship 
between cultural production and cultural management. On that 
base, an effort will be made to contribute to an analysis of the 
phenomenon of the Party cultural monopoly. 
In order to understand why and how the Party cultural monopoly 
can be formed and maintained for a certain period of time in the 
established communist society, and to what extent and under what 
conditions it tends to decline, I think it is important to 
understand the nature of cultural products and cultural 
production in the Party-state and their logical evolution. This 
requires further analysis of the base of cultural performance and 
the materiality of cultural management. In doing so, I believe 
that a political economy of cultural studies is essential to 
approach that goal, as it provides an adequate framework and a 
starting point to observe the complex of cultural practice and 
its relationship with material production in modern societies. 
Throughout human history, the very existence of culture and 
cultural performance has involved a dual process: On the one 
hand, it centres on human beings, spiritual activities, thus 
remains in the realm of human beings, mentality characterized by 
creativeness, uniqueness, ingenuity and diversity in its abstract 
sense. on the other hand, it entails a real sense of material 
realization, thus involving human production with material 
resources for its manifestation. It is through the development 
of such an intertwined process that the nature of culture and its 
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material forms (i. e cultural products) are ultimately determined. 
Under modern capitalism, that is in essence attached to the 
condition of commodity production, there are two ways in which 
culture and its production are cultivated. According to Garnham, 
first, culture remains a superstructural phenomenon in relation 
to non-cultural modes of material production; second, culture 
becomes a part of material production itself by generating 
surplus through pursuing the exchange-value that "directly 
subordinate to or at least in a closely determined articulation 
with the laws of development of capital" (N. Garrham, 1990: 32). 
Moreover, the means of cultural production in capitalist society 
may be provided either in direct commodity form as part of the 
accumulation process; or as part of the realization process of 
other sectors of the capitalist economy; or directly out of 
capitalist revenue: or through the State (Ibid., 1990: 42). Thus, 
in further examining the role of exchange value in relation with 
the cultural production, Garnham argues: 
We need to remember that a system of commodity exchange 
is itself based upon an institutionalized system of 
cultural production with a symbolic form, money (emphasis 
added). Indeed Habermas, following Talcott Parsons, 
identifies money along with power as one of the two basic 
media of communication which have historically ensured 
the development of what he calls the system-world and the 
associated rationality of modernity (ibid., 199o: 1o). 
Garnham's theoretical elaboration on the subject helps us to shed 
light on understanding the abstract sense of cultural commodity 
in general and its presence and management under the condition 
of modern capitalism in particular. Thus we may draw the 
following conclusion: Like any other Commodity, cultural products 
in modern capitalist society has its use-value and exchange- 
value. Crucially, the relationship of a cultural product between 
its use-value (i. e mainly through symbolic message or service to 
be used) and its exchange-value (i. e worth based on the abstract 
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f orm of money) , involves a process of dialectical movement. 
Whilst the use-value tends to exercise its power to influence, 
affect or even dictate the exchange-value and has an 
irreplaceable and important role in the process of commodity 
value realization; the underlying tendency is that the exchange- 
value tends to subordinate the use-value, though it needs to be 
understood in the historical and specific contexts. 
But, what about the situation in the Party-state (i. e the 
classical Soviet Model) where the mode of commodity production 
was abolished and replaced by the command economy with the 
absence of the market mechanism? Of course, we cannot easily draw 
a similar consideration to the matter under a social production 
system that is fundamentally different from the commodity 
production system. However, what we can say is that the basic 
understanding of the nature of the culture and cultural 
production in modern commodity production does provide a 
foundation for us to examine the state and logical evolution of 
cultural production and its management under the condition of 
communist totalitarian society. 
It is known to all that an established communist society is 
determinedly ruled by the Political power and communist ideology 
[cf. 1.4.1). Culture and cultural performance are thus seen as 
an essential part of the party's framework, and as such, culture 
is produced first and foremost for the purpose of the Party's 
totalitarian control over the mind of the general public. This 
is the case applicable to all Soviet model societies. But, given 
its concerns of scale, degree and thoroughness, the Chinese 
experience seems to be more persistent, more penetrating and more 
extraordinary than any of those of its counterparts. Since I have 
already discussed political and social aspects of this at some 
length in previous chapters, I want to look, briefly, at the 
economic aspect of cultural production and distribution in the 
Party-state. 
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A command (or planned) economy is a logical extension of the 
Party's totalitarian rule. This economic solution to feed her 
people is implemented on the ground of the non-market environment 
and bureaucratic resource allocation. In theory, however, the 
planned economy was often, if not always, defined by the 
communist regime in the rather philosophical way of economic 
thinking. The argument employed by orthodox economic discourse 
was fairly sophisticated and, according to Cheung, it is normally 
elaborated in this way: because of defects in the market, or the 
phenomenon of market failure in a capitalist production system, 
it assumes that a less costly economic performance would be 
attainable if each owner of a resource gives up his rights in 
exchange for an acceptable deal with certain beneficial security, 
while delegating the making of decisions to a centralized firm 
style of management. Moreover, since all means of production 
return to the public, it is natural that all decisions about 
production and income distribution should be vested in the hands 
of one authority where different industries, institutes and other 
agencies can be treated as different divisions, sections, 
departments, sub-departments, and so forth of that entire 
society. Correspondingly, this new solution of a centrally 
planned economy, as believed and accepted to a varying degree in 
the communist world before the 1980s, would deliver both social 
equality and rational use of material resources (S. Cheung, 
1982: 39-40). 
In the classical model of the centrally planned economy, it takes 
the form of direct state mandatory arrangement through, in its 
best sense, projected short and long-range "planning" and through 
the operation of a giant bureaucratic machine to dictate 
everyone's economic activity on the scale of the whole society. 
Under such a system, therefore, all means of production belong 
to the Party (N. B. in communist theory, however, the Party is 
unquestionably assumed to represent the general will of people, 
thus it is always asserted that the means of production also 
belong to people) ; this is a crucial point of the Political 
legitimacy whereby the Party through its subordinating state 
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institutions, directly conducts the process of all production 
including cultural and media production; then the Party in turn 
works out how to distribute all produced goods to its members of 
society. It is important to note that it is the Party's power 
that determines the whole process and absorbs the entire result; 
and in this way, the Party also takes sole responsibility for 
losses and gains. Therefore, it would be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible, to leave room for a real movement of commodity 
production to be engaged in; it is also hardly surprising that 
the conception of making profits, the incentive to efficiency and 
the enterprises initiatives etc. are so alien to that of the 
system even in terms of producing pure consumer goods (e. g 
clothes, shoes etc. ) . To be sure, these norms which are taken for 
granted in the modern economy are virtually irrelevant to the 
practice of communist-run economy. 
In the same way, but to a greater extent, the cultural products 
are produced, distributed and used chiefly for the purpose of 
political and ideological education, to borrow the communist 
term, "to mould people's outlook of the world according to 
Marxism and Leninism". In addition, cultural consumption is 
largely seen as a collective "welfare" activity offered by the 
state in the line with the Party's overall strategy to advance 
the communist course [cf. 3.4.1]. The motivation of pursuing 
exchange-value, if one is so permitted, is too weak to be taken 
into account. In China's film industry, for instance, during the 
Mao's era; the box office took little part in deciding what kind 
of films and in how many should be produced. The film producers 
and studios could neither take initiatives nor had the right to 
protect their interests, if they were allowed to have any. When 
the authority issued the directive in 1961 saying TV stations 
should have access to airing every new film two weeks before that 
film was premiered, the film industry had no way to complain but 
was forced to obey it. Meanwhile, no film producers and studio 
needed to worry about cost and finance, since the government 
absorbed all gains and losses in the production and distribution 
process. obviously, the film industry was cut off from the 
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audience in the first place, and therefore, filmmaking as well 
as its consumption was disassociated from a market performance 
(L. Zhang & Y. Huang, 1992). 
In short, therefore, I would argue that, under the condition of 
the command economy, given the fact that cultural and media 
products in the Party-state have a predominantly political and 
ideological utility, and non-commodity nature, the element of the 
exchange-value of the products is virtually excluded. Therefore, 
the pressure for realizing the exchange value of the cultural 
products through providing the satisfactory use-value for the 
users (i. e through commodity exchange behaviors of producers and 
consumers via the monetary system as it happens in the market 
economy), is reduced to a minimum. Thus, in a given period of 
time, the ruling section of the society can directly materialize 
cultural production, in a maximal scale and absolute sense, to 
be devoted to monopoly power and cultural hegemony. This is one 
of the major reasons and material base that have largely 
explained how the Party cultural monopoly is maintained and how 
it is operated through the process of material production. 
As I see it, the phenomenon of cultural monopoly in the Party- 
state is closely linked with its exclusion of the exchange-value 
of its cultural products. The scope of this exclusion, however, 
is in turn largely determined by the capacity of the Soviet model 
communist system itself. However, party monopoly power, single 
ideology dominance and the command economy of the Soviet system 
was capable of functioning adequately only for a short period 
[cf. 1.4; 2.2; 5.1]. In other words, this is a self-paralysis 
system and tends to exhaust 
itself by its excessive cost it 
required for maintaining its existence. As a result, the 
spontaneous popular resistance movement followed by growing 
pressure for the change 
is bound to occur. In response to the 
increasing challenge, the ruling authority headed by the reform 
elites is ready to take the 
initiative either by introducing a 
market reform programme, or by partially opening up access to 
political participation and tolerating a degree of freedom of 
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expression. Both of these inevitably lead to a considerable 
retreat of Party totalitarian control from society; this in turn 
leads to the decline of an official Party-led culture. In the 
first place, country like Poland as well as some other eastern 
European countries and the former Soviet Union, mainly adopted 
the political solution where the public developed their own 
political and cultural spheres outside official control 
(jakubowicz, 1989). By contrast, Chinese authorities started by 
introducing market mechanism to manage the cultural activities, 
thus the economic concerns (i. e the pressure to realize the 
exchange-value) has been playing a more and more important role 
in the process of the cultural production [cf. 5.3; 5.4]. 
6.1.4 TV as an Agent of CUltural Changes in Post-Mao China 
The application of the above theoretical discussion to the 
Chinese case is that, although Party cultural hegemony and its 
sanctioned forms imposed by the ruling power can be maintained 
for some of the time, some aspects of the public life and in some 
dominant ways, the ultimately uncontrollable cultural activities 
made the decline of the official culture and the rise of the 
alternative inevitable and predictable. Clashes and the crisis 
of party cultural identification are the background to the 
process of the post-Mao reform movement, within the political and 
economic contexts that surround and shape its development. In 
effect, Chinese television, as J. Lull observed, has deeply 
affected all aspects of life -- highlighted, legitimated, and 
popularized -- that have stimulated alternative, competing 
visions of China's future and the personal dreams of millions of 
Chinese people (1991: 209). Thus the television medium has played 
a crucial role and made a giant contribution towards that process 
of changes. 
The decline of the official culture and the rise of alternative 
culture have taken place in Post-Mao China in the light of 
circumstances where 1) the economic reform remained relatively 
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successful; 2) the idea of democracy and pluralism increasingly 
became a spiritual resource and started to appeal to the Chinese 
people; 3) the process of commercialization of cultural products 
commenced; and 4) the television industry grew rapidly with 
widespread TV set ownership in ordinary households. In my view, 
the first and second are the necessary conditions; the third is 
the sufficient condition and the fourth is what I would like to 
call a "special condition" -- a condition materialized by the 
mass media in general and television in particular to facilitate 
the cultural and social transformation. 
in ef f ect, television in China has become the f ocus f or, and the 
foremost means of, catalyzing new cultural freedom. The impact 
of the emergence of pluralistic culture in Chinese television are 
thus twofold: firstly, it tends to drive television programming 
into a popular orientation in an effort to attract and please 
mass audiences for varying purposes and commercial interests as 
discussed previously. However, such a trend has objectively 
promoted a degree of cultural diversity. Various TV dramas, 
plays, music, operas, traditional Chinese "Crosstalk"(i. e an 
animated comical debate performed by two persons), sports, 
cartoons and game shows etc. have now all entered tens of 
thousands of ordinary households and become to some extent an 
indispensable part of public life. This could hardly have been 
imagined ten-odd years ago. Entertainment programmes from foreign 
countries, from the region of non-communist China -- Hong Kong, 
Macao and Taiwan, are also getting popular among Chinese viewers. 
The impact of popular culture and television on the life style 
of Chinese people is thus very significant. It stimulates the 
Chinese people's awareness of the outside world, enlarges their 
activities of cultural participation and alters the way they 
spend their personal leisure time. In the work of a study of 
British broadcasting and the public life, Scannell and Cardiff 
discovered that, with the widely-ranging programmes offered by 
radio broadcasting, the general public were brought into a new 
kind of social life. "The fundamentally democratic thrust of 
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broadcasting... lay in the new access to virtually the whole 
spectrum of public life that radio opened up for everyone. 
Broadcasting equalized public life through the principle of 
common access for all" (P. Scannell & D. Cardiff, 1991: 14). 
Although this was the observation from the British experience, 
Scannell and Cardiff's remark, by and large, also applies to the 
situation of today's China. It is through these new cultural 
practice and routines that has imperceptible yet profound 
influence in transforming the mentality of Chinese people. The 
"demonstration effect" is at work which tends to make people 
diverge from the official thinking irreversibly. Wei Bing, a 
young Chinese broadcaster, has this observation: "the bringing 
of television itself is a counter- (Party) cultural phenomenon 
because it's against the dominant ideology which is without 
entertainment and pleasure. It (television) gives people pleasure 
and tries to focus on what individual people are really 
interested instead of just following the propaganda rule: it 
implies that leisure and pleasure are worth attention" (in 
i. connon, 1991: 27). 
Secondly, television, among others, itself has gradually 
developed as a potent cultural forum for independent 
intellectuals (many of them are dissidents) to criticise reality 
and disseminate their pro-democracy ideas (which are now labelled 
by the authorities as "bourgeois liberalism") through documentary 
programmes, objective reporting and various forms of fine art on 
the airwaves. I suggest that this dimension constituted a direct 
and fundamental challenge to the very existing framework of the 
ruling power and was thus bound to be the focus of the clashes 
engaged by the different social forces. In this way, television 
has become a powerful and handy medium to enlighten the Chinese 
people, a major resource for an alternative culture, and a 
momentous import for the expression of heterodox views. 
Therefore, to the Party-led culture, television can have a 
potentially huge subversive influence. This was the case most 
remarkably in the controversial airing of an inspiring six-part 
TV series entitled "River Elegy" (He Shang). The programme was 
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extremely popular with its audiences. It ran twice on CCTV 
network in the mid-1988, and was rebroadcast by numerous local 
stations afterwards. The series at once became a hit-show 
attracting extensive coverage of the mass media and fermenting 
intense and unprecedented debates concerning China's 
democratization and political reform throughout the country. 
Moreover, it stirred up public reactions from all walks of life, 
including overseas Chinese communities around the world. During 
the course of development, the means of television is absolutely 
crucial. "If this had been written into a novel or served as the 
subject of scholarly research", a well-known Chinese journalist 
remarked, one would doubt that "it would have caused such an 
uproar among government authorities" (B. Liu, 1990: 84). This is 
understandable, however, as R. Williams indicated, the power of 
television as a medium of social communication was so great that 
it altered many of our institutions and forms of social 
relationships; and as such, it affected some of the central 
processes of family, cultural and social life (R. Williams, 
1990: 11). As a matter of fact, these kinds of political and 
cultural shock caused by certain broadcasting programme or, 
newspapers, articles frequently occurred in the early 1980s; and 
have intensified in recent years. 
In the following part, I attempt to review the programme of 
"River Elegy" at some length and provide an analysis of its 
social impact which only television can create on such a popular 
scale. Apart from my personal account and study, some of the 
information presented in the following discussion also comes from 
journals and books which devoted to the debate on the subject. 
Chief among them are: Hong Kong's Asia Weekly (29.1.1989); 
mainland China's China Reconstructs (Jan. 1989); He Shang (1989) 
Taiwan: Jinfeng Press & Fengyun Shidai Press. 
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6.2 THE "RIVER ELEGY" ( HE SHA14G ) SHOCK 
6.2.1 Background 
"River Elegy "was produced by several young intellectuals. The 
River of the title refers to the Yellow River, a major river 
which has long been regarded as the "cradle" of Chinese 
civilization. The principle scriptwriter are Su Xiaokang, a 39 
year-old former teacher at the Beijing Broadcasting Institute and 
Wang Luxiang, 32, an instructor at Beijing Teachers College. The 
director was Xia Jun, 26, a CCTV reporter. The series appeared 
on television at a time when the society was approaching a stage 
of crises. Notably, the economic reform was blocked by wide 
spread corruption and run-away inflation, whilst the appeal to 
democracy was gathering strong momentum as well as facing 
increasing resistance. The aim of the programme was thus to 
explore China's fundamental problems in the process of 
modernization within the context of Chinese society and culture. 
According to Su, it attempts to take a critical and historical 
point of views so as to stimulate conscious self-examination 
throughout the country in this time of social transformation 
(X. Su, 1989). 
In fact, River Elegy is a milestone of innovative ambition and 
intellectual scope for the television medium. Even its opponents 
could not speak against the level of achievement this production 
signifies as an imaginatively crafted synthesis of studies across 
a wide range of disciplines with each of the six episodes 
presenting its comparative analysis of civilizations, at the same 
time reaching into the historical past to identify or imply its 
relation to the present (E. Gunn, 1990: 218, W. Cui, 1988: 123). 
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6.2.2 The Theme of "River Elegy" 
The programme, constructed around the central image of the Yellow 
River, was an intellectual attempt to clarify the problems facing 
China's modernization and reform. It made use of impressive 
visual imagery to mount a systematic attack on traditional 
Chinese culture through which the reality of the Chinese 
communist system was implicated and repudiated. The Yellow River, 
the Great Wall and the sacred dragon, all three key items of 
symbolism of Chinese civilization which were always identified 
with the pride of the country's heritage, are deeply questioned 
and challenged. "Who are we? ", "Why did we become so backward in 
the modern times? " "Why democracy and rule by the law failed to 
arrive in modern China? " "What is the fate of China's future? " 
These fundamental questions were first addressed by China's 
pioneers of the modernization movement more than one century ago 
when Qing Empire (1644 - 1911) was defeated and humiliated by the 
western Powers. From the Chinese Communist Partyls point of view, 
they had long since been settled. The authors of the programmes, 
however, indicated that it was under the current Party's rule 
that these questions had been deliberately avoided and become 
ever more acute. "We can no longer avoid a reappraisal of the 
fateful factors that shaped our civilisation", Su states in the 
introduction. It is painful, as Nathan remarks, for the Chinese 
still to have to be discussing it after so many decades of 
modernization efforts pursued at such great cost. The authors of 
the programme clearly feel that communism performance has failed 
and say so almost in so many words (A. Nathan, 1990: 123). In this 
way, the TV series argues that every Chinese must sincerely 
tackle them again in order to search for a better China. More 
than that, however, the programme attempted to re-discover and 
re-examine the root of the Chinese and Chinese civilization. 
Employing the theory of Marx's Asiatic mode of production and 
Toynbeeals rise and fall of civilization, the programme further 
argues that the dynamics of Chinese civilization, which was 
developed from its agricultural based economy, geographic and 
environmental conditions, and the long history of centralized 
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empire unity, had already exhausted itself. Therefore, the 
conclusion is quite alarming: China could face the very danger 
to be "expelled" from the modern world unless it undertakes 
fundamental reform and adopts a new value system (cf. E. Gunn, 
1990: 217-219; L-White, 1990: 107). 
In the symbolism of the series, the Yellow River, with its 
yellow, silt-laden water, represents the traditional culture and 
the Chinese identity which was, according to the narration, 
preoccupied with the worship of the land, inward-orientation and 
isolationism. The broad, tempestuous blue sea and ocean, on the 
other hand, symbolizes the outside wold, openness and the spirit 
of enterprise. To a great extent, it argues that "this Yellow 
land cannot teach us the true spirit of science, nor can the 
fierce Yellow River reveal the true consciousness of democracy". 
The fate of the four great inventions (paper, printing, gunpowder 
and the compass) in Chinese history, for instance, highlighted 
the insularity of China. While gunpowder helped to destroy 
feudalism in Europe, while the compass helped European nations 
to build up world markets and overseas colonies, while paper and 
printing helped break through the knowledge monopoly and 
capitalize the enlightenment movement, however, in China--the 
home of these inventions, as remarked by the narrator, gunpowder 
was used only for firecrackers to frighten away ghosts and evil 
spirits. The compass failed to promote Chinal's maritime and 
trading activities; whereas the use of paper and printing also 
did little to bring modern knowledge or foster science and 
technology innovations in China. Why was that? An academic in the 
series made two points to explain*this failure: firstly, as for 
technology , the Chinese were mainly interested in its 
application to the monumental problems of a centralised empire, 
such as flood control and irrigation; secondly, as for "pure 
science", the Chinese world-view which did not start from the 
distinction between subject and object, cause and effect, spirit 
and matter, did not encourage the development of empirical 
science (cf. China Reconstructs, January 1989). 
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At the time when Magellan's ships were making global adventure 
and da Vinci was inventing the helicopter, what did the Chinese 
do? The series reminds us that the emperors of Ming dynasty (1368 
- 1644) started to close China's door to foreign countries 
particularly those that came from the sea. The founder of the 
dynasty issued a degree saying that "not a single ship, not even 
a plank must be launched into the sea" to contact and trade with 
the outside world. 
As for the Great Wall, says the series, "it has been recognized 
as the only man-made structure visible from the moon. One even 
uses it as China's symbol of strength and grandeur. Yet, if the 
Great Wall were able to speak for itself, it would honestly tell 
China's sons and grandsons that it is a grand tragic memorial 
created by historical destiny. It by no means stands for power, 
enterprise, glory, but rather isolation, conservatism and 
cowardice. So it asks: what is there to be proud of? "Because 
it is so colossal and ancient, it has branded deeply into our 
national soul its boastfulness, its deceitfulness and conceit". 
The series regards traditional official ideology -- Confucianism 
-- as a mechanism for maintaining autocratic rule, hindering 
China from social progress. The fondness for dragons reflected 
a kind of worship of an idol which embodies ancestral nightmares. 
It called upon the Chinese people to let go the intoxicating 
dream of history and open their eyes to the real situation of 
China on this planet at this very moment. 
Throughout the programme, the authors persistently present the 
main argument that the only hope of a better future China is to 
undertake fundamental change towards democratization and 
modernization. The series ends with a lyric poem using 
metaphorical words (to escape censorship) to express the thematic 
idea: 
The characteristics of despotism are mysteriousness, 
autocracy, and willful nature. 
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The characteristics of democracy should be its 
transparency, its stress on the people's will, and 
scientific orientation. We are just now stepping out of 
muddiness into transparency. 
We already have stepped from being sealed off into 
openness. 
The Yellow River must pierce the highlands of yellow earth. 
The Yellow River must empty, finally, into the azure ocean. 
The sorrows of the Yellow River, the hopes of the Yellow 
River, constitute its greatness. 
The greatness of the Yellow River may exist in building new 
land between the ocean and the highlands. 
When the Yellow River reaches the estuary, a great and 
suffering juncture. 
Here, and churned for one thousand miles will be deposited 
to make new land. 
Roaring, surging ocean waves will crash into the Yellow 
River here. 
The Yellow River must allay its dread of the ocean. 
The Yellow River must maintain its course, and with it the 
will and vigour it brings from the highlands. 
The waters of life come form the ocean and flow back to the 
ocean. 
The Yellow River, after a thousand years Of solitude, 
finally can see the azure ocean. 
Thus the television programme successfully touched the other side 
of China and made a passionate appeal to the idea of democracy. 
In my view, the fierce attack on Chinese autocratic history and 
Confucian culture served to criticise the reality in which the 
Chinese communists attempted to retain their one-party system in 
the guise of nationalism in the era of a global democratization 
movement. The metaphorical critique here was implied to demand 
an urgent and thorough cultural, political and social reform in 
China. 
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6.2.3 Public Reactions to "River Elegy" 
The programme was much more than a television series; it left 
every Chinese to answer these crucial questions. As one critic 
remarks: "For the Chinese the programmes were a potentially 
liberating attempt at self-criticism, without recrimination, that 
tried to explain the underlying cause of Chinal's present dilemma" 
(J. Burrows, 1989: 35). It thus had a significant social impact on 
how people's response to the series reflected their profound 
concerns about the prospect of the on-going reform program and 
the very future of China. Immediately after the show on CCTV, 
popular reaction to the "River Elegy" came from everywhere. 
Within just a week of the show, the CCTV received over 3,000 
letters from the audience -- to praise, support, argue, defend 
and criticize -- about the programme. The series was so popular 
as well as so controversial that a special term "River Elegy Re" 
(in Chinese, "Re" means craze, fad, shock) was employed to 
describe the phenomenon. In the city of Guangdong, for instance, 
half million people took part in debate over the programme, often 
buying tickets to enter the debate room (M. Wang & A. Singhal, 
1992: 183). The media both inside and outside China gave it 
immense coverage. Exclusive columns in newspapers and magazines 
were dedicated to the discussion of the series; and, radio and 
television organized a series of public debate. In short, the 
intellectuals, students, workers, farmers, soldiers, grassroots 
cadres, the general public and even some party leaders -- all 
sections of society were stimulated to become involved in the 
heated political debate that was created by the "River Elegy" 
phenomenon; this debate provided the focus for a challenge to the 
existing Party culture. What is a striking point is that the 
series could widely disseminate ideas so disliked by the 
communist authority (or, to use the official term "poisoned 
bourgeois ideas") neither underground, nor overseas, but on the 
still officially controlled national television network; it 
influenced so many people in a way that thousands of hours of 
official "brain-washing" projects (or to use the official term 
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"political education") could never do. One American professor was 
even reported to say that the very appearance of the "River 
Elegy" on Chinese national television indicated the awakening of 
Chinese nation, and thus the realization of China's modernization 
would not be far off (cf. G. Qia, 1990: 118). Another one pointed 
out that "the production and broadcasting of River Elegy was an 
act of social leadership by intellectuals that contributed 
momentum to the growth of new social organization among students 
and workers", to which the 1989 Chinese pro-democracy movement 
to some extent could be attributed (E. Gunn, 1990: 225). 
Positive and negative reaction to the show also caused an 
enormous political storm in China's ruling sector. For instance, 
Wang Zhen, the vice president of the state, was totally outraged 
after watching the programme, saying 11 1 have never been so angry 
in my life" and made every effort to "disinfect" this polluted 
programme and suppress the authors. He then ordered his secretary 
to write an denunciatory article titled "What did the River Elegy 
advocate? " attacking the program for "national nihilism", 
"distorting the history of modern Chinese revolution, 
"challenging the Party leadership" etc. In the meantime, however, 
Zhao Ziyang, the Party general Secretary at the time, presented 
the videotape of the programme as a state gift to the visiting 
prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew (L. Wu, 1990: 121). No 
wonder the "River Elegy" shock greatly frightened the ruling 
hardliners and compelled a response from a portion of the state 
apparatus that felt threatened by it. After the 1989 Beijing 
tragedy, the series was banned immediately and became a major 
target for official attack being accused of "giving theoretical 
and emotional preparation" for the 1989 pro-democracy movement 
in China. "To broadcast the River Elegy", said the broadcasting 
minister Z. Ai in a national meeting, "was the biggest error we 
made in broadcasting work in 198811 (Z. Ai, 1990: 17). Moreover, the 
series's producer and scriptwriter were denigrated. Because of 
this, the chief writer X. Su became the authority's most wanted 
man. He managed to escape to Hong Kong and now exiles himself in 
the USA; his collaborator L. Wang was arrested and apparently 
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released without trial in the later part of 1990. As for the 
Party boss Zhao Ziyang, after he lost his post for his sympathy 
with students in the middle 1989, the "gift affair" became one 
of the major charges against him (People's Daily, 17.7.1989; 
L. Wu, 1990). 
Meanwhile, as the hardliners regained the upper hand after the 
1989 Beijing tragedy, the authorities wasted no time in launching 
an all-round campaign in an attempt to quench the popular 
response to the series, and the political consciousness of the 
Chinese people that has been rapidly aroused by, among many other 
factors, the programme of "River Elegy". In the first place, the 
propaganda authorities quickly launched a "disinfection" 
campaign. They hurriedly produced a series of short programme 
titled "One Hundred Mistakes of River Elegy" to denounce the 
original series. on another occasion, in a cartoon carried in the 
PeoPleLg_P_a_i_1y a young man says haughtily to the dragon "I am not 
your son, and to the Yellow River in the image of a country woman 
"your are not my mother", and he dashes towards a foreigner 
driving a car yelling "Daddy! " (People's Daily, 20.12.1989; 
Chi_naNow, Autumn 1989: 5). After mounting attacks, and after one- 
year of preparation and hard-work, they broadcast on the national 
network their equivalent version of "River Elegy" called "On the 
Road: A Century of Communist Party and Socialist Movement in 
China". When I was in China in late 1990,1 watched this 
programme. It is a four-part documentary which attempted to 
justify one Party rule in China. However, in my observation, 
audience resistance was quite evident. I asked many people what 
they thought about the programme, they seemed to show little 
interest in the series. Someone said this was simply an 
officially repeated discourse on the correct leadership of the 
communist Party. The audience research staff from CCTV also 
indirectly confirmed this. They told me that many audience sent 
letters to CCTV saying the programme was full of cliche. It is 
not surprising that the counter-"River Elegy" programme sponsored 
by the authorities has worked little upon audience, and the 
enormous impact of the series "River Elegy" has since 
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reverberated across mainland China as well as the overseas 
Chinese community ever more. 
6.3 BEYOND THE SHOCK 
6.3.1 Why and How Did This Happen? 
Further sociological analysis or literary critique of this 
programme are beyond our work. In our immediate concern, however, 
the importance of the "River Elegy" phenomenon and many other 
similar cases appearing in Chinese television in the last decade, 
seems to lie in the self-contradiction of the performance of the 
television medium, namely, its institutional practice is 
apparently often opposite, or, at least, at odds with its 
institutional task which is based on communist ideology, and its 
institutional formulation which is designed only to serve the 
Party's interest. Why and how did this take place? 
The question can be approached in many ways. However, several 
important factors should be taken into account: the increasingly 
feeble ability of the ruling elite to maintain the cultural 
hegemony; the intrinsic nature of cultural diversity; the growing 
autonomous role of media professionals in dealing with non-news 
and current affairs programming; the complicated relationship 
between culture and the media (as discussed previously) , the 
impact of commercialization and decentralization on the Chinese 
mass media and audience's pressure etc. In this study, however, 
I would like to stress further two points: 1) the institutional 
characteristics of the mass media; and 2) the dialectical process 
of sweeping changes in media performance and cultural production 
in the last decade within the existing institution of party 
political dominance: a contradiction of underlying tension 
between continuity and changes, between an old set of social 
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relations and the newly emerging social relations. "Institution" 
may be defined here as a set of regulation, procedures and 
organizations within the framework of the overall social system 
and particular cultural heritage to perform the tasks and roles 
involved in governance (R. Macridis, 1986: 2); and, according to 
A. Smith, "the interest of the relationship between cultural 
issues and the creation of institutions lies in the manner in 
which the latter help to resolve the former" (A. Smith, 1976: 52). 
The mass media are important social institutions in modern 
society, and as such, they follow their internal logic to develop 
within particularly social settings. Meanwhile, as Garnham 
pointed out: a media institution "takes on specific 
characteristics within and between nation states, determined, 
among other things, by the structure and state of development of 
the economy, by the form of the state, by the state of class 
relations, and by the relationship with dominant and/or 
subordinate state" (Garnham, 1983: 323). In the following 
analysis, I attempt to make an inquiry into institutions and 
offer my observation on the subject. In doing so, I limit my 
discussion to the framework of institutions itself and draw a 
theoretical model by starting to focus on the issues of 
institutional choice on the general and abstract level. For the 
various reasons, I only extract some key elements of the issue 
to analyze, while neglecting some other elements which may be 
important and relevant to the change of institutions. Therefore, 
its limitation should not be underestimated. 
6.3.2 The Inquiry into Institutions 
To some extent, the power and function of institutions lie in 
their capacity of control on the one hand, and their capacity of 
developing the undertakings on the other hand. It thus involves 
the choice for priority to achieve the goal. Moreover, the 
arrangement for such a choice is essential to the proper 
operation of institutions, and as such, it involves human cost 
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as targeting resources should be delivered and certain means 
should be employed in an effort to produce or pursue the 
desirable result. Thus the cost constraint in the process of the 
defined choices both in the kind and in the level is constant and 
permanent. 
It seems to me that there are two problems concerning making the 
choice. In the first place, making choice is subject to the 
situation of the cost constraint. In a given condition, it is 
tempting to argue that the cost constraint is crucial to 
determine what kind of resources and means, in what level and 
what way, should be deployed. Therefore, the relationship between 
the choice and the cost constraint is often problematic; and the 
level of the choice is in inverse proportion to that of the cost 
constraint, namely, the level of choice will increase as the 
level of constraint reduces. If the choice is settled, the change 
of the cost constraint will then, 1) only affect the level of the 
choice, but not the kind, if this change is confined to the 
normative paradigm; 2) alter the kind of the choice, if this 
change is beyond the normative paradigm. 
In the second place, the difficulty of making the choice lies in 
the choice itself, a state which can be expressed in a 
formulation of "either A or B 11. The problem is that, while 
making either choice A or choice B may benefit from each other 
or complement each other, on more occasions, however, making such 
a choice tends to oppose or unbalance each other. Thus the 
institutional choice can not only contain the contradictory 
factors, but also tends to negate each other. In a fundamental 
sense, the priority for an institutional control and the priority 
for an institutional development are contradictory at heart. Thus 
the choice between either of them will have large effects on 
institutional performance and formation, but the degree of such 
effects in determining the change of institutional model is 
subject to the conditions discussed above. Now let me look at the 
situation of Chinese media institution. 
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For a society such as China, that is characterized by a fully- 
f ledged communist authority plus a backward economy with the 
framework of pre-industrial dominance, the choices of media 
institution, i. e a priority for control or, a priority for 
development is problematic. While the implementation of control 
is strengthened (i. e. the choice is made on the control side, 
implying that the level of the choice itself is reduced; the 
costs constraint is increased by a lump of resources placed for 
policing, monitoring and punishing; the constraint is also 
rising; in this way ), the dynamics of development is 
undermined; and vice verse. In my view, the nature of the plight 
concerning the institutional choice, helps to shed light on 
understanding the above mentioned contradictory phenomenon in the 
performance of Chinese television. 
6.3.3 The" Chicken-and-eggshel Joe Phenomenon 
As noted, the institutional emphasis of Chinese television (as 
well as the other mass media) in Deng's era is set on the 
development side within the context of economic pragmatism of the 
leadership to realize modernization ambitions. In so doing, the 
new realistic communist authority initiated a series of policy 
shifts giving priority to media modernization and 
institutionalization. These ultimately required the establishing 
of a new and dynamic system to replace the old one. By adopting 
a decentralization strategy and market mechanism in Chinese 
broadcasting, the medium performance virtually departed from its 
rigid centralized model. A movement that contained the tendency 
towards reforming the existing media structure thus occurred. The 
institution of Chinese television is undertaking profound 
transformation. It created new forces and a new flexible paradigm 
which further contributed to the decline of the Party's political 
control power. The fate of the "River Elegy" is obviously the 
case reflecting this trend. originally, CCTV invested some 1.3 
million yuan (approx US$ 350,000 in 1988 exchange rate) to 
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produce a kind of a tourist documentary about the Yellow River. 
Like the similar programmes shown previously, the authorities in 
general would expect the theme of the documentary be devoted to 
the attractive and positive side of Chinese history and the 
prosperity of the country under the Party leadership. In a word, 
it ought to be eulogistic rather than critical. 
However, the increasing instability of the Party's ideological 
control, the desire of TV producers to ensure the viewers, 
satisfaction and the cost-effectiveness consideration (i. e the 
pressure for realizing the exchange-value) , the operational and 
management changes of CCTV and other television stations (cf. 4; 
5; 7], objectively, have created the institutional condition of 
flexibility, and given an impetus to the practice of diversity 
and pluralism. When the programme was about to be made, the man 
in overall charge of the programme who is the deputy director of 
CCTV, gave this instruction to the authors of the "River Elegy": 
You can write and produce the programme at your will, 
there is no problem to pass (censorship) from my side. 
But, the sole criterion I require to this programme is 
that it should ensure the satisfaction of the general 
public as well as the older cadres (note: here the 
phrase normally referring to those people who used to 
possess the high position and now semi-retired 
communists] (cited in X. Su, 1991: 63). 
In a delicate context, this instruction implied a balanced 
double-meaning: on the one hand, the programme should break with 
official conventions concerning cultural performance and reflect 
the authors' creativeness and the true feelings of the general 
public in an attempt to show CCTV's innovation and competition; 
on the other hand, it should also be cautious not to go too far 
to challenge directly the existing authority, otherwise, it would 
be impossible to get the pass from the Party media watchdogs. In 
reality, the effectiveness of the practice is, however, largely 
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determined by the situation of the day and the balance among the 
different social forces concerned. 
As a result of reform progress in post-Mao China, the media 
institutions now have to take audience preference and 
advertisers' interests into account, and more and more rely on 
popular appeal and controversy to compete with each other. In 
other words, they have to abide by certain basic rules in order 
to realize the exchange-value of their products. Thus the 
institution becomes the centre of the conflict between the old 
forces and the new ones. CCTV has actually played the dual role 
of the old Party's instrument and the pioneer of cultural 
pluralism, often the later overcoming the former. Meanwhile, one 
also should note that, at least up till the 1989 Beijing tragedy, 
the post-Mao political environment in China had steadily 
improved: Maoism had been discarded, the circulation of 
information and ideas had been greatly increased, the Party's 
penetration of society had been substantially reduced and many 
ares of life had been depoliticized etc. (A. Barnett, 1986). As 
a result, there is growing new a "public space" for cultural 
diversity along with the increasing media autonomy, allowing more 
opportunities for the expression of heterodox views within the 
fast changing public communication environment. In short, the 
communist totalitarian control over the society in the last 
decade has been on shifting sands. It was under such 
circumstances that such a series which to a large degree 
expressed the dissident view and pro-democracy ideas, which 
entirely at odds with the Party ideology and official 
doctrinaire, came out and got sanction to be aired on the 
national television network. Through these complicated 
interacting practices, I notice that a kind of the public sphere 
and the spirit of freedom of expression have gradually developed 
and cumulatively grown within the existing institution. To borrow 
an old Chinese metaphor, the situation is a bit like an eggshell 
with a chicken growing inside it: outwardly, the formulation of 
the old institution appears undisturbed; but inwardly the alien 
social forces and new formulation are progressing. A very recent 
233 
report from Beijing in the Guardian vividly illustrated this on- 
going trend: 
The current hit (of TV soap), I Love You Definitely, 
written by Wang Shuo, China's most popular novelist and 
screenwriter, was sold to the national station, CCTV, 
for 3.5 million yuan. Scarcely a day goes by without the 
offical media accusing Wang Shou of cynicism, 
opportunism, degeneracy or bad language. "I just thumb my 
nose at these people", he says. "If they had the power to 
put me in jail, then I might listen to them, but they' re 
just a bunch of dusty, out-of-touch old bores and they 
can't hurt me. If they don't like what I write, they can 
just turn their television off" (The Guardian, 
19.2.1993: 22). 
In fact, as J. Lull pointed out, many ideological twists and turns 
that have come from the authority itself for the past several 
years in China have been influenced by nuances originating with 
workers in television and the other mass media who have dared to 
produce unofficial ideas, accounts and explanations. By invoking 
the government's own rhetoric and rationale of openness and 
reform, China's change agents in the media often have actually 
been able to do their oppositional work in the guise of the 
official line (J. Lull, 1991). In my observation, the existence 
of insufficient, or even the absence of institutional 
arrangements for social communication in the Party-state greatly 
increases the prospects for cultural clashes and civic 
discontentment. Thus the effort in the search for alternative 
channels and the impulse to express the dissident voice can never 
be eliminated. It should come as no surprise, therefore, that the 
self-contradiction of media performance in post-Mao China, 
through the illustration of the "River Elegy" and many other 
cases, displayed a degree of non-conformity of the Party media 




FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND MEDIA DEMOCRATIZATION 
If the evolution of the decentralization policy, market-oriented 
performance and cultural pluralism brought about profound changes 
in the development of Chinese television after Mao, then the 
movement towards institutional reform became an essential step 
for any further substantial progress, and was bound to follow in 
the late 1980s. It was viewed with hostilely by those who wanted 
to continue the Party monopoly control over broadcasting, and was 
treated cautiously by those who wished to change some aspects of 
the Stalinist media model piecemeal while maintaining the Party's 
prestigious leading role. But those who wanted to undertake a 
fundamental reform of the existing institution were enthusiastic 
about the new development. Thus the process of China's media 
democratization became a see-saw battle involving a series of 
confrontations, challenges and progress as well as resistance and 
repression. The dance between reform and reaction has been an 
unceasing one since 1978. Indeed, the irreconcilable, cumulative 
and intensifying conflicts between the state and society, between 
the Party existing media institutions and dynamics of media 
democratization, have created the foundations of antagonistic 
contradiction which in time cannot but entirely, from deep within 
China's social formations, undermine the communist system and 
push the mass media as well as the society towards fundamental 
changes. 
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7.1 THE PARTY-STATE AND FREEDOM OF THE PRESS 
Achilles was invulnerable from weapons as he had been 
dipped by his mother Thesis in the River Styx at birth, 
except for the heel by which he was held. At Troy, he was 
the most fearless warrior, but was eventually killed by 
Paris with an arrow which struck his only vulnerable 
spot, his heel. 
-- Greek Legend 
Give me a fulcrum, I can move the Earth. 
-- Archimedes 
Communism's "Achilles, Heel" 
Given the entrenched nature of the mass media in the communist 
state, it is not surprising that the Party has made every effort 
to maintain broadcasting (and other mass media) as the Party 
mouthpiece. Therefore, the practice of media democratization 
remains pivotal in the battle field between the ruling Party on 
the one side, and the media corps and the general public on the 
other. The Party's fear of the people, of free expression, of a 
free press is a product of the communist system, a function of 
the system as long as it deprives people of their basic political 
rights with respect to the relationship between public authority 
and popular power. Indeed, unlike its counterparts Fascism and 
national socialism (as defined by Radel, 1975), the very 
existence of communist totalitarianism and the whole secret of 
its power foundation are based upon the maintenance of, what I 
would like to call "the dictatorship of the consciousness" backed 
by coercion. The paradoxical praxis of 20th century communism is 
its political unreformability. One has every reason to argue that 
media freedom and media democratization are the "Achilles' Heel" 
of continued communist power. 
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According to the logic of communism, those who control the means 
of the use of the symbolic system virtually control human thought 
in general. This indicates that an established communist regime 
has to have two "barrels" firmly in hand -- the barrel of the gun 
and the barrel of the pen -- if it is to seize and consolidate 
totalitarian state power successfully. This was put bluntly by 
Lin Biao (1908 - 1971) [who was once designated as Mao's heir 
(1969), later was accused of plotting a revolt and was said to 
have died in mysterious plane crash in Mongolia]. 
carrying out a revolution is inseparable from two 
barrels. one is the barrel of a gun and the other, the 
barrel of a pen. To establish a political power, we must 
depend on these two barrels (Lin Biao, cited in K. Lu, 
1979/1980). 
Crucially, the communist authority, whilst ultimately resorting 
to the barrel of the gun as its final solution, must pivotally 
employ the barrel of the pen to undertake its fundamental task: 
ensuring "unified thinking" to make people believe in the Party, 
love the Party and support the Party. But, the key question is, 
is it really possible to control human consciousness in the long 
term? No. That is the fatal misunderstanding of communist social 
engineering in the twentieth century. 
Moreover, there is a legitimacy problem constantly confronted by 
the regime -- its commitment to Marx's doctrine -- on the issue 
of freedom of the press and media democratization. For one thing, 
while the Party defended monopoly control of the media on the 
grounds that it was for the good of the people as laid down by 
the officially interpreted Marxism, Marx himself fervently 
advocated media freedom. As a result, the Party destroyed af acet 
of its own credibility and constructed for itself a hypocritical 
image, purporting to follow Marxist theory while at the same time 
suppressing all forms of freedom of expression. Thus freedom of 
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the press to some extent is seen as the most vulnerable point for 
the survival of the communist system. 
7.1.2 The Battle For Press Freedom 
on the other hand, to the media corps and the general public, 
freedom of the press is in every sense the fulcrum of Archimedes' 
lever for breaking through totalitarian control and for the 
realization of democracy. Of course, to have the right to free 
speech would not mean to have everything, or guarantee a 
satisfactory outcome (according to the present human condition, 
it is impossible to achieve this), but if this vital right is 
taken away on whatsoever pretexts, it is bound to jeopardize all 
of one's human rights and put people on the road to serfdom. 
Hayek, in his book On The Road To Serfdom, argues that without 
the freedom of private property, people lose every other freedom 
(F. Heyek, 1944). However, in my experience of the communist 
state, deprivation of the citizen's right to free speech and a 
free press, that is, deprivation of political rights rather than 
the Heyek's economic rights, is the foremost step towards the 
road to serfdom and the creation of a communist totalitarian 
state. 
The struggle for media freedom in the communist state is vital 
to create a democracy and the process of transformation of 
communist media institutions. The communist authority is very 
much conscious of this point. The new General Secretary of 
Chinese Communist Party Jiang Zemin (1989 -- ) has remarked: 
In recent years, "freedom of the press" has become a 
crucial slogan that has been used by a tiny number of 
stubborn bourgeois liberalists [note: a label equivalent 
to "class enemy" in Mao's era] to battle against the 
Party and the people (People's Daily, 2.3.1990). 
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This clearly indicates that the ruling Party elite realized, 
particularly in the wake of the 1989 Beijing pro-democracy 
movement, that freedom of the press could cost the Party -- its 
monopolistic power. This was explicitly put by the broadcasting 
minister Ai Zhisheng: 
In every country, those who are engaged in social 
upheaval must first take the control of the mass media 
as well as advocate the slogan of freedom of the press. 
It is clear now that the essence of addressing this 
slogan in our country during that period (of the 1989 
upheaval) is to attempt to seize the leadership power of 
the Party and government on the media work (1990: 123). 
Because of this sensitivity, in the early 1980s when the reform 
programme had just been initiated in the economic sector, the 
battle for press freedom in the Chinese mass media was carefully 
termed as "journalism reform" as the word "reform" was so 
fashionable everywhere at the time. In reality, however, this was 
a catch-all phrase which included anything from improvements in 
writing, editing, programming production and service quality to 
structural reform, management innovations and functional media 
changes. However, the post-Mao media evolution has revealed that 
through tug-of-war practice, the progress of freedom of the press 
in the Chinese media has been underway with the underlying trend 
gradually heading for democratization. In the following section, 
I provide a descriptive account and a sociological interpretation 
of such changes in post-Mao era with special reference to 
broadcasting. 
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7.2 THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE OF MEDIA FREEDOM 
IN POST-MAO CHINA 
7.2.1 Breakdown of Reporting Taboos and Improvement of the 
News Service 
The increased volume of information available through Chinese 
radio and television, and diversified news reporting both in 
terms of quality and quantity was perhaps the first and most 
important step in the direction of a media institution exercising 
freedom of the press. The last decade has seen an unprecedented 
expansion in news service broadcasts. 
In the early 1980s, following the Party's shift towards economic 
reform, the foci of news programming began to diverge from the 
original model of Politico-ideological dominance towards 
(relatively) audience-oriented programmes with the emphasis on 
economic reporting. During that period, China was also affected 
by the western trend of thought of "Information Society", an idea 
rapidly spreading in Chinese society through the translation of 
Toffler's popular book The Third Wave, which had some impact on 
policy-makers' thinking about the function of the news media. In 
November 1982, Wu Lengxi, the reform-minded broadcasting 
minister, spoke about the news programme at the national 
conference for directors of television stations. He asked that 
all stations should take measures to improve news services in 
response to the increasing need for information in the drive 
towards national modernization. He stressed that such an 
improvement could offer a "breakthrough point" for the overall 
reform of television (L. Wu 1982: 226-232). Journalism reform in 
the broadcasting field, according to the official vision, was 
said to mean an emphasis on "freshness, speed, brevity, scope, 
and loudness" (People's Daily, 21.11.1983). In that sense, 
newsmen were given impetus to establish a climate that seemed to 
encourage innovations and (towards) open expression of public 
opinions in their reporting. 
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With the efforts of hundreds of thousands of professionals, many 
taboos have been broken since then. A prominent case was the 
emergence of critical reporting on television. According to Shi"s 
study, critical reporting particularly in respect of exposing the 
seamy side of society, used to be forbidden on radio and 
television. This followed important advice taken from the Soviet 
experience in the mid 1950s, mainly for fear that the airwaves 
could be easily intercepted by outsiders and used to benefit 
enemy propaganda. There were even specific rules as to how to 
deal with bad news such as natural disasters, accidents, and 
economic setbacks (T. Shi, 1987: 166). For example, accidents could 
be released on the media when their causes had been found out and 
when they would not damage the good image of the Party and the 
socialist system. 
However, there was a breakthrough in this no-criticism rule on 
the airwaves in post-Mao China. On September 8,1979, for 
example, the CCTV national network broadcast the news story that 
some high ranking bureaucrats and their family members used 
government cars for private shopping and sightseeing. This became 
a target for criticism because there were no private cars in 
China at that time and the number of government cars was also 
extremely limited. The news triggered enormous public response. 
Within just a few days, CCTV received more than 1,500 letters 
from its audience most of which praised this reporting as a good 
job done in the people's interest. (T. Shi, 1987: 166-167). After 
that, more TV stations were encouraged by the move and engaged 
in exposes. The government, facing increasing public pressure, 
felt that it must take some tough action to tackle the problem 
of official corruption as well as other public concerns in order 
to stabilize and maintain the social order. However, there 
remained two important restrictions governing criticism in media 
reporting: first, the Party's leadership would not be challenged; 
second, media criticism was not allowed to offend top leaders or 
the institutions at the same level as the media organization. In 
other words, a provincial television station could not broadcast 
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a criticism of central authorities or of fellow provincial 
authorities. For these two levels (central and provincial) only 
CCTV had the authority to do so, provided it has managed to 
obtain permission. 
Despite these restrictions (which are still in place officially), 
the post-Mao reform progress has gradually created favourable 
conditions for media criticism. Some conventional practices have 
been broken and some forbidden areas have been entered. For 
instance, the southern Fujing station managed to report serious 
environmental pollution in the city of Xiamin which aroused 
immediate concern and drew support both from the public and the 
authorities; the northern Heilongjing station attacked a local 
council maintenance team for its deliberate refusal to repair a 
broken residential water supply system for over 20 days, simply 
because the people there had not given the staff in charge the 
extra "wine and cigarettes" (Z. Zhang, 1987: 40; T. Shi, 1987: 167). 
In 1987, the unrest in Tibet was fully reported on the 
television. Even if the reporting was distorted to some degree 
and was for the propaganda need of the Chinese government, 
unpleasant incidents of this kind would never have appeared on 
national television in the past. Michael Berlin, a former 
Washington Post reporter teaching journalism in China, said he 
was "amazed to see a Chinese television reporter, mike in hand, 
standing outside the private home that a provincial official had 
allegedly built with government funds and trying to question a 
family member about the allegation as he emerged, stunned and 
enraged by the live report" (M. Berlin, 1989: 32). 
In developing such a process, quite a number of stations set up 
special programmes to conduct critical reporting (how critical 
depends on the Political climate of the day). Amongst the most 
popular programmes of this type have been Guangdon Television's 
"Take It as Evidence", Shanghai's "From our Viewers", Shandong's 
"Seen on the Street", and Beijing's "Voice of the Audiencell(cf. 
T. Shi, 1987: 167-170). The audience's response has been very 
positive since the emergence of this kind of reporting. As a 
242 
result, letters and phone calls from the viewers have increased 
substantially almost in every television stations (J-Hong, 
1992: 17-18) 
A number of "firsts" were tried and recorded in the television 
medium, such as market information programmes, sensitive topics 
of political debate, direct satellites supplying international 
news, live telecasts of the Party's congress and the national 
people's congress, VIP interviews, news on the frustration of 
economic reform, reports from audiences, disaster coverage, 
criminal reports and human interest stories. These programmes, 
unimaginable in Mao's era, are now daily practice. Some have 
become conventional, others remain more or less acceptable to the 
authority, others controversial (e. g critical reports, political 
debate). However, it is clear that the underlying trend has been 
generally characterised by an enlarging space for the media to 
occupy and the implicit evolution of freedom of the press. 
7.2.2 changes in the News Supply 
In the meantime, the structure of domestic news supply has more 
and more departed from merely relying on unified and centralized 
news production (usually from CCTV), and moved towards an 
exchange basis of local and regional cooperation. In November 
1983, for instance, with the initiative of the Shanghai TV 
Station, the "Yangzi River Delta TV Co-op Network" was 
established. This regional network is based on the Yangzi River 
Delta which includes Shanghai and six other provinces in Eastern 
China. By the end of the 1980s, around 40 stations ranking from 
provincial level, city level to local county's joined the 
network. Using microwave transmission, stations within the region 
now exchange their news programmes daily and thus have greatly 
improved their local news coverage as well as content (J. Yu, 
1986: 21; X. Zhou, 1986: 14; The Advancement of Chinese 
Broadcasting, 1991 ). 
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In accordance with these changes, the quantity of the news 
service has also steadily increased. Due to the problem of 
nation-wide data availability, we only have the data of CCTV and 
Shanghai TV Station (STV) concerning this issue. Nevertheless, 
the facts provided in the following tables still, to some extent, 
speak for themselves and more or less represent the trend of the 
state of news service in a national level. 
Table 7.1 
Increase of TV News Items 

















------ -- -- 
1,000 
1981 4,200 1981 4,800 
1983 11,000 1983 4,900 
1985 20,400 1985 91900 
1988 25,000 1988 15,000 
Source: For CCTV data, for 1980,1981,1983 figures, see China 
TV Stations ( 1987 ), Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting 
Institute Press, pp 39; for 1985 figure, see The 
Ad ancement of Chinese Broadcasting ( 1991 ), 
Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press, pp 86; for 1988 
figure, see China Broadcasting Yearbook ( 1989 ), 
Beijing: Beijing Broadcasting Institute Press, pp 30. 
For STV data, for 1979,1981,1983 figures, see China 
TV Stations ( 1987 ), ibid. pp 155; for 1985 figure, 
see China Broadcasting Yearbook ( 1986 ), ibid. pp 765; for 1988 
figure, see Shanqhai TV Information, No. 6,1989, ppl6. 
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Table 7.2 
CCTV News Schedule ( 1988 ) 
Time News Programme Duration 
8: 30 Morning News 30 m 
9: 20 Morning Brief 5 m 
12: 00 Noon News 15 m 
14: 20 International News 5 m 
19: 00 Network News 30 m 
21: 00 Economic News 30 m 
22: 00 Night News 15 m 
Sources: CCTV Thirtv Years ( 1958 -- 1988 )_, pp 695 - 699; 
Shanghai Radio & TV Weeklv, No. 9,29.2.1992. 
Table 7.3 
STV Local News Schedule ( 1992 ) 
Time News Programme Duration 
9: 00 Morning News 10 m 
12: 30 Noon News 15 m 
14: 00 News Brief 5 m 
18: 30 Evening News 30 m 
20: 00 Information 30 m 
21: 30 Night News 15 m 
23: 00 Late Night News 15 m 
Sources: CCTV Thirtv Years ( 1958 -- 1988 )_, pp 695 - 699; 
Shanghai Radio & TV Weeklv, No. 9,29.2.1992. 
7.2.3 seeking Greater Editorial Independence 
An important focus of media reform efforts was to seek greater 
editorial autonomy. This is always the goal of media 
professionals in the world, but in the Chinese context, it 
chiefly had two meanings - Firstly, the media attempted to be free 
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from the day-to-day minutiae of interference from above (the 
Party, government and various authorities); secondly, the media 
attempted to provide a sort of role of the fourth estate in terms 
of the checks and balances of power. As the reform movement went 
on, the Party also felt strong pressure to change its media 
management style. Thus during the last decade, the communist 
authority began to evolve its media control method from a direct 
and merely administrative dimension to somewhat indirect and 
multifold concerns. This can be seen as an attempt towards 
forming a sort of arms' length control pattern which is widely 
practised in other types of societies. In the mid-1980s, major 
radio and television stations started to adopt the "editor in 
charge of journalistic affairs" system in which reporters and 
editors gained relative autonomy to deal with their business. 
Accordingly, most of the programmes, including news and 
documentaries, did not need to be pre-broadcast-reviewed by the 
administrative authorities (before, there had been a pre- 
broadcast-review system by which high ranking officials in charge 
of propaganda affairs previewed the programmes and had the power 
to decide whether they should be shown ). After the 1989 Beijing 
tragedy, this situation was reversed to some degree, but it is 
reported recently that the preview control has been loosened 
again except on some politically sensitive topics (X. Sun and 
B. Tong, in interviews with the author, Beijing, September 1990). 
Meanwhile, the desire for the media to be the fourth estate was 
growing after the death of Mao. This gathering momentum 
culminated in the 13th Party Congress (October 1987) when the 
reform-minded Party leaders showed some support for the media 
playing the role of power check. In Chinese, it was termed as 
"media supervisional role". In the main congress document, it 
formally endorsed the principle of media supervision and proposed 
three ways to conduct it: that the mass media should oversee the 
Party and government work and performance; that the mass media 
should inform the public of important events; and that the mass 
media should report openly debate on important policy issues 
(Zhao Ziyang: The 13th Party Congress Report, 25.10.1987). Some 
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top leaders even suggested that political issues could now be 
discussed publicly, a reference that was applied to the role of 
the media as the public forum of debate. Wan Li, Chairman of the 
National Congress, made this point quite clear in a national 
symposium on soft sciences in 1986: 
All the political and policy matters should be studies. 
They can be debated Publicly before decisions are made. 
Dissenting views must not be attacked from the higher 
plain of principle and in the context of a class 
struggle, as was done in the past... (People's Daily, 
15.8.1986). 
Thus strong impetus was given to the mass media in seeking 
greater editorial autonomy. Television, with its vivid visual 
appeal, played a very active role in providing access to public 
information, covering political debates and giving greater 
attention to many sensitive issues such as inflation, corruption, 
policy formulations, political reform, the development of 
legislation and "bad news" stories like the 1986 student 
demonstration and the 1987 forest conflagration in northeast 
China (Z. Wang, 1988). 
7.2.4 Structural Changes in Broadcasting Personnel 
There has been a steady improvement in the professionalism of 
Chinese broadcasting. In the last decade, media education has 
expanded rapidly. The number of journalism schools and 
departments proliferated from a dozen in the early 1980s to 76 
in the late 1980s. Now more than one thousand journalism 
graduates and postgraduates are recruited by the mass media every 
year. In broadcasting, for instance, nearly four thousands 
graduates from the Beijing Broadcasting Institute entered various 
radio and television stations to work after 1979. As a result, 
the proportion of broadcasting personnel with higher education 
and special training has steadily increased, now reaching over 
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50% as compared with 20% ten years ago. In the early days, 
Chinese broadcast corps were largely staffed by ex-military 
personnel; college graduates particularly those receiving formal 
training in journalism and communication programme were very few 
in the field (L-White, 1990: 93-95). However, this situation has 
greatly changed. In 1986, for instance, the News Department of 
the Shanghai TV Station had 39 reporters and editors among whom 
50-0-- graduated from media training programme in universities 
(J. Yu, 1986: 21) 
To some extent, this generation of younger, more energetic, more 
independent, more innovative and better-educated professionals 
are the driving force in changing the status quo of media 
institutions. Their presence has not only affected the dynamics 
of the broadcasting industry, but also greatly advanced the cause 
of the media reform programme. In the same vein, the composition 
of broadcasting personnel has also experienced a structural 
change towards the process of professionalism which has had a 
profound impact on the performance of broadcasting. This change 
has been virtually completed in regional stations where the 
proportion of professionals has reached more than 50% (which is 
similar to that of developed countries) of the total number of 
staff. The following tables provide statistics showing this 
trend. 
Table 7.4 
Staffing Structure of Chinese Broadcasting (1984 - 1989) 
------------------------------------------------------------- 













1985 220,469 18.8% 18.2% 13.8% 49.2% 
1986 248,535 21.1% 17.5% 13.5% 47.9% 
1987 221,625 23.3% 18.9% 16.4% 41.4% 
1988 234,071 24.4% 17.5% 18.4% 39.7% 
1989 244,320 24.4% 17.8% 18.9% 38.9% 
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Note: *Professionals include editors, producers, announcers, 
presenters, arts personnel etc. 
** others also include wire broadcasting maintenance workers 
which make up about 11% of the total staff. 
Source: China Broadcasting Yearbook 1986,1987,1988,1989,1990. 
Table 7.5 
Staffing Structure of Regional TV Stations (1982 - 1987) 














--- ---- -- -------- 
1984 45.8% 10% 25.3% 18.9% 
1986 45. % 10% 22.3% 22.7% 
1987 52.4% 9% 21.8% 16.8% 
Source: The 1982 figure is taken from An Introduction of Chinese 
Television ( zhuang, 1985: 246 ); the rest from The Advancement 
of Chinese Broadcastinq, Ibid. pp 151. 
7.2.4 The 1989 Beijing Spring 
The struggle for press freedom reached a decisive break in the 
1989 Beijing pro-democracy movement. For several weeks leading 
up to the declaration of martial law on May 20, the Chinese mass 
media, for the first time in the People's Republic of China, 
refused to obey the Party's instructions unconditionally. This 
act of defiance as well as the aftermath of the tragedy itself 
has been much written about, so what follows below is merely a 
brief account with the focus on broadcasting journalism. 
In the middle of May 1989 when the students' hunger strike at 
Tiananmen Square rapidly approached a crisis point, a large 
number of journalists began to take action, strongly showing 
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their solidarity with the students and the general public. They 
publicly demanded political reform in general and media freedom 
in particular, a widely held view, and one reflecting the deep 
frustration with the failure of Deng's reform to match economic 
liberalization with parallel political democratization. This 
view was, among many others, strongly expressed by a group of 
CCTVI's reporters, editors, producers and directors in an 
emotional statement of support of the students pro-democracy 
movement: 
... When the party makes a mistake, we have the 
obligation to tell the party so and to ask it to listen 
to the people. ... Therefore, we can no longer keep 
quiet. We f irmly cast our lot with the students. We 
sympathize with and support the students' hunger strike 
and petition. The government should not be afraid of 
losing face; it should agree to a frank dialogue. It 
should not douse the fervent patriotism of the students 
with cold water. ... If the TV station could air the 
dialogues (between students and leaders) live, it would 
also be a feat in media history. If transmitting van are 
available, we can rent them from the local stations. 
... What has happened to the media under the bureaucratic 
system? Editors, directors, reporters no longer have 
brains in their heads. Their throats are cut. They have 
become robots who only obey the commands of their 
superiors (Mimeographed flyer, cited from Chinese 
sociology and Anthropology. Fall 1990: 47-48). 
Meanwhile, several large journalists demonstrationsl involving 
around ten thousand people led by CCTV, People's Daily, Xinhua 
News Agency -- all the Party's top media institutions, were 
successfully organized at the peak of the movement, supporting 
the students and protesting against media censorship. On May 18, 
for instance, about 1,000 CCTV staff took to the street shouting 
slogans "Don't force us to lie", "We must speak the truth". What 
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was striking about these actions during that period was the fact 
that these journalists from various media bodies publicly marched 
under banners of the media organizations to which they belonged. 
Moreover, many famous journalists openly defied the authorities' 
warnings and used their professional skills to tell the truth to 
the world. For example, Wei Hua, the anchorwoman for the English 
service for the CCTV gave several interviews to foreign reporters 
expressing the determination of the Chinese journalists to 
struggle for media freedom. A comment by the editor of Beijing 
Review states that "the outburst of discontent among Chinese 
journalists is expected to hasten the pace of press reform which, 
when fully realized, is likely to be the first breakthrough in 
the reform of China's political structure" (Beiling Review, 
15.5.1989). 
During those few weeks the Chinese media enjoyed their greatest 
freedom in history: the CCTV network boldly reported, with fairly 
extensive detail and objectivity, every development of the 
movement such as students demands, public debates, millions 
people's demonstrations and dialogue proposals. (cf S. Mark, 
1991: 259-282; B. Liu, 1990; Y. Mu & M. Thompson, 1989: 109-143; 
J. Lull, 1991). M. Hopkins, among many others, vividly described 
the role that television played during that period: "The 
audience, accustomed to unimaginative footage of factory workers 
turning out machine tools and peasants harvesting grain, tuned 
into something startlingly different in may; moving scenes of 
young students on a hunger strike in Tiananmen Square. There they 
lay in make-shift tents, ministered to by fellow students, taken 
away in ambulances through crowds when their condition weakened 
to the point of death -- their only demand being a hearing from 
their leaders. It would have been television at it's most 
powerful anywhere; in China the impact was unimaginable" 
(M. Hopkins, 1989: 35-36). 
In short, the images and symbols which were conveyed through 
television as well as other mass media in the 1989 Beijing Spring 
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had a tremendous impact in advancing the course of media freedom 
and social democratization in China. 
7.2.5 Resistance and Repression: The other side of the story 
However, there is the other side of the story: a story of hard- 
line communist resistance and repression of the movement for 
media freedom. As the pressure for media freedom grew, so did the 
intensity of hard-line reaction. Because of the authority"s 
failure to make a commitment to genuine political reform and the 
establishment of a democratic system, the politics of post-Mao 
China has had an erratic and unstable pattern. A tug-of-war 
scenario has thus characterised the reform decade, as periods of 
retreat were followed by periods of advance, and periods of rapid 
momentum was replaced by those of a more suppressive policy 
(Harding, 1987). This has had a great impact on the institutional 
reform of the Chinese media, largely dictated by the changes of 
the political climate during the 1980s. Broadly speaking, then, 
the practice of press freedom gained ground when economic and 
political transformation movements were relatively successful, 
but it suffered from frustration as the result of setbacks to 
these reform programmes. The communist authorities as a whole, 
however, have every reason to view the institutional development 
of press freedom is the worst thing they wish to see. Therefore, 
many efforts have been made to maintain the Party's dominant 
position over the media, and when the political situation was 
reversed in favour of communist hard-liners, suppression 
campaigns -- usually coined "Anti-bourgeois Liberalization" -- 
were launched in an attempt to crush the press freedom movement. 
Prior to the 1989 Tiananmen killings, such major campaigns were, 
notably, the crackdown on the Democracy Wall movement (1979), 
"anti-bourgeois spiritual pollution" (1983) and "ant i -bourgeois 
liberalization" (early 1987). 
In broadcasting, however, the Secretariat of the Chinese 
Communist Party Central Committee passed a resolution as early 
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as in 1981 to ensure af irm stance. It reads: "Radio and 
television are the most powerful modern tool for the purpose of 
educating and inspiring the Party, the army, and the people of 
all nationalities to build a socialist material and spiritual 
civilization. This is the fundamental nature and task of radio 
and television. " In doing so, "broadcasting must keep in line 
with the Party voluntarily, and serve the main Party objectives 
of the time"(Selected Broadcasting Working Documents, Vol. 1, 
1988: 100-101). Whatever the reform movement in progress, the 
ruling officialdom remains determined to hang on to the bottom 
line. This was clearly revealed in a confidential speech made by 
the current broadcasting Minister, Ai Zhisheng with the stress 
on the official version of the broadcasting reform on October 
5.1988. He stated that "the purpose (of broadcasting reform) is 
by no means to change the essential role of broadcasting as the 
Party mouthpiece, but, rather, to strengthen it. " 
In order to achieve this requirement, the Party demands that all 
media reporting work, broadcasting in particular, must be 
conducted in line with the principle of so-called "Positive 
propaganda". That is "about 80% of the reporting should be 
devoted to achievements, good things, while 20% to shortcomings, 
the negative side of society etc. " (Y. Hu, 1985: 18). According to 
Li Rui Huan -- the newly appointed Party's chief ideologue 
(1989 - ), "This is the key guide line that socialist media work 
must observell(R-Li, 1990). But what does this principle mean in 
the practice of media reporting? The textbook of the Beijing 
Broadcasting Institute gives an explanation: 
"Positive propaganda" means news that deals with models 
of people and good situations which can be used to 
mobilize and inspire the general public. ... In this way, 
news that can be catalogued in this respect should be 
reported. Bad news such as disasters also can be 
reported, but, emphasis should be placed on the 
activities and brave endeavours that serve to recover 
from the disaster. ... Positive propaganda does not mean 
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the exclusion of critical reporting, but, such a 
reporting should be: 1) truthful; 2) typical; and 3) 
constructive. The purpose of reporting such a critical 
story is, therefore, to enhance people's confidence and 
give them inspiration and strength rather than make them 
depressed and pessimistic. Stories solely designed to 
expose the seamy side of society should be banned (X. Lu, 
1982: 570). 
In reality, the operation of media control mechanisms regarding 
reporting comes in varying forms. Some are in the form of formal 
Party documents, others are in the form of internal bulletins 
(e. g Propaganda Trend issued by the Party Propaganda Department 
on a weekly basis), some are just a short notice or even an oral 
message from leading Party figures. In the broadcasting field, 
the most important directive concerning radio and television 
reporting is the bulletin of the Broadcasting Editors' Daily 
circulating only to the persons who reach certain higher rank 
positions within the field of broadcasting. It usually gives very 
specific directives on issues of reporting, plainly telling 
broadcasters what they should and shouldn't do. In the issue of 
19 February 1985, for example, it read: "Recently, there have 
been some reports devoted to "beauty contests". At present these 
kinds of activities should not be reported too much" (cf. 
W. Chang, 1989: 169). In another interesting case, the broadcasting 
minister Ai Zhisheng gave his directive on reporting Christmas 
celebrations in Chinese campuses and the popularity of Karaoke. 
This is what he said: 
I think radio and television had better not advocate the 
phenomenon of the Christmas celebration which is now 
getting increasingly "popular" in university campuses, 
because such a western life style is not suitable to our 
nation. ... 
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The other day, Fujing Province TV Station received a news 
programme about the popularity of Karaoke entertainment. 
This also should not be advocated, and particularly 
should not be broadcast on the national network news 
service (Z. Ai, 1989). 
In another important development with regard to the f urther 
strengthening of the struggle against the institutional practice 
of media democratization, the communist authority devised a new 
censorship institution in an attempt to maintain its absolute 
control. In January 1987, at the height of another "Anti- 
bourgeois Liberalization" campaign, an administrative censorship 
bureau -- the State Media and Publication office (SMPO) was 
formally established and a conservative ideologue Du Dao-Zheng 
was appointed as the general director. The purpose of this new 
organization, according to Du, is 1) to ensure the Party's 
effective leadership on media and publication work; 2) to 
maintain the administrative order of the media and publication 
work. Specifically, the SMPO is designed to carry out the 
following major tasks with regard to the media and publication: 
1. to handle drafting and implementing laws and regulations in 
this area; 
2. to provide guidance on principles and policies; 
3. to examine all publications; 
4. to exercise unified planning and management (D. Du, 1987). 
In brief then, the whole issue of what you can or cannot say in 
the mass media is framed in the Party's interest. This is seen 
by the authorities as the ultimate criterion for conducting media 
reporting. It is no secret, therefore, that the ruling power is 
attempting to employ all necessary means through the existing 
control mechanisms to resist and repress the progress of 
institutional progress in media freedom. 
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However, the media reform programme is an important part of the 
evolution of overall social change and political democratization 
in post-Mao China. As a result, the tendency to enlarge the 
practice of media freedom, such as favouring greater 
informational openness, better representation of public opinion, 
increased media oversight over the policy-making and seeking 
greater editorial autonomy, has been growing. Thus, on the one 
hand, the more the media reform is pushed forward, the more the 
whole media institution diverges from the original Stalinist 
state-control model, and the more it requires sweeping democratic 
change; on the other hand, despite considerable progress achieved 
throughout the 1980s, the core of the Party media system remains 
largely unchallenged. Indeed, any further progress that may lead 
to a fundamental institutional change will face well-entrenched 
opposition and strong resistance. Frustration and conflict are 
inevitable, particularly after the 1989 Beijing tragedy. It is 
an inherent phenomenon that will largely dictate the future 
course of media reform. 
7.3 THE POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF MEDIA REFORM 
In this section, I want to discuss the political consciousness 
of media reform during the last decade. In doing so, I intend to 
choose the heated debate on the Media Law (which may also be 
translated as the Press Law) as the focal point to examine how 
political consciousness over media reform has developed. The 
issue became a touchstone in the development of the post-Mao 
Chinese media legislation as well as democratization which 
involved the process of media institutional reform. Meanwhile, 
if we assume, through the analysis of the media law debate, that 
the political consciousness of the Chinese media circles was in 
some way to show a wide-degree of support for press freedom and 
the institutional reform on the one hand, and the dissatisfaction 
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with the status quo on the other, then it is necessary to measure 
the scope and scale of this existing consciousness and find some 
tangible materials to confirm or disconfirm it; if so, how far? 
It is worth examining four important opinion polls about media 
reform conducted in 1988 and 1989 in China, in which I was also 
partly involved. 
7.3.1 The Debate on Media Legislation 
The issue of media legislation in the context of Deng's era is 
mainly concerned with the rights of the media corps and certain 
regulatory matters dealing with how the mass media should 
function and how media freedom can be fulfilled (the communist 
authorities dare not deny freedom of the press, in theory). In 
many ways, it can be seen as a momentous effort to shift the 
existing media institution from the rule of man (i. e the Party, 
in this context) to the rule of law. After a ten-year "dark age" 
of poor performance with the media being virtually a slave girl 
of Maoism during the cultural revolution, a whole generation 
started to realize that it was time to make efforts towards media 
institutional reform. 
Among the prominent advocates of media reform is Hu Jiwei, an 
influential media figure who used to be the editor-in-chief of 
the Party's organ, People's-Daily, and was forced to resign in 
1983 as a victim of the Campaign against "bourgeois liberalism". 
He also held the post of the president of the Chinese 
journalist's national trade union organization and vice-chair of 
the Education, Science, Culture and Public Health sub-Committee 
of the National People Congress up till the mid-1989 when he was 
purged by the hardliners for his "bourgeois journalism ideas" and 
for "provoking the Beijing counter-revolutionary riot". 
As early as the late 1970s, he had articulated a controversial 
argument which initiated the debate over media legislation. Being 
a chief editor of the People's Daily, he carefully pointed out 
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that the public interest should be superior to the Party's and, 
according to historical experience, that the Party was more 
liable to error than the people. Therefore, he argued that the 
mass media should be loyal to the people's interest and to 
guarantee this obligation. For that purpopose, a media law was 
needed. It must be noted that Huls argument was nothing but 
common sense to the non-communist world, but it did offend the 
orthodox communist media theory at the time, and made the Party 
conservatives feel deeply uneasy. Meanwhile it was understood 
that the argument could cause controversy mainly because it 
devalued the Party's supremacy by articulating the dissident 
view which was somewhat on the margin of the official line (e. g 
loyality to the people) . In other words, Hu actually employed the 
officially accepted tone to challenge the Party media status quo. 
Thus both pro and con sides could find legitimate bases of their 
own on which to stand. During the debate, a recurring theme among 
those arguing for a relaxation of Party control was the need to 
replace Party supervision of the media with public opinion 
(K-Starck & X. Yu, 1988). As Sun Xupei, a senior media researcher 
in China's Social Science Academy pointed out, the existing 
Chinese media institutions tend to breed uniformity; as a result, 
all the media say similar things with a similar tone, creating 
virtually a single voice in society. Therefore, it was necessary 
to reform such a media institution replacing it with a multi- 
tier, multi-type, pluralistic media system. For that purpose, Sun 
believed that enacting a media law based on the freedom of the 
press was a crucial step in that direction (X. Sun, 1989). 
In the same vein, another influential figure Zhong Peizhang, 
former director of the Media Bureau of the Party's Propaganda 
Department, lists three glaring defects of the Chinese media 
system: 1) the uniform nature of the media performance which is 
divorced from the needs of an audience from all walks of life; 
2) sheer propaganda which results in ignoring the basic function 
of the mass media -- to inform people; and 3) state budget or 
subscription at public expense. Thus he argues that the goal of 
media reform and media legislation is to "achieve press freedom. 
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Otherwise, it would be no use for us to talk about more open and 
democratic mass media" (P. Zhong, 1988). 
Xie Wenqing, who used to be the vice minister of Chinese 
Broadcasting in the early 1980s and is now vice president of the 
Chinese Broadcasting Association, sharply criticised the lack of 
media freedom in China saying: 11 1 was told that our media were 
even unable to report the truth of the summer's highest 
temperature, therefore, how can (we expect) people believe us? 
As a result, readers and audience turn to the foreign media, (try 
to) listen to the Voice of America, and read Hong Kong 
newspapers" (W. Xie, 1988). Li Senhua, deputy director of the 
Shanghai Radio Station, urged to pass the media legislation to 
improve the situation (S. Li, 1987). 
The ideological conservatives, on the other hand, viewed the 
issue of media legislation as an important opportunity to 
legalize its current administrative intervention in media work. 
As such, they wanted control and order to be emphasized in the 
media law, and the Party's interest not to be undermined. For 
that reason, Du Dao-Zheng, general director of the State Media 
and Publication office, reminded people that the media law should 
give a proper restriction to the practice of media freedom; 
otherwise, he warned, such freedom would damage the national 
interest and the just rights of other people (D. Du, 1988). 
In responding to Duls view, Hu argues that "the aim of media 
legislation is to protect freedom of the press. Should there be 
restrictions? There should. But such restrictions should not be 
put first. ... The aim of restrictions is not to interfere with 
freedom of the press, but to allow the improved exercise of press 
freedom. Protection and restrictions cannot vary with people. 
Action should not be based on an of f icial Is will -... Everything 
should be done according to law. There should be a transition 
from rule by men to rule by law" (J. Hu, 1989). 
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In practice, however, the prolonged debate about the media law 
did not materialize until 1985 when Hu Jiwei was put in charge 
of drafting the law and became the sponsor of the Research Office 
for Media Law. However, as the result of a conservative backlash, 
establishing the State Media and Publication Office (SMPO) in 
1987, the responsibility for drafting the media law had been 
partly transferred from Hu Jiwei and his research group to Duls 
smPO between 1987 and the mid-1989. Nevertheless, the process 
of drafting the media law during that period was generally 
directed towards the media reform led by Hu Jiwen. Li Zuxin, a 
member of the media law drafting committee, outlined the five 
main points of the proposed drafting media in 1986: 1) no 
administrative interference; 2) freedom of publication to ensure 
the ability of citizens to do whatever is within the boundary of 
the law; 3) supervision by public opinion to allow full 
participation of the public in political affairs; 4) openness; 
and 5) abolition of censorship prior to publication and 
enforcement of penalties for libel, slander, bribery, leaking 
state secrets and treason (Z. Li, 1986: 11-12). 
By early 1989, it was reported that the draft of the media law 
had been almost completed and was about to be submitted to the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress -- China's 
legislative institution -- for examination and approval in June 
1989. Because of the failure of the Beijing pro-democracy 
movement and the subsequent victory of hardliner communists in 
the power struggle, the agenda was entirely changed. Instead of 
passing the media legislation, the Congress deputies hurried to 
implement the Party's emergency order to approve a Public 
Demonstration Law which means any kind of oppositional 
demonstration was virtually banned. Moreover, only four months 
later in October 1989, the law forbidding demonstrations took 
effect, whilst the draft media law, with the purging of Hu Jiwen, 
was made a target for hardliner attack on the grounds that the 
proposed law was influenced too much by Huls idea of bourgeois 
press freedom and would undermine the Party's leadership over the 
mass media. Thus the on-going process of media legislation since 
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1989 has been set back, and, not surprisingly, the pace of 
institutional change in aspects of legality can only proceed at 
a glacial rate, at least for the time being. 
7.3.2 Opinion Polls Regarding the Media Reform Programme 
Now I want to extend my analysis to opinion polls over the issue 
of Chinese media reform. These polls, one way or another, 
reflected: 1) the underlying problems and crises within existing 
media institutions; 2) the increasing repudiation of the 
Stalinist media model; and 3) the desire for future change. In 
this study, I rely mainly to the data of four influential surveys 
conducted in recent years by two media and opinion study groups. 
one is the Public Opinion Research Institute (PORI) of the 
Chinese People's University, a prestige Gallup Poll in China, and 
the other is the polls carried out by the Journalism Institute 
of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) . This is not only 
because they are important, but also because they are the only 
kind of surveys conducted so far in China. The four are: 
(1) A Survey on Celebrities Perspectives on the 1988 Reform 
(Media Section), February 1988 by PORI; 
(2) A Survey on Celebrities' Perspectives on the 1989 Reform 
(Media Section), February 1989 by PORI; 
(3) The National Media Survey on Media Reform, March-April 1988 
by PORI; 
(4) Attitude and Opinion on Media Reform (National Congress 
Deputies sectionj, December 1988 by the Journalism Institute Of 
the CASS. 
"Celebrities" here refer to a certain section of the Chinese 
political elite, most Of whom are academically accomplished, 
advanced in age and hold high official positions (many are at 
ministerial level or above); the number of selected, valid and 
completed anonymous questionnaires were 200 (1988) and 172 
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(1989). The national media here refer to Chinese mass media 
circles, those leading persons directly involved in television, 
radio and newspaper in all national, regional and local city & 
county levels plus media researchers and policy makers; the 
number of valid and completed anonymous questionnaires was 1,884. 
The deputies of the National People's Congress are to some degree 
equivalent to MPS in the UK (but they are not elected) and come 
from all walks of life; the number of valid and completed 
anonymous questionnaires was 1,542 (the total number of deputies 
is nearly 3,000). The references of the four surveys original 
reports are collected in the book entitled: A Collection of the 
Chinese Media Surveys (published in Chinese, Shenyang Press, 
1989). The figures I quote below, unless otherwise indicated, are 
all from the above-mentioned surveys. 
7.3.2.1 General Assessment of the Status Quo of Chinese Media 
To some extent, the findings of the four surveys often provided 
surprising insight into people's thinking. In the national media 
survey, more than 87% of Chinese media VIPs clearly expressed 
their dissatisfaction or strong negative attitudes towards the 
existing media institution as a whole; 78.7% admitted that the 
mass media were increasingly losing credibility among audiences 
and readers in terms of providing information, propagating the 
Party's policies and convincing people to identify with Communist 
ideology; 78.7% thought that the situation had already made a bad 
or very bad impact; and 76.3% acknowledged that Chinese people 
were in no way satisfied with media performance. Asked about the 
pace of media institutional reform, the 94% said that it was too 
slow and too little; some radicals even said that there had been 
no real progress at all (as far as the system itself is 
concerned) - Interestingly, similar assessments can be seen in the 
two successive celebrities surveys. 62-0o of those celebrities 
questioned in the 1988 survey severely criticized the status quo 
of the Chinese mass media and expressed their desire to reform 
the existing model. One year later that figure had increased to 
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75%. That is to say, instead of defending the mass media 
performance under the current communist authority, many key 
members of the nomenklatura did not conform to the Party's 
position. In the poll of Congress deputies, the assessment of the 
media performance seemed to be better than the above three; 
however, 62% of deputies questioned still criticised the media's 
role of reflecting public opinion and other duties of social 
communication. The evidence employed here has two major 
implications: firstly, it suggests that a large part of the 
social elite are well aware of the media legitimacy crisis and 
no longer identify themselves with the existing media 
institution; secondly, it reflects the current consensus on media 
reform with an emphasis on urgent substantial democratic changes. 
Therefore, the demand for fundamental institutional reform is 
gaining momentum. 
7.3.2.2 Major Criticisms and Problems 
According to the four surveys, criticisms concentrated on two 
areas: media performance and the media's role in society. In the 
National Media Survey, 78.8% said that there were too many 
restrictions on critical programmes/reporting (i. e the 
authorities' acceptable version of the media "Fourth Estatell 
practice) ; 67.6% acknowledged that there was little truth in the 
coverage of certain sensitive topics. A senior media professional 
in the survey pointed out that the current problems of Chinese 
media performance include "Poor information, low credibility, 
one-sided opinions and evasion of public concerns". These 
descriptions generally reflected the majority view in the 
surveys. In the Celebrities survey, the feelings of 
dissatisfaction were even stronger: 91.5% criticized the media 
for rarely providing a chance for people to express their views 
and providing little popular access to the debate over important 
issues; 87% said the media were not open enough in their 
reporting of political affairs and the process of policy-making. 
As the demand for the media to play a supervisory role was 
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growing, 75% in the survey thought the media did not actively 
criticize or supervise the Party and government work, and 60.5% 
wished to abolish censorship. 
It should be noted here that the language used in the 
questionnaires for these surveys was neutral and, therefore, 
acceptable to the authorities in order to avoid unnecessary 
troubles. Even so, however, the surveys' findings still exposed 
a blatant contradiction between the declared "people's media" on 
the one hand, and the actual media as the Party's servant-girl 
on the other. In a word, ordinary Chinese have virtually been 
denied the right of access to the media in the name of upholding 
the people's democratic dictatorship. As a matter of fact, more 
and more people both inside and outside media circles have begun 
to realize the point and these surveys, one way or another, 
confirmed this recognition. As one senior figure in these surveys 
remarked, the key to media reform is to introduce democratic 
mechanisms to reconstruct the whole system. 
7.3.2.3 On Issues of Media Legislation 
The surveys revealed widespread support for enactment of the 
media law in order to protect f reedom of the press. But as to how 
to understand and materialize this, those questioned seemed to 
fail to reach consensus. The key issue was the attitude towards 
non-public ownership media (presumably, the ownership is a kind 
of "public" control through the state in communist society). If 
freedom of the press also means the right of people to set up and 
run non-official media in China, then a kind of ambivalence was 
quite evident in these surveys. On the one hand, most people in 
the surveys were perfectly aware that the purpose of media 
legislation was to protect freedom of the press; on the other 
hand, a considerable number of people feared that the situation 
would get out of control, if non-government media including 
private ones were allowed. The following table shows the attitude 
of Congress deputies which, by and large, also represented the 
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other three groups. 
Table 7.6 




The purpose of media legislation is to protect media freedom 




Citizen's freedom of the press means that citizens can run 
their own press 
Agree Disagree No Answer 
35.3% 60.1% 4.7% 
7.3.2.4 Directions and Priorities of Reform 
How can the institutional reform of the Chinese media succeed 
within the context of a national modernization movement? The 
majority of the elites (ranging from 80% to 95% depending on 
different priorities they chose) in the surveys believed that the 
first crucial step to be taken involves separating the Party's 
power from media management with some form of constitutional 
guarantee. In other words, each TV/radio station, as well as 
newspaper, should become autonomous with adequate decision-making 
power; unless absolutely necessary, any outside interference 
should be kept to a minimum. The media should be subject to the 
law based on a regulatory framework. In the survey of Congress 
deputies, 77% viewed media institutional reform as the priority 
agenda; and for that purpose, the majority of deputies questioned 
agreed that media reform should follow the principles of openness 
( 93.5% ), rule of law (93.2%) and autonomy (58.4%). 
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Within that framework of reform intentions, they also addressed 
short term priorities and long term targets. The short term 
(within five years) tasks include: giving the media greater 
freedom; drafting a media law to implement the transition from 
the current rule of man to rule of law; bringing into full play 
the media's supervisory role and expanding its coverage of all 
public concerns. The long term (five to ten year) tasks are: 
establishing a pluralistic structure which should allow open 
access to the public and allow non-official media existence and 
development; financial independence and full introduction of 
market mechanisms. 
It is clear that these polls suggest that political consciousness 
over Chinese media reform was firmly established during the 1980s 
and the consensus was heading for overall institutional change. 
The main intention was to diminish and eventually dismiss Party 
dominance in the mass media and replace it with a democratic and 




Before concluding this thesis, it is worth considering the 
possible future construction of the Chinese broadcasting model 
and the directions it might take in this seminal period of the 
late twentieth century. Of course there are enough uncertain 
variables surrounding the issue to forbid confident speculation. 
In general, however, several contingencies will shape the course 
of the Chinese broadcasting system. Among them, three broad 
determining factors economic marketization, cultural 
pluralization and social transformation -- may lead the new 
Chinese broadcasting system towards three possible orientations: 
public service broadcasting (PSB), or commercial, or two-tier 
broadcasting (the last with PSB state regulation on the central 
level and commercial broadcasting locally). 
In Britain and much of the Western European countries where 
public service broadcasting (PSB) was prevalent, the PSB model 
was traditionally regarded as a major forum for national cultural 
development. The (adopted) regulation approach and its relevant 
policies were justified on the grounds of public interest along 
with technical constraints of spectrum allocation. In an 
historical development within contexts of the Western European 
democracy, the praxis of PSB has experienced many changes with 
varying versions and features. However, the PSB model essentially 
possesses four factors: 1) primacy of cultural and political 
consideration over the pursuit of economic (i. e profit) interest; 
2) universal access to the service with a range of quality 
program; 3) public regulation of ownership and funding sources; 
and 4) a form of management which places a barrier between 
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political power and the economic control of broadcasting medium 
(known in Britain as the "arms, length" principle). 
This type of public service broadcasting model is favoured by 
some policy makers at ministry-level in China. Wang Feng, the 
section head of Broadcasting Policy & Regulation Department, 
Ministry of Broadcasting told the author in an interview that in 
his opinion, while already unwelcome signs of commercialization 
are evident, the existing Chinese broadcasting system bears 
similarities to PSB and this is the direction which policy and 
regulation should take. He said: 
China should and can develope a broadcasting system based 
on the PSB model. I say it should be, because the ethos 
of PSB and its approach are fit for China and will much 
benefit to the general public in terms of spiritual 
enlightenment and national development. I say it can be, 
because the existing Chinese broadcasting system has 
some similarities in aspects of its understanding of the 
objectives of the broadcasting media, ownership, 
organizational solutions, some program performance etc. 
of course, our social system is very different from 
Britain's and that of other Western countries. That 
difference makes the emulation of the PSB model 
problematic, but I still believe that such transformation 
is feasible in the long term. Nowadays, many 
broadcasters particularly in local stations only consider 
how to make more money for themselves rather than to 
provide a good service to audience. of course they are 
not entirely to blame: they have practical problems. But I 
we can set a clear goal to pursue a PSB approach with 
consistent and appropriate policy and regulation, the 
current uncertainty will be removed and the danger of 
commercialization in broadcasting which now seems to 
prevail, can diminish (24.10.1990). 
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Zhao Suifu, deputy director of the same department shares these 
views: 
I've been abroad several times, including to Britain, on 
tours seeing foreign broadcasting systems. I found 
there is a lot to learn from the British system. The 
advertising on television and radio is well regulated; 
the programming in general is serious and of a high 
quality, not like some countries' which show sex and 
violence to seduce the audience; the relationship among 
the government, broadcasters, general public is also 
properly balanced. ... Since the 1980s, our broadcasting 
system has evolved enormously. So where shall we go? The 
question of future development becomes more and more 
important. Of course, there is no point in copying 
another country's system or a particular model. We have 
already had the painful experience of copying'the 
Soviet's. But I would like to stress that we should not 
let broadcasting media become a ready source of money. I 
think a sense of social responsibility is crucial in 
constructing the system. Thus the British model has a lot 
more to offer than others (interview with the author, 
24.10.1990). 
From an historical point of the view, a form of the PSB model 
with some authoritarian aspects is likely to be appreciated by 
the Chinese public. As Stavis notices, the Confucian tradition 
always demands a good government rather than a limited government 
or a government which can be controlled by the people through 
constitutional means. Adam Smith's idea of the "invisible hand" 
to create an optimal society would not go down well with the 
Chinese (B. Stavis, 1988: 138). However, the possibility that China 
will construct a PSB-oriented model nowadays is fraught with 
problems and is challenged by many others. For instance, Zhou 
Fanyang, the man who first put advertising on Chinese television 
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in 1979, disagreed outright with the views expressed above. He 
told the author: 
Personally, while I appreciate the PSB model, I 
believe it would be problematic to implement it now. To be 
frank, under the current condition of Chinese society, I 
am very sceptical at that a model based on the idea of 
public interest can be established. After many years of 
abuse by propaganda of sacrifice and selflessness, people 
simply do not believe there still exists something called 
the public interest. I think this is the biggest obstacle 
to the development of a PSB model today (13.10.1990). 
Another critic of the PSB model, media researcher Fa Dongsheng, 
questions from another viewpoint the viability of its use in 
China: 
I know the BBC model or PSB has won a shower of praise in 
the past as a model opposing the commercialised American 
one. This view is still very popular among the cultural 
elite in many other countries. However, as far as I have 
known, PSB in western European countries have been in deep 
crisis. To put it bluntly, it is dying. The new 
communication technology revolution and the world-wide 
changed political, economic and cultural circumstances 
have made this model unfashionable. In Britain, for 
instance, The Peacock Report and the government 
White Paper on broadcasting all suggest that a profound 
change toward a market-oriented and post-PSB model is 
inevitable. It would be blind not to acknowledge these 
trends. So I don't think that some of our policy-makers 
can revive this model in China although I do not deny its 
virtues (22.10.1990). 
In their view, therefore, a commercial model is the future 
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solution. 
Since 1983 the basis for a two-tier broadcasting system has been 
already structured in the organization and operation of Chinese 
broadcasting and it is in this direction, in the author's view, 
that the most likely future scenario lies. At present, the basic 
formations are there, and could be refined: a balance between 
market mechanism and state regulation, cultural diversity and an 
interest in national development. Therefore, the result of a two- 
tier television system emerging in post-Mao China tends to evolve 
into a powerful network of confederative institutions that more 
likely further sap the strength of the party's hegemony. 
To sum up, a mixed solution comprising a two-tier system stemming 
from the 1983 decentralization, can more dynamically serve the 
public interest and incline post-Mao China's economic and social 
changes. In the long term this situation will most likely move 
towards political pluralism and media democratization. However, 
it will remain to be seen whether such a new formulation of the 
Chinese television system can in fact develop and eventually 




Napoleon is supposed to have advised that China be allowed to 
sleep, for "when China wakes, it will shake the world". He could 
not have anticipated that two hundred years later China's 
population would constitute one fifth of the planet's. A late 
20th century conundrum of the capitalist world concerns the 
effect of China finally entering and competing in the world 
market (The Economist, November 28th 1992). 
Since before this force is unleashed upon the West, the party- 
state has to be transformed, a prior question concerns the 
process by which the probable opening of China's market will 
occur. By what means, in what way, and with what concomitant 
effects, will a Stalinist society, dominated by ideology and 
rigidly controlled through force, coercion, and organization, 
transform itself into a post-communist society and, furthermore, 
a democratic one? This thesis, using the material of media 
institutions and television in particular, has attempted to 
provided a tentative outline of the contemporary changing picture 
of China awakening to the international community. 
The Hungarian Political economist Janos Kornai has remarked on 
the inability of classic Soviet communist system to renew itself 
internally and so remain viable in the long run. He accounts for 
this in terms of the system's combination of repression, 
inefficiency and - notably - coherence. When it starts reforming 
itself, its coherence slackens and its internal contradictions 
strengthen (Kornai, 1992: xxv). 
The Gorbachev-style reform programme led to the drastic 
disintegration of the Soviet Bloc and the painful task of 
effecting an economic transition from a state command economy to 
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a market economy. At present, it seems possible that, in the 
short-to-medium term, the sudden demise of communism in the 
former Soviet Union may not guarantee its replacement with 
pluralism and democracy. 
The transformations in communist China suggest, in contrast, that 
rapid self-destruction is not inevitable. In post-Mao China the 
changes have taken a different course and promise a different 
outcome. This thesis has sought to track the particularity of the 
Chinese process of sweeping change by examining the structure, 
performance, production, organization and institutions in the 
media, especially television. The domain of the media lends 
itself to fruitful exploration because it provides both an 
example of differences between the Soviet and Chinese styles of 
state transformation, while being itself, in China at least, a 
major factor contributing to that transformation. 
However, any further understanding of the future China's 
development needs to answer a crucial question: where is China 
headed next? Will the current change necessarily find China 
becoming a society of economic prosperity, of cultural pluralism 
and of a political democracy? In the short-to-medium term, 
however, it is difficult to give clearly defined answers which 
provide support for such an optimistic outlook. 
The (post-) communist experience of transition has been described 
by scholars in terms of several models, each of which can be used 
to throw some light on the present and possible future prospects 
for change in China (e. g R. Blackburn, 1991; A. Callinicos, 1991; 
R. Dahrendorf, 1990; J. Kornai, 1992; S. Huntington, 1991; 
T. Whipple, 1991). 
The Romanian model of 1989 -a radical armed revolution - 
overthrew a communist regime under the Ceaucescu government. The 
main feature of the Romanian change is that the society suddenly 
leapt, in an extraordinary circumstance, from one extreme - of 
classic totalitarianism - to post-communist uncertainty. However, 
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few would predict a similar process occurring in China, even 
given the immediate aftermath of Tiananmen Square with the deep 
frustration and feelings of failure amongst members of the pro- 
democracy movement. The nature of the regime of Ceaucesculs 
Romania as against Deng's China suggests little possibility of 
parallel outcomes. In the first place, the tension between the 
party-state and the people in Romanian led to all-out war, but 
in Deng's China tension has been on a much-reduced scale with 
state power progressively weakening owing to the far-reaching 
social transformation since the late 1970s. The unpopularity of 
these two regimes is also not comparable: Deng's regime is hardly 
as unpopular as was Ceaucesculs, partly because the living 
standard of Chinese people has gradually improved, thanks to the 
economic reforms. 
In the second place, the Romanian model involved a civil war. 
This solution seems highly unlikely in the case of post-Mao 
China: the horrors of the period of the war-lords (1920s - 1930s) 
and of the civil war (1946 - 1949) are still fresh in the 
memories of the Chinese people. They would not easily resort to 
these solutions to the current socio-political circumstances. In 
addition, at a more fundamental level, the change of the nature 
of the post-Mao Chinese society, particularly bearing in mind the 
economic sector's deepening integration into the world market, 
suggests that the present situation is not at all conducive to 
producing conditions for a large-scale civil war. 
The Soviet model, which has been called a kind of the "implosive" 
model, is also unlikely to be repeated in post-Mao China for 
reasons which were examined in chapter two of the thesis. In 
effect, a combination of political tension, economic 
deterioration, arms race exhaustion, and multi-national and 
ethnic conflict in Soviet Union, imploded simultaneously to bring 
down the Soviet empire virtually overnight. In China, by 
contrast, not only do none of these conditions prevail to the 
point of total crisis, but the collapse of the Soviet empire and 
the consequences of that collapse seems to have had a severe 
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impact on the outlook of the Chinese society both at the levels 
of government and ordinary people. 
The negative effects of the result of Soviet sudden 
disintegration can be condensed into three aspects. The first 
was the emergence of military nationalism, and in some regions 
it ran rampant into destructive semi-civil war and endless local 
fighting. The second was the uneven disappearance of the old 
state administrative structure before an effective democratic 
alternative had time to replace it. Thus, it had little hope of 
securing, relative speaking, an orderly and smooth transition. 
The third was a hurried great push towards an immediate free 
market of price and privatization -a kind of shock therapy 
causing a sharp economic fall and hyper-inflation. This 
drastically lowered the general standard of living there. Thus, 
even setting aside differences of China's history and culture, 
or its large and homogeneous population, or the level of economic 
development, the government and people of China are unlikely to 
ignore the lessons learnt by proxy from Russia. 
A third possibility for China is the relatively attractive 
evolution model of Hungary (the resource of mass discontent and 
the legacy of the 1956 popular uprising being transferred to a 
cautious reform programme initiated by the local communist 
authority), Czechoslovakia (the velvet revolution), and Poland 
(the solidarity campaign and the round table achievement) . While 
different in a number of key respects, these three countries have 
it in common that they all managed to build up a tangible civil 
base outside the space of the party-state control and created the 
dynamics for further system transformation either by semi-market 
economic experiment (e. g Hungary) , or by a strong trade union 
movement supported by the Catholic Church (Poland), or by 
culmination of decades of efforts of intellectuals championing 
civil rights (Czechoslovakia) . It was through these developments 
that the communist state powers were gradually eroded in the 
context of the later era of the Cold War. While it is possible 
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to argue that Hungary's transitional pattern appears to have many 
similarities to post-Mao China, the differences are more 
striking. From the geo-political point of view, communist China 
has always been independent of the domination of another world- 
power, whereas (pre-1989) Hungary was always under the thumb of 
the Soviet empire. Without the processes that ended with 
Gorbachev's liberalization policy towards Eastern Europe, there 
would have been no chance of Hungary becoming an independent 
post-communist state. This was the case even though its economic 
reform was progressively stronger and more open, Hungary had to 
remain as a satellite of the Soviet empire. Also, the two 
countries were too unlike each other to institute the reform 
programme. The Hungarian economic reform was, in a sense, the 
result of the failure of the massive rebellion of 1956. The 
Chinese reform, on the other hand, was the result of the failure 
of the cultural revolution and indeed the whole radical version 
of Maoist communism (cf. 2.2). Apart from different cultural, 
historical and geographic concerns, these distinguishing 
characteristics had major discrepant effects on the two 
countries' transitional courses. 
Fourthly, there is the Post-Mao Chinese transitional model which 
this thesis examines in detail through the case-study of 
television development. In this model, Deng adopted an open-door 
policy and the market discipline which planted the seeds of 
party-state destruction, albeit unintended. Thus communist power 
steadily, but substantially retreats from society as a 
consequence of this radical socio-economic reform movement. 
social pressure for further fundamental changes gains momentum. 
However, since this transition is still in the process of being 
shaped, questions surrounding China's future remain. 
one may isolate three future scenarios as a base for prospective 
analysis: (1) a return to Maoism; (2) the prescriptive view of 
neo-authoritarian rule; and (3) the long-term evolutionary 
democratization. The first one -a return to Maoism - is very 
unlikely: as was analysed in chapters one and two, the conditions 
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for restoring Maoist communism no longer exist. Therefore, it is 
worth concentrating on the remaining two possib le scenarios, 
which are at the heart of current scholarly debate on China. 
Through its post-Mao economic reform drive, the Chinese communist 
party wants to hold on to political power and communication 
channels, while encouraging people to pursue economic interests 
and cultural diversity. Deng's intention is clear: to create, 
ultimately, a neo-authoritarian model or corporatism solution 
which South-East Asia's "Four Little Dragons - Taiwan, South 
Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong - have experienced. According to 
this prescriptive version, China is already in the midst of the 
neo-authoritarian scenario and it will continue well into the 
next century (e. g H-Harding, 1987; D. Goodman, 1991; B. Sautman, 
1992; V. Shue, 1992). To some extent, the pro-neoauthoritarian 
argument regards democracy as a kind of by-product of economic 
development. From that prescriptive point of view, the urgent 
task for China is not democracy but modernization. In order to 
pursue such a course there must be some political authoritarian 
arrangement and a strong-man government to maintain the social 
order, so the argument goes. This would supposedly lead to 
developmental takeoff of the national economy and the competitive 
performance in the world market. Obviously, this is the' scenario 
apparently successful in the Little Dragons in the 70s and 80s 
which Deng is most vigorously pursuing. In a sense, Deng's thesis 
seems to combine his nationalist ambitions with pragmatic means 
by which he hopes that China can secure a powerful position in 
the world, and that the communist party can secure its political 
continuity in China. In sum, the pro-neoauthoritarian argument 
suggests that democratization is not a better solution for 
Chinese society, but instead, that economic prosperity with neo- 
authoritarian rule is the most "promising" direction for China 
to follow. 
However, as post-Mao experience illuminated, there are serious 
difficulties in justifying and undertaking this neo-authoritarian 
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approach under the existing party-state institutions. These 
difficulties, which are increasingly intensified, include the 
conflicts and contradictions between communist rhetoric and de- 
communist reality, between old fashion formations and newly 
growing social forces, between arbitrary rule and rule of law, 
between an open economy and closed politics. The political- 
economic relationship, as pointed out by B. Stavis, is somewhat 
like a giant machine: "If one gear is changed with a new, 
improved design, then complementary changes must be made in the 
gears that mesh. Otherwise, the new, improved gear simply breaks 
the other parts, rendering the entire machine inoperative', 
(Stavis, 1988: 18). In effect, it is an old theme which applies 
to the contemporary human experiment in China, whether "man can 
live by bread alone". From a democratic perspective, we already 
have some answers from the failure of Soviet communism and the 
tide of global democratization in the last decade. 
Meanwhile, several flaws in this neoauthoritarian projected 
scenario must be mentioned. One lies in its inappropriate 
comparison with Little Dragons model (which, strictly speaking, 
excludes Hong Kong which still remains under British sovereignty 
until 1997). As we know, the Little Dragons were all constructed 
on the ground of market economy and non-communist paternalistic- 
style government. Under such social and political conditions, 
economic and personal autonomy were encouraged, political freedom 
and participation were restricted, but not entirely illegitimated 
and extirpated -- rather, it was merely delayed. In other words, 
the so-called neo-authoritarian social structure is convertible 
to liberal democracy at some future stage when the authorities, 
perspective sees fit (X. Ding, 1990). The basic argument for this 
approach is that a stable order requiring strong leadership is 
a prerequisite for rapid economic growth and improved living 
standards. In contrast, mainland China's one party-state 
legitimacy is entirely based on the communist ideology. Its 
political institutions and social structure are still ruled by 
such an ideology, although increasingly undermined by the reform 
movement. Unless this ideological ly-oriented political system is 
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broken down, the fundamental differences between an authoritarian 
state and a communist state remain distinct. Therefore, the 
institutional crisis and political tension will more frequently 
occur in the 90s' China if the current trend of social change 
continues. 
Another f law in the pro-neoauthoritarian argument is that it 
fails to understand that the success of the Little Dragons 
depended on special conditions in terms of size of country, 
population and the international environment. To a certain 
degree, strongman politics may be a recipe for rapid economic 
development in small and homogeneous countries, but mainland 
China is neither. The Little Dragons, economic take-off also 
occurred on the back of an inherited colonial political 
quiescence accompanied by well-formed infrastructurest, as well 
as, during the later phases of the Cold War, a huge gap in the 
world market which America, for the sake of the Cold War 
strategy, assisted the Little Dragons in filling (E. Perry, 93: 20- 
21). 
A third f law is that this scenario does not take into account the 
Chinese people's growing demand for pluralization and 
democratization, including cultural and political freedom, as was 
overwhelmingly expressed in the 1989 pro-democracy movement. In 
fact, social development throughout the post-Mao period has been 
characterised by an underlying tendency on the part of the 
Chinese majority to demand for their democratic rights and change 
the structure of the party-state politics. This trend has further 
increased with the widening of the communication access of the 
mass media, especially the television medium and, most recently, 
the growing satellite TV, fax machines, and VCRs with massive 
information flows in and from the outside world, all of which the 
authorities find extremely difficult to control. As a result, 
Chinese people have increasingly been aware of their rights and 
interests and prepared to fight for them. 
In the debate regarding the pros and cons of the neo- 
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authoritarian model, this author f inds that the scenario may 
prove economically successful, but only for a certain stage and 
may last only for a brief period. In effect, the model itself is 
a temporary phenomenon. Taiwan and South Korea, for instance, 
have almost fully implemented a democratic constitution and the 
other members of Little Dragons follow close behind. Therefore, 
we may need to consider an alternative scenario: the long-term 
evolutionary democratization model. 
The reason for advocating this possible scenario, very briefly, 
is that the steady weakening of party-state power and the gradual 
expansion of individual freedom and economic autonomy have 
created space for the new pluralistic social formations to grow. 
Within that set of frameworks the different forces develop their 
own bases, being insensitive to their own interests, and thereby 
give rise to an expectation and a momentum for political reform 
and further social democratization. Thus, in conjunction with the 
institutionalization and rationalization movements which have 
been driven by the post-Mao modernization programme, an 
evolutionary political change, slowly but cumulatively and 
irreversibly, will most likely lay the foundations for Chinese 
democracy. This process instituted from post-Mao socio-economic 
reforms and demonstrated so explicitly in the 1989 Tiananmen 
events, can be understood only in terms of the profound but still 
incomplete process of changes in the politics of the party- 
state's retreat and social pluralization. The growing strength 
of such a change, in my view, lies in the society and awakening 
consciousness of democracy of the Chinese people rather than in 
the party, or by virtue of the particular individual leader. 
However, recent experiences in other (post-) communist country's 
transition suggest that the transformation and democratization 
of the party-state have been a momentous challenge as well as 
generating problems that should never be underestimated. 
Therefore, the argument of a long-term evolution toward Chinese 
democracy must not assume that the current development could 
bring a full democratic political institution in the short-to- 
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medium term. If "Rome was not built in a day", nor will Chinese 
democracy. But it is important to point out that such an effort 
towards building up a democratic society in the last decade has 
gradually been strengthened and crystalised in China. Thus, it 
gives one reason to raise ones hope for this perspective. 
It remains to discuss how these possible scenarios link with the 
future development of Chinese television. If the neo- 
authoritarian scenario prevails it will have a major effect on 
the current reconstruction of the Chinese media system in general 
and the television system in particular. The media might move 
towards corporatism in which the state licenses the media 
organization and grants a degree of autonomy in exchange for the 
media observing certain controls. So the party would remain, 
ultimately, hegemonic, especially in the political and 
ideological sector; while at the same time it would relax a 
measure of control in the areas of media administration, 
management, financial resources, and to some extent (programming) 
editorial policies. Applied to television, this might entail 
central and local stations working together to preserve the 
party-state's basic interests rendering obedience to the party's 
will, and in return, they could concentrate on pursuing market 
interests and would become more and more commercialised. 
From one point of the view, it seems that in such a scenario the 
new television system would develop into one that would be 
consumer -or i ented rather than citizen-oriented. In that case, the 
choice and freedom of the media organization and the audience 
would be constrained by such consumerism which regards individual 
rights as identical with consumer rights (also see 1.2.4 for the 
critical analysis). While this process would support economic 
modernization, it would not necessarily lead to constructing a 
media system based on democratic principles and citizen's rights. 
While acknowledging the threats to democracy posed by 
consumerism, this thesis argues that it would still not eliminate 
the process of the current media institutional contradictions 
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engendered by Deng's reform programme. The four major 
contradictions, examined in detail in the appropriate chapters, 
may be summarised as follows: the party-state versus the market; 
secondly, the old structure versus the new formations; thirdly, 
central power versus local autonomy; and, lastly, party political 
hegemony versus the democratic challenge and cultural pluralism. 
The clash of these four contradictions will whittle away the 
existent framework of the party-state, weakening the pro- 
neoauthoritarian order - if such an order survives for a 
sufficient length of time. Thus this weakening process will 




In summary, social reform in the communist state entails a 
simultaneous, dialectical process reviving socio-economic 
dynamism on the one hand, and abandoning party-state praxes on 
the other. As a result, the Party-controlled media system is 
bound to proceed to organic transformation. However, by using the 
medium of television as a key example, this thesis has shown 
that, under the conditions of Deng Xiaoping's particular and 
contradictory reform programme, and in the context of Chinese 
society, Chinese mass media have created their own pattern of 
transition that has no parallel in other communist states, least 
of all the Gorbachev-style ones. 
The main characteristic of the Chinese case is that the reform 
of the media institutions and also the growth of the industry 
have together created a two-fold framework which governs the 
post-Mao media development. This dual framework contains and 
constrains the media institutions, policies and strategies, and 
transactions, their performance and structural changes and their 
ways of delivering resources and increasing productivity. The 
outcome is that media transition in post-Mao China is not 
radically revolutionary, but evolutionary. The growth of these 
media institutions incrementally redefines reality, producing its 
own dynamics and conflicts. 
Chinese television, after over a decade of substantial reform and 
rapid expansion since 1978, has achieved remarkable results and 
brought profound changes in many of its essentials. The Chinese 
communist leadership has retained monopoly power over the 
television medium, but it no longer monopolizes television 
activities or exercises effective control over the pace and 
283 
direction of television development. 
The reform movement which brought the new forces of commercial 
involvement, market mechanism, structural de-centralization and 
pluralistic culture into Chinese television, has led to a 
substantial divergence from the Stalinist model. This evolution, 
therefore, contains an underlying tendency with twofold 
implications. On the one hand, these new forces have undoubtedly 
become the locomotive of the rapid development of Chinese 
television, and considerable progress has been made in the 
practice of freedom of the press; on the other hand, they have 
increasingly intensified the clashes between the new social 
formations and the well-entrenched orthodoxy, and greatly 
exacerbated the crises within the existing system. Thus a 
fundamental institutional change is not only necessary, but also 
inevitable if any further democratic progress is to be made. 
However, as already noted, the question of media freedom and 
institutional reform in the communist regime is essentially a 
matter of political struggles for the survival of the party 
nomenklatura and its whole social system. A long term see-saw 
battle rife with conflict and frustration, with periodical 
advance and retrogress, is the likely near-future scenario. 
The 1989 Beijing tragedy, the most momentous setback yet suffered 
by the Chinese democracy movement in the post-Mao era, has had 
a major adverse impact on the progress of Chinese television 
reform. The leadership of the regime is now fully aware of the 
vital importance of controlling the mass media, especially 
television. The tension is thus running high on the political and 
ideological front. In October 1989, in the wake of the Beijing 
tragedy, the broadcasting minister, Ai Zhisheng demanded tighter 
Party control of broadcasting. Later, the new Party general 
secretary, Jiang Zemin, called for all broadcasters to serve as 
absolutely loyal voices of the Party (People's Daily, 2.3.1990). 
As present, in the aspect of institutional reform of Chinese 
television, the signs are of stagnation, even regression. 
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Meanwhile, as we have discussed throughout the thesis, Deng's 
reform programme -- balancing a contradictory course -- has been 
initiated as a desperate resort to save the party-state system 
and to prevent the advent of democracy. However, a set of 
different social forces combined to open the flood-gates which 
Deng and his party have no longer the ability to control. In the 
words of a Chinese proverb, they have the heart, but have no 
means to do so. As a result, far from preserving the party-state, 
Deng's programme turned out instead to be the midwife of far- 
reaching societal transformation and democratization in China. 
There is thus a fatal dilemma facing the Chinese communist 
authority: its continuation can be ensured only through further 
sweeping reform, but the reform will inevitably bring about 
changes which challenge the continued existence of the system. 
Given this insoluble contradiction, the ruling officials cannot 
and dare not actively resurrect the old model. In the domain of 
television, the growing momentum of reform continues 
irresistibly. In effect, whatever happens after the 1989 
Tianenmen tragedy, the underlying structural reasons for sweeping 
reform of the media system, which have been so evident in the 
last fourteen years, can only become stronger and stronger as 
years go by. From a long-term perspective, the on-going process 
will, one way or another, further undermine the existing media 
institution and lead to another wave of demands for a fundamental 
institutional change. 
The hope for China's future, therefore, must be that the 
transition from the party-state to a more pluralistic and 
democratic society can work through peaceful evolution rather 
than radical revolution. With luck its demise can be largely 
bloodless -- despite what looked like a tragic omen in the events 
surrounding Tianenmen Square. 
END -- 
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